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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Although almost all scholars have recognized that the prologue 
of the Symposium is a literary gem, few have given it the attention that 
it deserves. Despite the wealth of recent scholarship on the 
Symposium, the prologue has not received as much attention as 
other aspects of that dialogue have: the structure of the dialogue, 1 
1 Martin Warner, "Dialectical Drama: The Case of Plato's 
Symposium" in The Language of the Cave, ed. Andrew Barker and 
Martin Warner (Edmonton, Alberta: Academic Printing and 
Publishing, 1992), 157-175; Charles E. Salman, "The Contrivance of 
Eros in Plato's Symposium" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1986); 
Steven Lowenstam, "Paradoxes in Plato's Symposium," (hereafter, 
Lowenstam, "Paradoxes") Ramus 14 (1985): 85-104; John Miller, 
"The Esoteric Unity of Plato's Symposium," Apeiron 12:2 (1978): 19-
25; Henry G. Wolz, "Philosophy as Drama: An Approach to Plato's 
Symposium," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 
(1970): 323-353. 
In addition, four commentaries have recently been published on 
the Symposium: Daniel Anderson, The Masks of Dionysos: A 
Commentary on Plato's "Symposium" (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1993); Robert Lloyd Mitchell, The Hymn to Eros: A 
Reading of Plato's "Symposium" (Lanham, Maryland: University 
Press of America, 1993); R.E. Allen, The Symposium, vol. 2 of The 
Dialogues of Plato (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 
1991 ); Stanley Rosen, Plato's Symposium, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale. 
University Press, 1987). Dover has also written a mainly grammatical 
commentary on the Symposium that elaborates somewhat on the 
philosophy of the dialogue. See K.J. Dover, ed. Plato: Symposium 
(hereafter Dover, Symposium), Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980). 
2 
the speeches of Pausanias,2 Eryximachus,3 Aristophanes,4 
Agathon,5 Socrates,6 and Alcibiades?; the seating arrangement of 
2 Donald K. Gallagher, "In Praise of Pausanias," Kinesis 6 
(1974): 40-55; Robert Nola, "On Some Neglected Speakers in Plato's 
Symposium: Phaedrus and Pausanias," Prudentia 22:1 (1990): 54-
73. 
3oavid Konstan and Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, "Eryximachus' 
Speech in the Symposium," Apeiron 16 {1982): 40-46. 
4Steven Lowenstam, "Aristophanes' Hiccups," Greek, Roman, 
and Byzantine Studies 27 (1986): 43-56. Hereafter Lowenstam, 
"Hiccups." 
5John G. Griffith, "Static Electricity in Agathon's Speech in 
Plato's Symposium," Classical Quarterly 40 (1990): 547-548. 
6Sylvie Gresillon, "L'ironie du discours de Diotime dans le 
Banquet de Platon," Revue des Etudes Grecques 100 (1987): xxi-xxii; 
Walter Benjamin, "Socrates," The Philosophical Forum 15:1-2 (1983-
1984): 52-54; Reinhard Brandt, "Platon, Symposion 199c3-201 c9," 
Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 64 (1982): 19-22. 
7Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and 
Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), 87-233. 
3 
the speakers, 8 immortality, 9 beauty and love, 1 O lexical and textual 
matters.11 
Often when analyzing the Symposium, scholars ignore or 
merely summarize the prologue, even though they would not let any 
other part of the dialogue escape with such little comment.12 Nor--
8Peter H. von Blanckenhagen, "Stage and Actors in Plato's 
Symposium," Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 33: 1 (Spring 
1992): 51-68. 
9M. Dyson, "Immortality and Procreation in Plato's Symposium," 
Antichthon 20 (1986): 59-72. Michael J. O' Brien, "'Becoming 
Immortal' in Plato's Symposium," in Greek Poetry and Philosophy: 
Studies in Honour of Leonard Woodbury, ed. Douglas E. Gerber 
(Chico, California: Scholars Press, 1984), 186-205. 
1 Ocatherine Osborne, Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of 
Love (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). Vigdis Songe-M0ller, 
"Sexualitat und Philosophie in Platons Symposion," Symbolae 
Osloenses 63 (1988): 25-50; David L. Roochnik, "The Erotics of 
Philosophical Discourse," History of Philosophy Quarterly 4, no. 2 
(1987): 117-129; David M. Halperin, "Plato and Erotic Reciprocity," 
(hereafter, Halperin, "Reciprocity") Classical Antiquity 5 (1985): 60-
80; Halperin, "Platonic Eros and What Men Call Love," (hereafter 
Halperin, "Eros") Ancient Philosophy 5 (1985): 161-204; Ludwig C.H. 
Chen, "Knowledge of Beauty in Plato's Symposium," Classical 
Quarterly 33:1 (1983): 66-74; Gerhard Kruger, Eros und Mythos bei 
Plato, Klostermann Texte Philosophie, ed. Richard Schaeffler 
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978). 
11 R. Renehan, "Three Places in Plato's Symposium," Classical 
Philosophy 85 (1990): 120-126. Joseph Cotter, "' E TTaTTo8aveTv 
TETEAEVTTJKOTL: Plato, Symp. 180A," Glotta 62 (1984): 161-165. 
12An extreme example of this phenomenon is Miller, 19-25, 
who ignores the prologue entirely in his discussion of the structure of 
the dialogue. Friedlander does little more than give the historical 
background of the dialogue; Paul Friedlander, Platon, 2d ed. (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1960), 3:1-3. Anderson, Mitchell, and Allen 
4 
with one exception13--have recent in-depth studies of the 
Symposium explicitly connected the prologue to the heart of the 
subject of the dialogue, Eros. Instead most scholars have 
concentrated upon explaining the historical or cultural background of 
the drama of the prologue, occasionally alluding to the implications for 
our understanding of the rest of the dialogue, including Socrates' 
description of Eros.14 Furthermore, David Halperin, the sole scholar 
to treat the prologue primarily as a dramatization of Eros' effect on 
people believes that the prologue refutes Socrates' philosophy of 
Eros.15 Thus, even those scholars who have explored the prologue 
have not fully understood the prologue's relationship to Socrates' 
presentation of Eros. 
In order to give the prologue its due, this dissertation will 
examine how it is organically connected to the dialogue as a whole. In 
particular, this relationship will be shown by examining how the 
prologue dramatizes the philosophies of Eros espoused in the 
dialogue and how, contra Halperin, it vindicates Socrates' speech. In 
summarize the content of the prologue and then explore one or two 
aspects of the prologue in their commentaries: Anderson, 7-19, 
explores the Dionysian allusions in the prologue; Mitchell, 3-17, 
explains primarily the cultural context of the prologue; Allen, 3-12, 
places the Symposium's prologue in the context of the Platonic 
corpus. 
13David M. Halperin, "The Erotics of Narrativity" (hereafter, 
Halperin, "Narrativity"), in Innovations in Antiquity, ed. Ralph Hexter 
and Daniel Selden (New York: Routledge, 1992), 95-126. 
14See, for example, Rosen, 1-38; Allen, 3-12; Mitchell, 3-17. 
15David M. Halperin, "Narrativity," 95-126. 
5 
the dissertation I will argue that the dramatic action of the prologue is 
not an unnecessary literary adornment, but drama in the service of 
philosophy, for Plato uses the drama of the prologue to put in 
concrete terms the theories of Eros espoused in the dialogue. Thus, 
we will see that a portion of the text that seems to be devoid of 
philosophy is in reality as serious in philosophical purpose as the 
arguments in the body of the dialogue. 
In making this claim, I will be arguing primarily against two 
interpretations of the Symposium. The first is that of the analytical 
philosophers, who claim that the prologue is not an essential element 
in the dialogue, but can be overlooked in deriving Plato's view of Eros. 
The second interpretation is that of most dramatic critics, who take 
the drama of the prologue seriously, yet do not always connect its 
action to the philosophies of Eros expounded in the dialogue. When 
the dramatic critics do interpret the prologue in terms of Eros, it is as 
often as not critical of Socrates' view. Their reticence to equate the 
arguments of Plato's Socrates with the views of Plato is usually well 
justified, but, as we will see later, in the case of this dialogue Socrates' 
views on Eros do in fact reflect Plato's own approach to philosophy. 
The Analytical Philosophers and the Prologue 
In the discussion that follows the term "analytical philosophy" 
will be used in a broader sense than is used in contemporary 
philosophy. The term will be applied to all individuals who scrutinize 
the logic and language of isolated statements from Plato's dialogues 
and largely ignore those elements in the dialogue that cannot easily 
6 
be analyzed in such fashion, even if they would not claim to be 
adherents of that modern philosophy. Thus, such a designation will 
include such diverse scholars as G.M.A. Grube, Karl Popper, Paul 
Shorey, and A.E. Taylor. This term will even include a few scholars 
such as Francis Cornford who acknowledge in theory the importance 
of dramatic elements but in practice ignore them.16 
Against these analytical philosophers we must maintain that the 
prologue is an essential element of the dialogue as it now stands--
philosophically as well as dramatically. That the prologue fulfills a 
literary requirement is fairly well accepted even by those scholars who 
disregard the prologue's philosophical significance, but that the 
prologue dramatizes Plato's philosophy of Eros is by no means 
universally accepted.17 Yet there is a good reason for approaching 
the prologue as a dramatization of Plato's view of Eros: Plato himself 
16G.M.A. Grube, Plato's Thought (London: Methuen Publishing 
Company, 1935; reprint, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1980); Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 1, The 
Spell of Plato, 5th ed. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966); 
Paul Shorey, The Unity of Plato's Thought (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1903; reprint, 1960); A.E. Taylor, Plato: The Man 
and His Work, 7th ed. (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1960); Francis 
MacDonald Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (New York: The Humanities 
Press, n.d.; reprint, Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 
1975.); Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (New York: The 
Humanities Press, n.d.; reprint, Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Inc., 1957). 
17For a summary of current scholarship on the Symposium, 
see the discussion on pages 1-4. As will be shown, almost all scholars 
believe that Plato's dialogues are literary masterpieces, but many 
scholars deny that there is any philosophical significance to the 
ostensibly non-philosophical portions of the dialogues. 
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hints that the prologue can--and ought to--be read in this way. 
Throughout the dialogue the guests of the symposium 18 state that 
Eros is a force that governs nearly all human behavior. Eros is not 
mere gratification of carnal desires between an epaaTfis and 
epwµevos, but is the cause of all the good in society. Agathon credits 
Eros with the power to create peace (195c1-6), 19 Phaedrus and 
Pausanias state that civic virtue comes through Eros (178d1-179b1; 
182b6-c6), and Eryximachus says that Eros is a cosmic principle 
(186a3-b1 ), at work not only in bodies, but also in the sciences 
(186a7-187a1), music (187a1-d4), divination (188b6-d3), and the 
governance of the whole world (188a 1-b6). Socrates goes even 
further: For him, all men are by nature epaaTai--men under the 
influence of Eros.20 All men love or desire because they value 
1 BSymposium, when italicized and capitalized, refers to the 
dialogue written by Plato; symposium, when not capitalized, refers to 
the fictional banquet described in Plato's dialogue, the Symposium. 
19Unless otherwise noted, the line numbers of all ancient texts 
will refer to those of the Oxford Classical Text. 
202osa5-d9. The word Epc.us has traditionally been translated 
"love", although "desire" is a better translation, since Eros is not 
limited to romantic love. As Socrates argues in the Symposium, epc.us 
is the recognition of a lack of something and the concomitant desire to 
fill that lack (199d1-201 c5). 
In this dissertation, Epc.us will generally be transliterated rather 
than translated to prevent the reader from adopting a too narrow 
definition of Eros. At the same time, however, I have generally 
preferred tO translate rather than transliterate Epav, epaCTTTJS', and 
epwµevos for the sake of fluent reading. I have translated these three 
words as "love" or "desire," "lover," and "beloved," respectively. On 
those occasions when I have translated epav as "love", it is because 
8 
Beauty and its kin, the Good {204c8-e7), and long for immortality 
(206ce8-207e4). To be sure, not all men are epaaTai in the same 
way--some desire bodies; others, ideas--but all are epaaTaL Thus, 
throughout the dialogue and especially in the climax of the speeches 
on Eros, Plato portrays all important human activities as driven by 
Eros. 
At the same time, Plato criticizes actions ostensibly carried out 
in the name of Eros. Pausanias, for example, concedes that base 
men do love, but their love is inspired by Vulgar Eros, not the 
Heavenly one (181a7-c2). Similarly, Eryximachus sees two types of 
Eros operative in the world, one which creates harmony and the other 
which upsets the balance (186a2-b2, b5-d5). This point is driven 
home by Socrates, who says that Eros urges all men to procreate, but 
some beget ideas, while others, being less noble, beget children 
(208e1-209a5). In his description of the Ascent to Beauty (210a1-
211d1), Socrates elaborates this distinction. He gives several objects 
of desire--bodies, souls, fields of learning, ideas, and Absolute 
Beauty. In all the dialogue's speeches--and particularly in that of 
Socrates--Plato suggests that a person may be influenced by Eros, 
but may not be loving the right object or loving in the correct way. 
Thus, it is appropriate not only to see that Eros governs the actions of 
men, but also to evaluate the type of Eros present in those men. 
Plato is using it in a more narrow definition at that time. Thus, in the 
next paragraph, I have Pausanias speaking about "love", not "desire", 
since he views Eros primarily as sexual desire. 
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Since men can be evaluated in terms of Eros, this dissertation 
will examine the philosophies of Eros implicit in the action and 
characters of the prologue and will also evaluate these philosophies 
in light of the arguments made in the speeches of the dialogue. This 
dissertation will also show how Plato uses literary methods (e.g., 
narration, foreshadowing, verbal echoes) not to be an end in 
themselves, but to connect the actions of the prologue's characters 
with the philosophies of Eros expounded in the dialogue. In so doing, 
this dissertation will show that the prologue is meant by Plato to be not 
merely a charming literary device, but also a serious philosophical 
statement. 
Of course, the analytical philosophers would not agree that the 
prologue is serious philosophy and we must examine, therefore, why 
they make short shrift of the prologue. Their attitude to the prologue 
is derived from their understanding of "dramatic" details in Plato's 
dialogues: For them, the drama of the dialogues is unimportant for 
understanding Plato's philosophy. Thus, they leave dramatic 
considerations (i.e., those parts of the text that cannot be reduced to 
logical propositions) to the philologists and concern themselves with 
various propositions stated by Plato. The tendency of analytical 
philosophers to examine a dialogue as if reading a treatise is seen in 
how Cornford names his commentaries. He turns Plato's Timaeus 
and Theaetetus into treatises: Plato's Cosmology and Plato's Theory 
of Knowledge, respectively.21 
10 
What lies behind this popular method of examining Plato's 
dialogues? There are two driving forces behind it, one philosophical 
and the other historical. Because analytical philosophy dominates the 
English speaking world,22 it is not surprising that scholars often 
employ its techniques to study Plato. Scholars who have been trained 
in the methods of analytical philosophy know how to examine the 
language and argument of a text, but are not necessarily prepared to 
evaluate the import of dramatic elements. Analytical philosophers, 
21 Also representative of this approach is Karl Popper who, 
ignoring dramatic elements in the Republic that hint at the irony in 
Socrates' statements, portrays Plato as a proto-fascist. No better is 
R.B. Levinson's In Defense of Plato (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1953), which replies to Popper without 
stating the dramatic context of Plato's seemingly fascist ideas. For 
better replies to Popper see Diskin Clay, "Reading the Republic," in 
Platonic Writings/Platonic Readings (hereafter Platonic Writings) 
(New York: Routledge, Chapman, & Hall, Inc., 1988), 19-33, and 
Jonathan Ketchum, "The Structure of the Plato Dialogue," Ph.D. diss. 
(State University of New York at Buffalo), 1981. 
Among the analytical philosophers there is disagreement over 
whether Plato had a unified system throughout his career or changed 
his mind over time. Especially debated is whether or not Plato's views 
on the forms, immortality, the soul, and the state changed from the 
early dialogues to the late ones. For the former ("unitarian") position, 
see Shorey. The notion that Plato developed as a philosopher over 
time was unanimously upheld in the nineteenth century and still 
prevails among analytical philosophers today. For an example of this 
view, the "genetic" approach, see Ulrich van Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, 
Platon, 2d ed., (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1920). For a 
survey of the problem and criticism of both approaches, see E.N. 
Tigerstedt, Interpreting Plato (hereafter Tigerstedt, Interpreting 
Plato), Stockholm Studies in History of Literature 17 (Stockholm: 
Almqvist & Wiksell International), 25-62. 
22G.S. Kirk, "Analytical Philosophy," in The Concise 
Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers, ed., J.O. 
Urmson and Jonathan Ree (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 11. 
11 
thus, are understandably less attracted to the prologue, which 
contains more drama and fewer propositions for debate, than they 
are to other portions of the dialogue. 
Analytical philosophers, moreover, are following a long tradition 
in the history of Plato scholarship. Rarely have past scholars given 
the dramatic elements in Plato's dialogues thorough treatment. 
Already in late antiquity, Plato scholars saw their task as merely 
collating the views espoused by the character Socrates in Plato's 
writings; often they selected those statements of Socrates that 
supported their own Neoplatonism or Skepticism.23 In the process 
they ignored dramatic elements. This trend continued in the Middle 
Ages: Medieval interpreters were interested chiefly in Plato's 
metaphysics, not his dialogues. They were interested in his 
metaphysics because they were chiefly concerned with the 
metaphysics of Neoplatonism, which they equated with Platonism. To 
compound the problem, they had little firsthand exposure to Plato's 
writings: Until the early fifteenth century little of Plato besides the 
Timaeus had been translated into Latin and scholars of Western 
Europe were by and large ignorant of Greek.24 Scholars of that era 
23The chief exception is Proclus; see page 21. For a good 
summary of the history of interpretation of Plato before 
Schleiermacher see Tigerstedt, The Decline and Fall of the 
Neoplatonic Interpretation of Plato: An Outline and Some 
Observations (hereafter Tigerstedt, Neoplatonic Interpretation), 
Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum, vol. 52 (Helsinki: Societas 
Scientiarum Fennica, 1974). 
24 Tigerstedt, Neoplatonic Interpretation, 10-18. Only in 1403, 
when the Republic was translated into Latin by Manuel Chrysoloras, 
12 
would obviously not have had a sufficient basis to appreciate Plato's 
dialogue form. 
Even after Western Europe became familiar with Plato's 
dialogues again, there was no clean break with the previous method 
of scholarship. Neoplatonism gradually yielded to new interpretations 
of Plato's thought,25 but scholars did not give serious attention to 
Plato's choice of the dialogue as the vehicle for his philosophy. When 
Jakob Brucker and Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann in the eighteenth 
century proposed new systematizations of Plato, they did not ask why 
Plato chose to present his philosophy in an unsystematized form. 
Both men, though rejecting Neoplatonism's systematization of Plato, 
assumed that they could derive Plato's philosophy by arranging the 
arguments of his dialogues. They assumed that Plato, like any 
philosopher worthy of the name, must have possessed an organized 
set of doctrines and desired to set them forth in an orderly fashion. 
Because the dialogues do not arrange Plato's teaching in an orderly 
way, Brucker and Tennemann took it upon themselves to create that 
order. In the process they completely ignored the dialogue form.26 
The analytical philosophers, then, merely continue the medieval 
pattern of examining isolated arguments drawn from Plato's 
dialogues. But whereas the medieval philosophers had little first-
did post-classical Western Europe have that seminal work of Plato. 
The first translation of all of Plato's works into Latin was completed by 
Marsilio Ficino in 1484. 
25Tigerstedt, Neoplatonic Interpretation 45-46, 63, 69-70. 
26Tigerstedt, Neoplatonic Interpretation, 58-61, 65-68. 
13 
hand knowledge of Plato, the analytical philosophers have less 
excuse for ignoring the dialogue form of Plato's philosophy. By 
refusing to interpret the dialogue as a whole and instead focusing on 
isolated statements, the analytical philosophers are not reading Plato, 
but only select elements from his works. No matter how helpful their 
logical or linguistic analysis of arguments drawn from Plato may be, 
their approach cannot be called a full exposition of Plato since they 
leave much of the dialogues' content out of consideration. 
A similar criticism applies to the esotericists, another modern 
school of Plato studies. The existence of an "esoteric" doctrine27 in 
Plato was first proposed by Tennemann. Although Tennemann 
eschewed secondary sources in reconstructing the esoteric teaching, 
modern esotericists derive Plato's true teaching chiefly from a few 
statements in Plato's late dialogues and from Aristotle's 
Metaphysics.28 They dismiss most of the content of the dialogues as 
dissembling or ironic.29 In so doing they remove from themselves the 
27Tennemann and the TQbingen School (as the modern 
esotericists are often called) hold that Plato had an "exoteric" 
teaching, intended for wide dissemination, and an "esoteric" teaching, 
which was passed down orally only to his closest pupils. 
28Typical of this approach is Konrad Gaiser, Pia tons 
ungeschriebene Lehre (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1968). Most of 
the work in this school centers around ontology. 
29The esotericists' keen perception of irony sometimes allies 
them with the dramatic critics, who are discussed on pages 19-29. 
Some scholars, thus, are able to be in both camps. Rosen, for 
example, argues for an esoteric teaching that can be found _through 
recognition of the irony in Plato's dialogues. See Rosen, xlii-xliii, as 
well as Tigerstedt's criticism of Rosen (Interpreting Plato, 79). 
14 
burden of a detailed exegesis of the dialogues. Not surprisingly, they 
ignore the dramatic elements of the dialogues as well, since they 
discount the dialogues themselves as "exoteric." 
Dismissing the dialogues from serious consideration, however, 
creates several problems. If Plato's dialogues are not meant to be 
taken seriously, why did Plato write some thirty dialogues?30 The 
esotericists' half-response to the question reveals that they operate 
under the same anachronism as the analytical philosophers do: The 
esotericists search for an esoteric doctrine because they believe that 
Plato, if he was a true philosopher, must have had a "system." 
Because the dialogues are notoriously unsystematic, esotericists 
assume that Plato must have imparted his true (i.e., systematized) 
beliefs elsewhere. But the concept that philosophical works must be 
systematic is a thoroughly modern notion.31 
The chief error of both the esotericists and the analytical 
philosophers, then, is the anachronistic view that philosophy must be 
a completely systematic presentation of a philosopher's beliefs. Both 
schools force Plato to follow modern norms of systematic thought and 
logical analysis. They choose what pleases them in his dialogues and 
reject whatever does not conform to modern views of how philosophy 
30Cf. Tigerstedt, Interpreting Plato, 76. 
31 Rosen, Ix; Tigerstedt, Interpreting Plato, 16, 67, 87-88. 
Tigerstedt traces the presupposition to Hegel's influence on Eduard 
Zeller, who influenced Platonic studies in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Tigerstedt is perhaps correct in detecting HegeJ as the 
primary source of this notion, although scholars such as Jakob 
Brucker had attempted to systematize Plato before Hegel. 
15 
ought to be practiced. Such a method is not a study of Plato, but of 
modern reactions to Plato. If a modern scholar is to understand 
Plato's works, he must forego the modern preoccupation with the 
proper format of philosophical treatises. Instead, he must examine 
the works of Plato in a way that respects the manner in which Plato 
expounded his philosophy. 
This is actually the position of those who take a dramatic 
approach to the dialogues. Although scholars who take this approach 
do not agree on how to interpret the dialogues, they at least agree 
that the dramatic elements are as worthy of consideration in deducing 
the philosophy of Plato as the "more philosophical" elements are. 
Furthermore, scholars who take the dramatic approach explain the 
dialogues more fully because they study an entire dialogue, not 
merely some of its passages. This approach fulfills a reasonable 
assumption of exegesis, namely, that a hermeneutical approach that 
accounts for more details is to be preferred to one that explains less, 
even as in other fields of learning, the more complete explanation is 
preferred over the less complete one.32 Therefore, an approach to 
Plato that explains the "dramatic" passages as well as the 
32For this reason the physics of Einstein has been adopted 
because it is able to explain certain phenomena more fully than that of 
Newton. Tigerstedt makes the keen observation that the foremost 
duty of philosophers, like the ancient astronomers, is "to save the 
phenomena" {Tigerstedt, Interpreting Plato, 21 ). By this phrase he 
argues against those scholars who attempt to solve the difficulty of 
interpreting Plato by excising the difficult passages from 
consideration. 
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"philosophical" ones is to be preferred to one that explicates only the 
philosophical passages. David Roochnik argues this point well: 
The nod must be given to that interpretation that incorporates 
more of the text as it is written into its account. The 
interpretation that recognizes the law of logographic necessity 
and is not predisposed to dismiss large segments of the text 
because they appear philosophically implausible will read the 
dialogues more openly and comprehensively than the one that 
does not. It will include detailed examinations of characters, 
settings, digressions and myths.33 
The dramatic approach to Plato also recognizes the importance 
of the context of Plato's philosophical statements. His statements are 
not isolated propositions, which can be studied in the abstract, as 
modern logical-positivism avers. 34 His statements are instead part of 
33David L. Roochnik, "Terence Irwin's Reading of Plato," 
Platonic Writings, 189. Cf. Robert Lloyd Mitchell, The Hymn to Eros: A 
Reading of Plato's Symposium (Lanham, Maryland: University Press 
of America, 1993), xiii. 
34Certainly Plato offers a number of propositions, which may be 
isolated and examined by themselves quite profitably. Cf. 
Whitehead's famous remark: "The safest general characterization of 
the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of 
footnotes to Plato ... I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought 
which scholars have doubtfully extracted from his writings. I allude to 
the wealth of general ideas scattered through them."--Alfred North 
Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, corrected 
ed., ed. D.R. Griffin and D.W. Sherburne (New York: Free Press, 
1978), 39, as quoted by Charles Griswold, "Introduction," Platonic 
Writings, 1. The real task for Plato scholars, however, is not to 
discover all the ways in which Plato anticipates the positions taken in 
the history of philosophy, but to explain how Plato uses an idea in a 
particular dialogue and how in drama and words he comments on that 
idea. -
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a dramatic context; if this dramatic context is recognized, often 
apparent contradictions in his philosophy will be resolved. Plato 
emphasizes the dramatic context in which a philosophical statement 
is given because he recognizes that language is ambiguous. Often a 
statement that is made in one context in a particular dialogue will be 
rejected in another dialogue--or even later in the same dialogue--
because the statement is being used in a different sense. 35 Hence 
the dramatic elements in a dialogue are crucial for understanding 
Plato's thought and for comparing one dialogue's arguments with 
those in a similar dialogue.36 
The dramatic approach to Plato also gives proper attention to 
the medium in which Plato chose to communicate his philosophy. 
Plato chose the dialogue form, even though he could have written 
prose treatises, as some of his predecessors had done.37 Any sound 
35As Rosemary Desjardins notes, Plato argues against many of 
his "doctrines," such as "virtue is knowledge" (in the Meno) and 
"knowledge is 86~a combined with :\6yos" (in the Theaetetus) not 
because he was a skeptic, but because he knew that a statement 
could be interpreted in different ways. Plato never merely gives a 
proposition, but shows how the statement can be understood to be 
true and in what contexts it is false. Rosemary Desjardins, "Why 
Dialogues? Plato's Serious Play," Platonic Writings, 115-118. 
36George Plochmann, "Interpreting Plato's Symposium," The 
Modern Schoolman 48 (1970), 32-33, rightly urges steering a middle 
course between "seeking an expoundable Platonic doctrine" and 
"doing away with all traces of doctrine by conceiving the dialogues 
simply as literary ... exercises." It might well be added that the opposite 
of systematized thought need not be incoherent babbling. Plato 
makes distinctions all the time, even if he refuses to gather all his 
ideas into one systematic treatise. 
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interpretation of Plato, therefore, must explain why Plato used the 
dialogue form. Analytical philosophy cannot offer an explanation 
because it focuses on isolated statements of Plato, not on the way the 
statements are presented. The esoteric approach simply ignores the 
question. The dramatic approach, however, explains Plato's choice 
of medium: Plato's early and middle dialogues ape Socratic elenchus 
and are an application of Plato's epistemology of µaiEvms: A teacher, 
Socrates holds,38 cannot teach pupils by lecturing--as the treatise 
format would suggest--but must help the students acquire knowledge 
37Rosemary Desjardins is correct in stating that much of 
philosophy before Plato had been written in poetry, often of a rather 
enigmatic nature; Desjardins, 113. But there were other forms of 
writing available to Plato. The historians had pioneered the field of 
prose and the orators were writing speeches that were disseminated 
as pamphlets. Several philosophical treatises had already been 
written: Anaxagoras' On Nature, Zeno's On Nature, Democritus' 
Ethics and Physics, to name a few. If Gilbert Ryle is correct, the 
panegyrics of the orators may have originally been delivered at the 
same time the dialogues of Plato were recited; Gilbert Ryle, Plato's 
Progress (Cambridge: University Press, 1966), 21-44. There would 
have been nothing unusual, therefore, if Plato had written prose 
treatises or pamphlets as the orators did. Plato, nonetheless, chose a 
more dramatic form of presentation. 
Eric Havelock, Preface to Plato (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1963), 202-210, offers another explanation 
for the dialogue form. Plato is the key figure in the transition of Greek 
education. The earlier mode of education emphasized poetry and 
mimesis. Plato made use of the technology of writing, which enabled 
him to submit statements made by poets and other experts to 
questioning (elenchus). Hence Plato, especially in the Republic, 
rejected poetry as a means of education. Havelock's interpretation of 
Plato explains much, but not everything, about the dialogue form. In 
most of his dialogues Plato includes a fair amount of "dramatic" 
material that is not always immediately relevant to the dialectic of the 
dialogue. 
38Theaetetus 149a-151d; cf. Phaedrus 275d-277a. 
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for themselves by asking them questions on a particular matter. Only 
when students are forced to answer questions and to have their 
cherished notions refuted, can they learn. Through the dialogue form 
Plato puts this theory into practice. He challenges his readers to 
confess their ignorance on certain matters and to attempt to argue 
better than Socrates' interlocutors do in the dialogues. Thus, the 
dramatic approach to the dialogues reveals that the form of Plato's 
dialogues reflects his philosophy and method. Form and content in 
Plato are inextricably connected. Since the philosophical and the 
dramatic are so closely connected in Plato, there are only two serious, 
consistent options: one can either reject the philosophical 
significance of the dialogues (the modern esoteric approach) or 
explicate both the dramatic and philosophical elements in the 
dialogues (the dramatic approach). One cannot choose some 
elements in the dialogues and ignore others, as the analytical 
philosophers do. The choice, then, is between the esoteric and 
dramatic approaches. Of these two the former is ultimately 
unsatisfactory because it requires a scholar to dismiss as trivial 
hundreds of Stephanus pages of often carefully crafted prose. Only 
an approach that explains both the dramatic and the philosophical in 
the dialogues--as well as the relationship between the two--gives the 
dialogues the full attention they deserve. 
The Dramatic Approach and the Prologue 
Merely saying that the dramatic elements deserve 
consideration does not, however, answer all the questions. Not all 
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scholars who take a dramatic approach to Plato agree on the 
significance of a particular dramatic element or even on the method a 
scholar ought to use to determine what the dramatic elements signify. 
This disagreement among dramatic critics of Plato is not surprising; 
after all, not all analytic philosophers agree among themselves on 
matters of interpretation. But this disagreement does raise an 
important issue: It is one thing to say that dramatic elements are 
philosophically significant and quite another matter to state the . 
significance. 
It is not the purpose here to establish a hermeneutic that will 
interpret all the dramatic elements in Plato's works. Indeed, Plato 
may not have intended for the dramatic elements to have the same 
significance in all the dialogues. But it is not necessary for us to have 
such a hermeneutic in order to interpret the dramatic elements in the 
prologue of the Symposium. As we have already seen,39 Plato gives 
a clue how to interpret the action and characters of the prologue: they 
are manifestations of Eros. The events, words, and characters of the 
prologue depict Eros at work in the lives of philosophers (e.g., 
Apollodorus and Aristodemus) and ordinary people (e.g., Glaucon 
and the unnamed friends of Apollodorus). The drama of the prologue 
also offers an opportunity to test the theories of Eros proposed by the 
guests at the symposium: The theories succeed or fail to the degree 
that they explain the behavior of the characters in the prologue. 
39See pages 6-9. 
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This method of using the drama of the Symposium to learn and 
evaluate its philosophy ought to be distinguished from neo-Platonic or 
medieval allegorical interpretation. Although there is nothing wrong 
per se in investing the characters with philosophical significance or 
evaluating their actions in philosophical terms, it is wrong to import 
arbitrarily a philosophy derived from a reading of other dialogues (or 
even later philosophers) to explain the characters in a dialogue. 
These objectionable methods are best seen in Proclus, a 
Neoplatonist who lived nearly a millennium after Plato. He argues in 
his commentary on the Parmenides that Parmenides, Zeno, and 
Socrates portray Being, '=-ife, and Intellect, respectively. When 
Cephalus arrives in Athens from Ionia (the home of natural science) 
to hear Socrates' conversation with the Eleatics (the home of the 
study of the intelligible world), this action represents the soul leaving 
nature or the body in order to ascend to Intellect or Being.40 Of 
course, the trichotomy of Being, Life, and Intellect is that of 
Neoplatonism; it is certainly not a distinction elaborated in the 
Parmenides. 
In contrast to Proclus and other allegorists, we will approach the 
Symposium in terms that the dialogue itself suggests. The difference 
between Proclus' allegory and our approach can be seen in Corinne 
Sze's and Hayden Ausland's treatment of the Republic. Sze and 
Ausland rightly look to the philosophical content of the dialogue, 
40Proclus, Commentary on Plato's Parmenides, tr. Glenn R. 
Morrow and John M. Dillon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1987), 27, 48-49 [628, 660-661]. 
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searching for the main points made by the dialogue, and then 
examine the drama in those terms. By so doing they avoid importing 
a foreign philosophy. Sze argues that the process of education, 
especially as outlined in the cave analogy in book seven of the 
Republic, is the central theme of the dialogue and that the first book of 
the dialogue dramatizes this analogy. Socrates descends from the 
realm of light (Athens) into the cave (the Piraeus, which is physically 
lower than Athens), just as all philosophers must deal with the 
unenlightened. There he encounters Cephalus, who because of his 
old age is as restricted in movement as the people chained in the 
cave. Cephalus shows himself to be a true troglodyte, a man of 
conventional wisdom. He remains unconvinced by Socrates and 
soon drops out of the conversation. His place is taken by 
Thrasymachus, a sophist who rejects Cephalus' traditional wisdom 
and Polemarchus' reliance on poetry. Thrasymachus is 
representative of those men in the cave analogy who have broken 
loose from their seats in the cave and can see that the shadows on 
the wall are not substantial, but have not yet ascended to the sunlight. 
Both Socrates and Thrasymachus reject traditional wisdom--the 
wisdom of those chained to their seats in the cave analogy--but 
Thrasymachus assumes that he is truly wise because he has seen 
the folly of his peers. Socrates, however, must point out that there is a 
much higher plane of knowledge, of which sophists like 
Thrasymachus know nothing. 41 Like Sze, Ausland sees the prologue 
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as a dramatization of the cave analogy, but also demonstrates that 
the prologue portrays the analogies of the sun and divided line, as 
well.42 Thus, Sze and Ausland have not arbitrarily chosen the 
meaning of the dramatic elements, but have allowed the chief 
philosophical themes and passages in the dialogue to govern their 
interpretation. 
It is this concern for looking at the main topic of the dialogue that 
separates Sze, Ausland, and the approach taken in this dissertation 
from the allegorists. This is not to say that there are no difficulties in 
determining what the emphasis of a dialogue is. But as Ausland 
notes, interpreting the dialogue dramatically is no more fraught with 
dangers than interpreting it analytically or linguistically. Scholars have 
stretched Plato's arguments to conform to their notions of his 
"'predicational logic', or his 'theory of ideas' or his 'political idealism'." 
Ausland adds, "[T]he truth is that the dramatic portions of Plato's 
dialogues are intrinsically no more susceptible of ill-founded, 
subjective or tendentious interpretations than are their hardest 
stretches of dialectical argument."43 In reality, with the Symposium 
we are on more solid ground than with most dialogues, for although 
there is a real debate as to what the heart of the Republic is, there can 
41 Corinne Sze, "Plato's Republic I: Its Function in the Dialogue 
as a Whole" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1971 ), especially 93-244. 
42Hayden Weir Ausland, "On the Dialogue-Proem to Plato's 
Republic' (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1987). 
43Ausland, 46. 
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be no doubt that the Symposium is chiefly about Eros.44 Thus, there 
is not as much room for disagreement on what philosophical concern 
ought to govern the interpretation of the drama in the Symposium. 
The dramatic approach also differs from the allegorical in 
understanding the dramatic elements not only as a dramatization of 
the philosophy in the dialogue, but also as the setting in which Plato 
can discuss certain questions. Plato does not formulate arguments 
entirely in the abstract and then surround them with dramatic events 
that act out the philosophical arguments. 45 The arguments of Plato's 
dialogues are dependent upon their characters and events. One 
would not expect Socrates to discuss courage with effeminate Ionian 
sophists, but with Laches and Nicias, two premier generals. Nor is it 
surprising that Plato debates with the teacher Protagoras whether 
virtue can be taught or that Eros is the topic at a party. The dramatic 
details not only serve as commentary on the philosophical portion of 
44James A. Arieti, Interpreting Plato: The Dialogues as Drama 
(Savage, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1991 }, 107, 
states that the dialogue is really about men creating a god in their own 
image, not about Eros. Arieti is correct in recognizing the influences 
of each character's personality in depicting Eros, but the dialogue is 
nonetheless about the longings and wants (Eros) of each person, 
even as he does create Eros in his own image. 
45See the discussion on pages 41-42 for a model of how the 
prologue was written in connection with the rest of the dialogue. In 
short we will see there that, while Plato most likely had a particular 
setting in mind throughout, the final edition of the prologue was not 
complete until the dialogue had either been written or all its details 
planned. 
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the dialogue (as the allegorists rightly aver), but often determine the 
matter of discussion and the direction of the arguments. 
Yet it is not only allegorists who abuse the dramatic approach. 
Some scholars, most notably Stanley Rosen, view the dramatic 
elements as a vehicle to appreciate Plato's sense of irony.46 Rosen, 
in particular, emphasizes the irony to be found in the dialogue 
because he believes that by irony the careful reader is led to discover 
Plato's esoteric teaching. Unlike most esotericists, Rosen rejects an 
esoteric teaching outside the dialogues; instead he believes that the 
esoteric teaching exists within the dialogues. Careless readers 
overlook the esoteric teaching, because they do not ponder the 
dramatic context of the philosophical arguments, but a careful reader 
understands Plato's esoteric teaching, as he sees how the drama of 
the dialogue undermines the philosophical arguments. For Rosen 
irony is the key to solving the dilemma of the Phaedrus' and the 
Seventh Letter's rejection of written philosophy: Plato never writes in 
such a way that the masses can grasp his esoteric teachings, but a 
reader keen on Plato's irony can understand Plato's secret message. 
Thus, Plato in one sense did not write down his philosophy (as the 
Seventh Letter states) and yet in another sense he did, using the veil 
of irony to keep his philosophy from the masses.47 In pursuit of this 
46David Halperin has a somewhat similar approach, although 
argued on different theoretical grounds. The differences between the 
two are so significant that, although they can both be counted among 
the pan-ironists, I will treat Halperin separately on pages 28-29. 
47Rosen, xiv, liv-lvii. 
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irony, Rosen subjects every last event, character, and detail of the 
Symposium to close scrutiny, detecting philosophical presuppositions 
behind the seemingly non-philosophical and observing any 
contradictions between the philosophy espoused by the characters 
and the philosophy implied by their actions.48 
Rosen's approach, however, is not without its problems. 
Although there is much irony in Plato's writings and a keen reader of 
Plato will discern as much, Rosen overstates his case. Merely 
because Plato employs irony from time to time does not mean his 
whole corpus is ironic or that there is an esoteric teaching lurking in 
his dialogues beneath the cover of irony.49 If Plato's secret teachings 
were shielded only by irony, Plato could not have counted on their 
remaining hidden from sharp opponents. For if Rosen twenty-five 
centuries later can detect the irony and the esoteric teachings, 
certainly Plato's opponents would have detected them, too.SO 
Furthermore, the dramatic elements are not fully explained 
when they are merely assumed to be clues for the detection of irony; 
48Rosen, xv. 
49Cf. Tigerstedt's comments on Rosen, Interpreting Plato, 78-
79. Alan Bowen criticizes Rosen and his teacher Leo Strauss as "a 
new species of esotericist to be distinguished from those depreciate 
the dialogues and rely on the oral tradition"; see Bowen, "On 
Interpreting Plato," Platonic Writings, 276 fn. 13. 
50Rosen, Iv, quotes Friedlander approvingly to the effect that 
our knowledge of irony has declined over the last century. But 
Friedlander's observation is a two-edged sword: Not only would 
Plato's friends have been more adept at detecting Plato's irony, but 
his enemies would have been also. 
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the dramatic details of Plato's dialogues surely do not exist solely to 
add irony to the words spoken by its characters. S 1 This point 
becomes clear, if we examine the role of dramatic elements in Greek 
tragedy. Sometimes dramatic elements add irony to statements 
made in a tragedy,S2 but dramatic elements perform other functions, 
too. They may allow the audience to understand better the plot of the 
playS3 or the motives of some of the characters, S4 or may add a 
realistic touch to the play, thereby evoking more sympathy from the 
audience.SS They may even undergird emotionally or dramatically a 
point made intellectually by a character.S6 Often they work 
unobtrusively; the audience is affected on an emotional level, not on 
S1 Cf. Tigerstedt, Interpreting Plato, 9S-96. 
S2cf. Oedipus' vow to avenge the death of Laius as if he were 
his own father (Soph., 0. T. 264). Oedipus' speech in lines 216-27S is 
full of dramatic irony because he does not know who he really is; 
therefore, examples will be drawn from this play to demonstrate how 
dramatic details can have other uses besides irony. 
S3cf. the role of the chorus of suppliants who open Sophocles' 
0. T. (lines 1-S7). Oedipus does not need to be informed that a plague 
has befallen Thebes, but the audience does. 
S4 The motive for Oedipus' diligence in searching for Laius' 
murderer is explained in an aside spoken by Oedipus (0. T. 137-140). 
He proves that self-interest, not mere altruism, motivates his action: 
the murderer of Laius might one day kill Oedipus. 
SSAristotle (Poetics 14S3b) was undoubtedly correct when he 
argued that a tragedy evokes an emotional response from the 
audience. The members of the audience identify with the protagonist 
and pity his misfortunes and fear lest something similar befall t_hem. 
S6Cf. the garb and posture of the suppliants in 0. T. 1-S. 
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an intellectual plane.57 Thus, good dramatic critics examine the 
characters, order of events in the plot, structure of a work, metaphors, 
etc., and then note how each element contributes to the work as a 
whole. In particular, dramatic critics place the dramatic action in its 
historical context and explain how it influences the philosophical 
content of the dialogue and vice versa. Rosen, fortunately, 
recognizes this truth, if not in theory, at least in practice; he has a 
greater dramatic sense in his exposition of the Symposium than his 
principles of exegesis might suggest. 
A similar criticism applies to Halperin's discussion of the 
prologue. Although Halperin would deny that he has adopted a pan-
ironical interpretation, since he believes that Plato is as serious in 
presenting his beliefs as he is in refuting them by dramatic means, he 
claims that in the Symposium Plato "systematically goes about 
undermining and subverting the very theories that his philosophical 
personae propound and that many elements of the Dialogue 
systematically combine to promote."58 Halperin adds that the 
dialogue cannot be interpreted wholly as literature or philosophy or 
some combination of the two: the dialogue appears to be both a 
literary game and a serious work of philosophy--and yet one cannot 
approach it in such contradictory ways at the same time. The net 
57Hence Plato's criticism of poetry in the Republic 10.598b-
608b, especially 601 b, 603c-607a. There poetry is criticized for its 
lack of real knowledge and its playing on the emotions of man. 
58Halperin, "Narrativity," 114. 
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result is a nihilistic interpretation, not far removed from a pan-ironic 
interpretation: "[T]here's no success like failure, and failure's no 
success at all."59 
Halperin, however, misinterprets Socrates' speech by making 
Socrates' Ascent to Beauty easier than Socrates intends. Since 
Halperin ascribes a much more positive doctrine of Eros to Socrates 
than what Socrates gives, Halperin is disappointed when the 
characters of the prologue fail. Halperin only focuses on those 
statements of Socrates where Eros begets amidst Beauty; Halperin 
ignores the statements of Socrates to the effect that Eros is always 
poor, strives for the Good, but rarely obtains it and loses it as he does. 
Since Eros is fraught with failure, it is not surprising to see such erotic 
figures as Apollodorus and Aristodemus fail in their narration of the 
dialogue and their imitation of Socrates. Halperin is wrong to 
conclude that the prologue shows the failure of Plato's "official" 
doctrine of Eros.60 The prologue confirms, not refutes, Plato's theory 
of Eros. 
While Rosen and Halperin employ dramatic criticism to detect 
Plato's irony, James Arieti employs it to disparage a close reading of 
the dialogues for their philosophical content. Arieti, unlike Rosen, 
focuses on the broad sweep of the drama. Arieti rejects a close 
reading of the text, as practiced both by the analytical philosophers 
and by dramatic critics of Plato, because it pays too much attention to 
59Halperin, "Narrativity," 122. 
60Halperin, "Narrativity," 101-102, 104. 
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the details and loses the big picture. Arieti believes that the dialogues 
were not meant as serious philosophy, but as recruitment speeches 
for prospective students at the Academy. When these dialogues were 
presented in a public reading, the audience would have been unable 
to remember every last detail; thus, the broad sweep of the dialogue, 
not the trivia, must be studied.61 Plato uses dramatic elements only 
to keep the audience's attention; each element is insignificant in itself, 
unless combined with others to form a major theme. 
Arieti correctly warns against overinterpretation,62 but 
underestimates the importance of specific dramatic elements. 
Audiences are able to remember and appreciate small details in a 
dramatic performance. As the large number of lines from tragedy 
quoted in other works indicates, the more alert members of an 
audience can remember small details from a work even years later. 63 
61Arieti, 3-5, 7-9, 250. In this way Arieti takes a stance similar to 
the esotericists, who view the dialogues as protreptic to further, 
formal study in the Academy. See Konrad Gaiser, Protreptik und 
Paranese bei Platon: Untersuchungen zur Form des Platonischen 
Dialogs, Tubingen Beitrage zur Altertumswissenschaft 40 (Stuttgart: 
W. KohlhammerVerlag, 1959), 17-21. 
62Plochmann, 35, is correct in criticizing Rosen for treating 
every detail of the Symposium with such seriousness that he "drain[s] 
it of humor, drama, personality, vitality," a trap into which Arieti rarely 
falls. Rosen sometimes borders on allegory. For example, he 
interprets the transmission of the dialogue through Phoenix to 
Glaucon as symbolic of the "rebirth of the Socratic circle through the 
instrumentality of the publication of the dialogue," even as the 
phoenix reproduces asexually. Rosen, 15, n. 39. Rosen himself, lxiv, 
admits that his analysis might seem on occasion to be "too talmudic." 
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Although some lines (and some plays) are more memorable than 
others and no audience can memorize every last word uttered in a 
play, the details of drama and dialogues are not bereft of significance. 
Keen members of an audience, as certainly existed in ancient Athens, 
would be able to follow most of the relevant details of a work quite 
well. An author, furthermore, must craft his work, because he does 
not know for certain which details will stick with an audience and which 
will not. In any case, since composing a work requires greater time, 
energy and personal involvement from the author than reading 
requires from the reader, every author imbues a creation with more 
nuanced meaning than can be fully comprehended in a single 
reading. Arieti's minimalism is unwarranted. 
Arieti, as well as Rosen and Halperin, demonstrates the 
tendency to nihilism that is sometimes--and wrongly--associated with 
the dramatic approach. This nihilism arises when the dramatic 
elements are seen as trivial or as only undermining, rather than 
dramatizing, supplementing, and altering, the philosophy of the 
dialogue. But such a nihilism is unwarranted. Even if Plato sometimes 
uses the dramatic elements to express irony, it does not follow that 
there is nothing but irony in the text.64 Nor do the dramatic qualities 
63For example, Aristophanes' Frogs is full of citations from the 
plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles; e.g., Frogs 1138, 1156, 1172, 
1182, 1187, 1206-1208, 1217-1219, 1225-1226, 1232-1233, 1240-
1241. 
64As Tigerstedt, Interpreting Plato, 96, rightly notes, "By 
becoming absolute Irony destroys itself. It can exist only as the 
opposite to Seriousness. And there are some matters about which 
Socrates-Plato is deadly serious. The 'pan-ironical' interpretations 
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of Plato's dialogues mean that he was less than serious in writing 
them to convey his philosophy. Dramatic interpretation of the 
dialogues should not be associated with nihilism or 
deconstruction ism. 
The dramatic approach, in fact, has usually offered a rather 
positive way of interpreting Plato. Friedrich Schleiermacher 
pioneered this approach by suggesting that a scholar needed to 
appreciate the dialogue form if he wanted to understand Plato. 
Schleiermacher rejected an esoteric reading of Plato and the attempt 
to reconstruct Plato's thought from secondary testimony like 
Aristotle's. 65 He decried the practice of analyzing only the 
philosophical statements of the chief characters in Plato's dialogues 
(Socrates in most dialogues; the Eleatic stranger in the Sophist and 
Statesman); instead Schleiermacher argued that Plato's dramatic 
form helped one to understand his philosophy. Plato, a "Philosophical 
Artist," rejected "the ordinary forms of philosophical 
communication."66 His dialogue format caused utter confusion 
entirely overlooks the religious basis of the Platonic Irony and its 
inseparable companion, the Socratic Ignorance. Human life in 
general and philosophy in particular are, indeed, but a play. But this 
play is God's own play, which we must play in all seriousness." 
65Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher, Schleiermacher's 
Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato, tr. William Dobson (London: 
John William Parker, 1836; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1973), 9-
13 (page references are to reprint edition). See also Tigerstedt, 
Neoplatonic Interpretation, 5-6, 69-70. 
66For a full discussion, see Schleiermacher, 3-40. The 
quotations are taken from pages 4 and 5. 
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among interpreters because the contradictions in them gave the 
impression that Plato was "more of a dialectician than a logical 
Philosopher."67 The solution, Schleiermacher argued, was not to 
adopt skepticism or to view Plato merely as a writer of beautiful prose, 
but rather to recognize the Socratic method of Plato's writing. In order 
to challenge his readers, Plato could not write treatises, which offered 
solutions to readers. Instead he wrote dialogues that did not answer 
the philosophical questions directly, but allowed the readers to 
formulate solutions from the material given them. To understand 
Plato, therefore, a reader ought to read the dialogues in the order in 
which they were written and allow himself to be challenged by the 
dialogues.68 In this way, Schleiermacher argued, a scholar ought to 
combine attention to dramatic elements with concern for Plato's 
philosophy. 
Since Schleiermacher's time, and especially in the last few 
decades, a number of scholars have paid attention to the dialogue 
form and the significance of dramatic details for the arguments in the 
dialogues.69 Although not all such scholars agree with one another 
67 Schleiermacher, 8. 
68Schleiermacher, 10-19. Schleiermacher concludes his 
introduction on pages 19-47 by arranging the dialogues in an 
appropriate order and giving criteria to determine the genuineness 
and order of the dialogues. 
69A number of general introductions to Plato have commented 
on the dramatic elements in Plato's dialogues but have covered too 
much ground to do a detailed analysis of Plato's works. See, for 
example, Arieti; Victorino Tejera, Plato's Dialogues One by One: A 
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on specific interpretations, most would assent to the following 
definition and hermeneutic of dramatic elements: A "dramatic 
element" is anything that is not a proposition for discussion by the 
interlocutors in the dialogue or the debate of the propositions 
themselves. Dramatic elements include not only the description of the 
setting of the dialogue, but also the light-hearted banter or 
pleasantries that may precede the more "serious" philosophical 
conversation, as well as any interruptions of the debate by seemingly 
extraneous circumstances. Also included as a dramatic element is 
any characterization of the interlocutors in the dialogue because a 
philosophical argument may be determined as much by the 
psychology of the participants as by strict logic or desire for the truth. 
In short, the dramatic elements are those details that may not be 
Structural Interpretation (New York: Irvington, 1984); J.H. Randall, Jr., 
Plato: Dramatist of the Life of Reason (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1970). Supplementing these works have been a 
number of articles on isolated aspects of Plato, as well as 
commentaries on individual dialogues. It is impossible to include in a 
footnote all such articles. Platonic Writings, 301-311, has one of the 
most comprehensive bibliographies of articles and books written from 
a dramatic approach. For representative articles offering an overview 
of a dramatic hermeneutic for interpreting Plato, see Drew Hyland, 
"Why Plato Wrote Dialogues," Philosophy and Rhetoric 1 (1968): 38-
50; Arthur Krentz, "Dramatic Form and Philosophical Content in 
Plato's Dialogues," Philosophy and Literature 7 (April 1983): 32-47; 
John Hartland-Swann, "Plato as Poet: A Critical Interpretation," 
Philosophy 26 (1951 ): 3-18. Dorothy Tarrant has shown the 
similarities in style and form between Attic drama and Plato's 
dialogues; see Dorothy Tarrant, "Plato as Dramatist," Journal of 
Hellenic Studies 75 (1955): 82-89. For examples of a dramatic 
approach to an individual dialogue, see Hyland, 44-49, on the Crito; 
Wolz, 323-353, on the Symposium; Warner, 157-175, on the 
Republic. For more extensive commentaries, see, for example, Allen; 
Mitchell; Rosen; and Nussbaum, 87-233. 
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logically necessary for the argument of the dialogue, but may speak 
to the less rational, more emotional side of the reader--a part of 
human nature that needs as much convincing as the more logical 
aspect of humanity and, as the Symposium argues, is a proper 
subject of philosophy. The dramatic approach to Plato, therefore, 
considers how these dramatic elements of the dialogue interplay with 
the more philosophical ones. 
Those who take a dramatic approach to Plato, thus, should be 
interested in the sort of dramatic details that abound in the prologue 
of the Symposium. Nonetheless, as stated earlier, even among them 
the prologue has not received due attention. Dramatic critics have 
tended to explicate how an entire dialogue fits together, drama and 
all, or how Plato weaves dramatic elements into a philosophical 
episode, rather than to look solely at the prologue.70 When they have 
examined the prologue, they have not always shown the connections 
between it and the philosophy of the dialogue. Thus, much work on 
Plato's prologues remains to be done. 
What work has been done in this area does deserve some 
consideration. Sze and Ausland, as has already been noted, attempt 
to link the prologue of the Republic to the rest of the work.71 Both 
70Roger Duncan, for example, puts the main speakers of the 
dialogue in their historical and dramatic context, but ignores the 
prologue completely in his discussion; Roger Duncan, "Plato's 
Symposium: The Cloven Eros," Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 
(1977): 277-291. Miller, 19-25, in his quest for the unity of the 
dialogue ignores the prologue. 
71 See pages 21-23. 
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demonstrate that book one of the Republic is an integral part of the 
dialogue, not an independent work carelessly tacked on to the 
beginning of Republic 2-10, and that the proem is a µ(µf)aLs of the 
philosophical content of the Republic. Jonathan Ketchum, in 
commenting on the structure of Plato's dialogues, has acknowledged 
the importance of the prologue. Ketchum argues that all the 
dialogues of Plato have a three part structure, prefaced by a 
prologue. 72 Even if Ketchum's Procrustean division of each dialogue 
into three parts is not wholly satisfactory, his acknowledgment of the 
prologue as a significant structural element in each dialogue is 
welcome. 
More helpful in his approach is Diskin Clay, who demonstrates 
how the prologues of Plato's Phaedo and Republic not only prefigure 
the major themes of the dialogues, but are closely connected with 
their epilogues. 73 Clay adds that there is more to Plato's careful 
72Ketchum, 2-3, argues that all of Plato's dialogues have the 
same structure: a prologue, followed by a protrepsis (which raises a 
particular philosophical question}, an incursion (an excursus 
discussing the presuppositions that underlie the debate in the 
protrepsis), and an exegesis (a new examination of the debate in the 
protrepsis or the beginning of a new, but related, topic). Ketchum is 
mainly concerned about the last three elements of the dialogue, but 
does at least recognize the significance of the prologue and its kinship 
to prologues in other works, such as those of Hesiod. The purpose of 
his study of the dialogues' structure is to prove that some of the 
dialogues (the Republic, tor example) are incomplete and are not to 
be thought of as Plato's last statement on the topic. For Ketchum's 
analysis of the prologue, see especially 45-49. 
73Diskin Clay, "Plato's First Words" (hereafter, Clay, "Words") 
in Beginnings in Classical Literature, Yale Classical Studies 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 120-129. 
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crafting of prologues than the desire to create an organically unified 
work: Plato sometimes uses the prologue to link his contemporary 
audience with the times of Socrates and to comment on this 
connection. 7 4 Clay is on the right path, but could add a fuller 
exposition on the philosophical significance of the historical eras 
portrayed by the prologues and the prologues' relation to the middle 
portions of the dialogue. 75 
Thus, even though Plato's prologues merit more attention from 
scholars, they have not been entirely ignored. The same can be said 
about the Symposium's prologue. As we have already noted,76 two 
scholars have thoughtfully examined the Symposium's prologue: 
Halperin and Rosen. Halperin focuses on one particular aspect of the 
prologue, the ruse of Apollodorus' narration of the dialogue, and 
traces its effect upon Platonic epistemology and literary criticism. 77 
His article on narrativity, therefore, will be examined in the next 
chapter. Rosen examines the prologue's characters and the 
74Clay, "Words," 122. 
75Qther recent studies on the prologue of a dialogue of Plato 
include Richard J. Klonaski, "The Portico of the Archon Basileus: On 
the Significance of the Setting of Plato's Euthyphro," Classical Journal 
81 (1986): 130-137; Christine Leclerc, "Socrate aux pieds nus: Notes 
sur le preamble du 'Phedre' de Platon," Revue de L'histoire des 
Religions 200 (1983): 355-384; Joan C. Harrison, "Plato's Prologue: 
Theaetetus 142a-143c," Tulane Studies in Philosophy 27 (1978): 
103-123. 
76see page 4. 
77Halperin, "Narrativity," 95-126. 
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transmission of the dialogue, as described in the prologue. 7 8 
Rosen's treatment of the prologue, however, does not give due 
attention to the significance of the date in which the dialogue is set or 
to the fourth century milieu in which Plato was writing,79 and his "pan-
ironical" approach to Plato occasionally skews his reading of the 
prologue.BO Nonetheless, Rosen's analysis offers a good starting 
point for further examination of the dialogue.81 
The Audience and the Composion of the Prologue 
Before we investigate the role which the prologue plays in the 
Symposium, we ought to have a working model of the audience of the 
dialogue and the manner in which the dialogue was composed. We 
must do so, even though it is nearly impossible to determine the state 
of letters in ancient Athens. Suffice it to say that a fair number of 
Athenians, probably the overwhelming majority, would have been 
unable to read the dialogues on their own. Since there was no 
78Rosen, 5-20. 
79Cf. Plochmann, 40-41. 
BOsee the earlier discussion on Rosen's hermeneutic on pages 
25-28. 
81 Mitchell and Allen have also written recent commentaries on 
the Symposium and discussed the prologue, but their works are not 
as thorough as Rosen's. Both works, in fact, tend to be more 
philosophical essays based upon the text--sometimes ranging far 
afield from the Symposium into modern philosophy. 
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printing press, few people would have been able to afford their own 
copy of the Symposium. 82 
We need not conclude, however, that only students at the 
Academy or a few wealthy bookworms would have been able to read 
the dialogues. Plato may have read his dialogues publicly, thereby 
allowing people who were not his students and even illiterate 
Athenians to hear his works. Such a possibility is likely, since the 
works of Protagoras, Anaxagoras, and lsocrates were read in 
public.83 
But who would have attended such readings? Both Arieti and 
Ryle have offered highly speculative answers. Arieti has suggested 
that the dialogues were meant as recruitment speeches or brochures 
82William Harris has suggested that only ten percent of 
Athenians could read and write. He bases this estimate on the 
assumption that ostracism is still the strongest indication of literacy 
levels in ancient Athens. At least six thousand men were needed to 
ostracize someone; if there was some competition between two 
candidates for ostracism--but not enough to ostracize two people--
roughly ten thousand men must have been literate, or approximately 
ten percent of the citizenry. Harris also notes that no modern culture 
gained widespread literacy until a large number of subsidized schools 
were set up; their absence in antiquity suggests that most Athenians 
were illiterate. Although Harris' construction of Athenian literacy is 
fairly plausible, it is by the nature of the problem difficult to prove. 
Moreover, the number of mass-produced ostraca could call into 
question whether there were even ten thousand literate people. 
William V. Harris, Ancient Literacy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1989), 15-16, 114. 
83So maintains Harris, 86, who argues from Diogenes Laertius 
9.54; Plato, Phaedrus 97b8-c1, and lsocrates 5.26. Diogenes is 
admittedly a later source, but Plato and lsocrates r_efer to 
contemporary practice. 
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for Plato's Academy.84 If this is so, then the audience must have 
been fairly sophisticated; only people interested in higher education 
for their sons would have listened to the dialogues. Ryle, however, 
has suggested that the dialogues were read at literary competitions, 
where Plato's dialogues would have competed against the speeches 
of Isac rates and other orators. 85 If this were the case, Plato's 
audience would have included a number of illiterate people who 
nonetheless loved a well crafted speech or dialogue. 
In the case of the Symposium, Ryle is probably closer to the 
truth than Arieti is. The dialogue was likely written not for 
philosophers or would-be philosophers only, but for an audience that 
would have loved the rhetorical flair in that dialogue. To appreciate 
the Symposium does not require a philosopher's background or 
training in Plato's thought. Furthermore, the dialogue defends 
Socrates from the charge that he corrupted the youth; -Socrates, the 
Symposium tells us, never seduced Alcibiades and refused to have 
intercourse with him, even when Alcibiades tried to seduce him. 
Because the dialogue is in part a defense of Socrates, it is more likely 
that Plato would have wanted this dialogue to be more widely 
circulated than most of his other dialogues. And since the dialogue is 
84Arieti, 7. 
85Ryle, 32-43. Ryle claims that the dialogues could not have 
been intended for members of the Academy only, since some of the 
dialogues pre-date it. Nonetheless, he concedes that some of the 
dialogues, such as the Timaeus and the Parmenides, were written for 
the Academy alone. It is difficult, indeed, to imagine a general 
audience sustaining interest in the Parmenides. 
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within the grasp of most audiences, we ought to assume that illiterate 
as well as literate people heard the dialogue. 
If the nature of the Symposium's intended audience can be 
determined only with difficulty, it is equally difficult to answer 
questions about Plato's manner of composing the dialogue and its 
prologue. Was the prologue written first and then the rest of the 
dialogue, or was the prologue written after the dialogue, so that it 
might better reflect the dialogue's content? These questions, of 
course, cannot be answered with finality since we do not know for 
certain what procedure Plato followed in composing any dialogue. 
Several later authors comment on Plato's method of composition, but 
their stories may be apocryphal. Diogenes Laertius (3.37) states that 
Plato composed the Laws on wax tablets; the dialogue was 
transcribed by Philip the Opuntian after Plato's death. If this 
statement is true, we can conclude that Plato revised his dialogues a 
number of times before publishing them. This conclusion is also 
supported by the remarks of Diogenes (3.37) and Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus (6.25.2-3), who note that Plato wrote several variants 
of the first sentence in the Republic.86 If this is true, then it is likely 
that Plato revised the prologue as he wrote the dialogue, so that the 
final edition of the prologue matched the thought and structure of the 
final edition of the dialogue. 
Thesleff would go even further. He argues that the dialogue 
was originally published without the Apollodorus prologue (172a 1-
86Cf. Clay, "Words," 114. 
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174a2); then, after Plato had written the Republic, he added the 
Apollodorus prologue to the Symposium.87 In this way Thesleff 
accounts for the similarities between the prologues of the Symposium 
and the Republic, allowing the prologue of the Symposium to imitate 
that of the Republic and the body of the Symposium to predate that of 
the Republic. Thesleff's suggestion would explain how the prologue is 
so integrally connected to the theme of the dialogue--it was written 
after the dialogue was completed. But we need not adopt this theory 
to explain the connection between the prologue and the content of the 
dialogue. Plato may have known exactly how the whole dialogue 
would be written before he even wrote the first word. More likely, he 
began by composing the prologue, then proceeded to write the body 
of the dialogue, and edited the prologue to make it conform to the final 
edition of the dialogue. This hypothesis accords with Diogenes 
Laertius' statements that Plato plaited and wove the dialogue until he 
was satisfied and that Plato had several first sentences for the 
Republic. For our purposes, however, all that need be said is that the 
final form of the prologue was not complete until the final form of the 
whole dialogue was complete. 
87Holger Thesleff, Studies in Platonic Chronology (hereafter 
Thesleff, Chronology), Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum 70 
(Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1982) 136, 180-183. 
Thesleff also argues that Plato added the narrative frame to the 
Protagoras, Menexenus, and Theaetetus in their second editions. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen that the prologue has not been 
explained in terms of its relationship to Socrates' exposition of Eros. 
We have rejected the approach of analytical philosophy because it 
does not explain the whole dialogue, but only selected portions of it. 
And, though praising the theory behind the dramatic approach to 
Plato, we have also criticized some of its practitioners for ignoring the 
philosophical implications of the prologue. 
In the next four chapters we will examine the prologue of the 
Symposium in four ways. In chapter two, we will see the purpose of 
Apollodorus' narration of the dialogue ( 172a 1-174a1). Then in the 
following chapters, we will demonstrate how the prologue's 
connections with specific portions of the dialogue undergird Socrates' 
arguments about Eros: in chapter three we will examine the 
prologue's relationship with the body of the dialogue; in chapter four, 
the vocabulary of the prologue and that of the dialogue; and in 
chapter five, the prologue's relationship with the epilogue. 
CHAPTER TWO 
EROS IN THE TRANSMISSION OF THE DIALOGUE 
In the last chapter we argued that the prologue is an integral 
part of the dialogue, connected to the rest of the dialogue by literary 
means and philosophical purpose. This thesis, however, is 
immediately challenged by the first two pages of the prologue (174a1-
174a2): The conversation of Apollodorus and his friends seems at 
first glance irrelevant to the rest of the dialogue. In particular, it seems 
senseless for Plato to spend so much time discussing how the 
dialogue was transmitted by Apollodorus and his friends. Whether the 
dialogue is narrated and by whom it is narrated should have no effect 
on the content of the dialogue.1 Furthermore, if Plato wanted to 
choose a narrator, he would have done better to choose Aristodemus 
or Socrates. Both were present at the symposium and could have told 
the story soon after the events took place. As the dialogue now 
stands, it is told twelve years later by a person who was a child at the 
time of the symposium. Even if Plato's choice of narrator can be 
excused, it seems entirely out of place for Apollodorus to describe his 
earlier conversation with Glaucon, who never appears elsewhere in 
1 As Arieti, 96, notes, all the discussion concerning the 
transmission of the dialogue is ironic. The Symposium is a work of 
fiction, not a transcript of an event that took place at Agathon's house 
in416 BC. 
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the Symposium. In sum, the part of the prologue that establishes 
Apollodorus as the narrator seems extraneous to the rest of the 
dialogue. Yet, as we shall observe, the narrative frame is an essential 
part of the dialogue. 
The Purpose of the Narrative Frame 
One approach to understanding the Symposium's narrative 
frame is to look at it as merely a representative of a certain form used 
by Plato in his middle dialogues. Thesleff, in particular, has 
approached the question from this perspective. He argues that the 
narrated dialogue is a particular form which Plato adopted for a few 
years and then abandoned. This form was merely one of several that 
Plato used as he progressed from dialogues of question-and-answer 
to monologues. Thus, the main significance of the Symposium's 
narrated form is its close chronological link to certain early middle 
dialogues, specifically, the Lysis, Charmides, Protagoras, 
Euthydemus, Republic, Phaedo, Theaetetus, and Parmenides.2 
But why did Plato change the form of his dialogues? According 
to Thesleff, Plato, as is seen in his first dialogues, was initially most 
concerned with defending the late Socrates. After his trip to Sicily, 
however, Plato set up the Academy and began writing dialogues to 
disseminate to a larger audience the content of his lectures. At that 
time he discovered that the aporetic dialogue, which had been 
2Thesleff places all of these dialogues in the 380's BC: .Studies 
in the Styles of Plato (hereafter Thesleff, Styles), Acta Philosophica 
Fennica 20 (Helsinki: Akateeminen Kirjakaupa, 1967), 21-22, 45. 
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designed to portray Socrates as an honest seeker of the truth, was ill 
suited for expounding the philosophy of the Academy. Thus, he used 
the narrated dialogue, an adaptation from memoir literature, which 
was more suited to a general audience. 
Thesleff's suggestion explains a great deal, but leaves many 
other questions unanswered. It does not explain why Plato chose the 
dialogue with narrative frame over other forms, such as the treatise, 
that would have been suitable for disseminating his views to a wide 
audience. In addition, Thesleff does not explain why Plato later 
abandoned the narrated dialogue: He merely states that Plato's late 
dialogues reflect his disillusionment after his second trip to Sicily. Nor 
does Thesleff explain the peculiar emphasis the theme of narration 
receives in the Symposium. For although other dialogues are 
narrated, few of them go to such great lengths to emphasize the 
process of narration. Nor does Thesleff explain why Plato puts the 
dialogue in the mouth of Apollodorus instead of Aristodemus or 
Socrates--or why the narrated prologue is an integral part of the 
dialogue as it now stands. 3 Thus, although Thesleff is right to 
observe that the narrative frame is a stylistic convention of the middle 
dialogues, his thesis does not explain many important facets of the 
Symposium's narrative frame. 
3Thesleff, Chronology, 136, 181, suggests that in the first 
edition of the Symposium Aristodemus narrated the dialogue and that 
Plato later added the frame (Apollodorus) with its unmistakable 
parallels to the Republic. 
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Other explanations for the peculiarities of the narrative frame 
have been given by recent commentators. Socrates cannot relate the 
dialogue since he is praised in it. Apollodorus' role as narrator 
questions the accuracy of his narration and the setting of the narrative 
frame forms a contrast with the body of the dialogue. Apollodorus' 
presence connects the Symposium to the Apology and the Phaedo, 
reminding the reader of the connection between death and Eros.4 
But these explanations, though correct as far as they go, leave a 
number of questions unanswered. If Socrates cannot narrate the 
dialogue, why must Apollodorus be the narrator? Why cannot 
Aristodemus narrate it--and in 416 BC, when the dialogue took place, 
rather than some twelve years later? Why must Plato cast doubts 
upon the narration of the dialogue? Why should Glaucon be 
introduced into the narrative frame? How does any of this advance 
the philosophy of the dialogue? 
To answer these questions, we must understand that the 
narrative process has a specific purpose in the Symposium. For 
although Plato uses the technique of narration in other dialogues, 
4Allen, 4, notes that the narrative form preserves Socrates' 
modesty; Mitchell, 225, adds that it prevents Socrates from destroying 
the coherence of the narrative. Allen, 4-5, and Rosen, 11, observe 
that the narrative form emphasizes the role of Apollodorus. Mitchell, 
4-6, and Rosen, 7-8, note that the narrative form contrasts the date of 
the narration with that of the dialogue's occurrence. Tilman Krischer, 
"Diotima und Alkibiades: Zur Struktur des platonischen Symposion," 
Grazer Beitrage 11 (1984): 55, notes the connection between the 
Symposium's prologue and the Aplogoy and Phaedo. For the 
relationship between death and Eros, see also Diotima's argument in 
207a6-208b6. 
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only in the Symposium is it a major motif. Apollodorus is not the only 
person in the Symposium to narrate information he has received. 
Throughout the dialogue the characters are learning information and 
passing it on to others. Apollodorus recounts events that took place 
twelve years earlier, even as Socrates' encounter with Diotima, 
----~--'-----·------------------- -·---~~ 
narrat~g_at the sym_pg_~lum, occurred twenty-five years before that. 
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One individual after another claims that he learned a particular fact 
from another person: Eryximachus, himself eager to praise Eros, 
credits the choice of topic to his beloved (177a3-4); Socrates puts his 
beliefs about Eros in the mouth of Diotima.5 Phaedrus quotes Hesiod 
(178b5-7) and Parmenides (178b11) in his speech; Eryximachus, 
Heraclitus (187a5-6); Agathon, Homer (195d4-5) and Euripides 
(196e2-3). 6 This motif of narration, furthermore, is underscored by 
the placement of speeches within speeches. Glaucon's conversation 
5Andrea Nye misses the point when she argues that Diotima 
must have been a real woman who truly taught Socrates Ta EpwTtKcx: 
"The Hidden Host: lrigaray and Diotima at Plato's Symposium," 
(hereafter Nye, "Diotima") Hypatia 3 (1989): 46. All of Plato's 
characters are fictional to the extent that Plato employs real people of 
the fifth century in conversations which he invents. Nye's belief that, 
since Diotima's views differ from Platonic philosophy, she must have 
been a real person and her words in the Symposium must be the very 
words she spoke to Socrates is a throwback to the hopelessly naive 
notion of A.E. Taylor and John Burnet that Plato's dialogues are the 
faithful records of actual Socratic conversations. Nor would Diotima 
be the only "made up" person in Plato, as Nye avers, if Diotima's 
historicity is rejected. The Er of the Republic is probably also 
completely a creation of Plato. 
6As Arieti observes, the guests in the Symposium prove their 
view of Eros with "proof-texts"; Arieti, 107. 
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is placed in Apollodorus' conversation with his friends two days later, 
just as Diotima's conversation is placed in Socrates' speech. First 
hand information is rare in the Symposium. 
No other dialogue--not even the narrated dialogues--
emphasize narration to the degree the Symposium does. To be sure, 
the prologues of the Phaedo, Theaetetus, and Parmenides discuss in 
nearly as much detail as the Symposium does how the narrators 
learned the dialogue. Phaedo and Euclides explain how they were 
present at the events of the Phaedo and Theaetetus, respectively; 
Cephalus of Clazomenae describes how he found a reliable source 
for the content of the Parmenides. In all three dialogues, however, 
narration is not a major motif in the rest of the dialogue. There is no 
passage in those dialogues comparable to Diotima's discourse in the 
Symposium. Nor do the characters in those three dialogues use 
"proof passages" as the Symposium does; more often than not, 
authorities are cited to be disproved, not to support an argument.? 
The Symposium, thus, is unique in its emphasis on narration.8 
7 Allen, 3, places the Symposium second to the Parmenides in 
terms of complicated schemes of narration. In terms of the tortuous 
path to the original dialogue, Allen may be correct, but the 
introduction to the narration of the dialogue takes fewer lines in the 
Parmenides than in the Symposium. More importantly, the body of 
the Parmenides is not concerned with narration. The Parmenides 
refutes various notions concerning the forms rather than approving 
any one solution. Although the works of Zeno and Parmenides are 
alluded to (127c5-d5), the purpose of the dialogue is not to establish a 
Parmenidean cosmology, but to emphasize weakness in Socrates' 
own views concerning unity and plurality. Similarly, the Theaetetus 
explores different explanations of what knowledge is--including 
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Why all this emphasis on narration? One can argue that 
narration serves a practical purpose in this dialogue: It allows Plato to 
use the Symposium as an encomium to Socrates. 9 By having the 
dialogue narrated by Apollodorus and Aristodemus, Plato has added 
two more characters to the chorus praising Socrates. One of them, 
Aristodemus, is a lover (EpaaTfis) of Socrates who imitates his 
teacher down to walking barefoot all the time (172b1-4); the other, 
Apollodorus, is a "Boswell" in his desire to know about the life of 
Socrates and in his admiration of him (172c5-6; 173d5-6).1 O 
Aristodemus and Apollodorus, however, are not merely two more 
people who praise Socrates in the dialogue. As narrators, they 
preserve Socrates' modesty. Socrates cannot tell how Alcibiades and 
Protagoras' dictum that man is the measure of all things (160c8-9, dB-
9)--but none of the suggestions receive Socrates' approval. 
BRosen, 2-3, calls the dialogue "a series of recollections within a 
recollection." According to Wolfgang Rosier, this motif accords well 
with the dialogue's dramatic setting, the symposium, since the 
symposium was dedicated to recalling past events, particularly the 
history of the community. (Rosier goes so far as to see symposiastic 
poetry as a partial precursor to the writing of history.) Wolfgang 
Rosier, "Mnemosyne in the Symposion," in Sympotica: A Symposium 
on the Symposion, ed. Oswyn Murray (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990), 230-236. 
9Cf Allen, 4; Mitchell, 6, 225. To some degree, all of Plato's 
dialogues are encomia to Socrates. In no other dialogue, however, is 
Socrates praised so openly as in the Symposium. 
1 OR.G. Bury applies the epithet "Boswell" to Aristodemus, but 
the description fits Apollodorus equally well. See R.G. Bu-ry, The 
Symposium of Plato, 2d ed. (Cambridge: W. Hefter and Sons, Ltd., 
1932), xvi. 
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the other guests were in love with him 11--nor for that matter how the 
guests offered somewhat ironic criticism of him.12 Indeed, Socrates 
cannot even be the primary source of this information, but 
Aristodemus must be. Socrates can only confirm that the symposium 
occurred as Aristodemus said (173b5-6). Thus, the unique emphasis 
on narration is partly due to Plato's intention of praising Socrates in 
the dialogue. 
By emphasizing narration, Plato also draws attention to the 
fictional nature of the Symposium. The reader is not involved 
firsthand with Socrates, a fact easy to forget when simply reading a 
conversation between Socrates and other people.13 Plato is 
describing events that took place in 416 BC, when he was 
approximately thirteen years old--too young to have attended the 
symposium.14 If Plato were portraying a real event, he would have 
11Allen, 4; Bury, xvi; Friedlander, 3:1. 
12Rosen and Duncan believe that the Symposium portrays 
Socrates in a bad light. Rosen, 20, argues that Socrates' faults are 
revealed, "soberly and unthinkingly by Aristodemus, drunkenly and 
with real penetration by Alcibiades." Duncan, 287-288, argues that 
Socrates is indeed hybristic in scorning his beloveds and forcing them 
to become his lovers instead, as Alcibiades maintains (222b3-4). To 
a degree, Rosen and Duncan are correct. The negative side of 
Socrates' behavior, nonetheless, need not be emphasized. If 
Alcibiades praises Socrates with great irony, Alcibiades also criticizes 
him with the same degree of irony. 
13Hyland, 43, aptly notes that these dialogues are "imitations of 
imitations," which, ironically, are condemned in Plato's Republic. 
14Ancient sources are divided between 429 and 427 BC as the 
year of Plato's birth. See Diog. Laert., 3.1-4; cf. Johannes Kirchner, 
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had to rely on the accounts of the older pupils of Socrates like 
Aristodemus to reconstruct the events of the symposium. Plato, thus, 
warns the reader not to expect that the Symposium is an account of a 
historical event. 
Yet there is a more important reason narration is emphasized: 
The process of narration exemplifies the main theme of the dialogue, 
Eros. As we argued in the first chapter, Plato suggests throughout the 
dialogue that all actions of mankind are governed by Eros. This truth 
applies also to narrators, for narration is a form of procreation, akin to 
the procreation of ideas, which is praised by Diotima (208e5-209b4). 
A narrator achieves a degree of immortality when his narration 
outlasts him, even as people achieve immortality by begetting 
offspring who outlive them and carry on the family name. Narrators 
perform their task through µeAETTJ, by which the natural forgetfulness 
(:\fi6n) is driven out and the continued remembrance of the dialogue 
guaranteed (208a3-7). Narrators, moreover, must be inspired by 
beauty, even as other men can beget ideas and children only when 
beauty is present (209b3-4). Only because the speeches in the 
symposium are beautiful can Apollodorus relate them to his friends: 
Apollodorus finds the speeches useful and moving (173c2-5).15 
Eros is also to be seen in the interest that many people show in 
the symposium, for Eros is a lack that longs to be satisfied. Thus, an 
ed., Prosopographia Attica (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1961 ), 2:204; 
J.K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 B.C. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1971 ), 333. 
1 Scf Alcibiades' comments on the beauty and lure of Socrates' 
speeches (215d1 -6); see also Halperin, "Narrativity," 111-112. 
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audience always inquires for more information from the narrator, for 
the audience must satisfy its desire for the dialogue. Glaucon and 
Apollodorus' friends ask for the dialogue to be narrated because they 
lack, yet long for, the words of Socrates. Since Glaucon does not 
know the content of the dialogue, he actively pursues Apollodorus to 
obtain the information (172a3-b7). Even Apollodorus at one time did 
not know the dialogue, but has inquired about it from Socrates and 
Aristodemus (173a8-b6). Likewise, Socrates seeks Diotima's wisdom 
on Eros because he recognizes his own inability to understand Eros 
or to answer the questions Diotima asks (201 d1-2). 
Narration, thus, is an erotic activity. The narrators retell the 
dialogue, just as all men long to procreate. The audience listens 
eagerly to the dialogue, just as all men strive to fill in what is missing. 
As Halperin argues, the prologue shows that Plato's theory of the 
erotics of the process of narration is both a success and a failure. On 
the one hand, both narrator and audience perform their tasks eagerly. 
Glaucon, Phoenix, Apollodorus and his friends are all interested in 
Aristodemus' story. On the other hand, the narration does not seem 
to stick in the minds of the audience. Several people have heard the 
dialogue, but by the time their story reaches Glaucon and his friend, 
the account is so confused that Glaucon does not even know when it 
took place (172b4-5, 7, c2-3) Furthermore, the people most 
knowledgeable about the dialogue, Apollodorus and Aristodemus, 
are not good philosophers. Intimate knowledge of the narration 
seems to have had little effect upon their lives. Narration, then, as 
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Halperin suggests, is as much a failure as a success in the 
Symposium.16 
This failure in the midst of success is especially evident in 
Apollodorus' efforts to present a truthful account of the symposium.17 
At first glance, Apollodorus seems to succeed in his presentation. He 
argues against several misconceptions of Glaucon concerning the 
symposium, gives the correct date of the symposium, and claims to 
have thoroughly researched this event. He states that he has even 
consulted Socrates about some details of the symposium (173b4-6). 
As far as Apollodorus is concerned, this dialogue, as it is about to be 
narrated, is free from error.18 But misinformation still remains. 
Socrates does not--and probably cannot--correct Aristodemus' 
account; he merely affirms it.19 Too much time has passed since the 
16Halperin, "Narrativity," 108-111. 
17The Symposium, of course, is fiction. Thus, when we say that 
Apollodorus presents a truthful account of the symposium, we do not 
mean that he is accurately describing a particular banquet of 416 BC. 
Instead, we are speaking of "dramatic verisimilitude" (as Guthrie calls 
it), i.e., that Apollodorus' account reflects the fiction that Plato wants 
the reader to adopt. See W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek 
Philosophy, vol. 4, Plato: The Man and his Dialogues: Earlier Period 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 336. 
18Bury, xviii, believes that Plato was writing against an earlier 
account of the symposium given by Polycrates the rhetor. It is difficult 
to say, however, whether the almost polemical defense of Socrates in 
this dialogue was directed against an earlier version of the 
symposium written by someone else. Bury is right in rejecting any 
polemic by Plato against Xenophon's Symposion, since the latter was 
probably written after Plato's work and is set at a different time (the 
Panathenean Festival ca. 420 BC). 
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symposium for Socrates to be of much help to Apollodorus when the 
latter learns about the dialogue from Aristodemus. The passage of 
time, however, is not the only culprit. At the S_Y!!!.Q.9Sium itself 
Ar!~todemus became drowsy .. )~.~us, Aristodemus' account of the last 
----~----..-~- -..,_,..~.,_...,_,.""',"'""F''"'"'".-,.' 
portion of the symposium is not entirely reliabie.-2"0""~)\p(5fJodorus, 
, ., ' '-'• .o• ~,,,, •""''·"'"'~"'"'"'''~ ....... (N,.,,"LI"+~"-••• ,,.~.' •, >"•''" ''"-''' ,, '" ''"• .... ;•~""c"fi'll"'J,~.'t ...... ,_~, ... ,,W .~• ... •,..., ''""'"~""'-'~-
moreover, has edited the dialogue, making at least one 
interi5'0Taifa·n:·2·r~·rn-·a-aaitr0r1·:··t1·15··ac;;;~·~t .. ~·t '!h~··cii~·1·~9~~'"·i·~··1i;;;·it~cit;y~· 
his own and Aristodemus' memory: Aristodemus could not remember 
the whole dialogue nor can Apollodorus-rememb~-~·~-~·~·i,;9-
.M~_..,.,,..~_ .. ,~-,,, ..... _.....~ .. ~·~-""'~~-... "'/><""'--"'\-'.J#<"<f''-:;"·~· ....... "'."' ... ,,,,.."'~·"-""··,1 ...... / .. 1· ~,,f-t,"•\,~ ... ~_,,.,,.,_,,.,,.~ ">d •>, o'•.•""" t">'•'l •'" ,'-~"·-~"'''',I'•,; "''"""-' .,.,.~ .... ,, •.• J;.11c~>..~~·l;~d,,"','••<'f<,><'"'-•'-:~.;~~·J>,(_,'!Jl1;i 
Anstodemus told him (178a 1-3). Thus, Apollodorus can narrate only 
__ ,,.,. ~""" ••. , ,.~,-~ • .,,.._,_,, •. ,..,,,.....,_,.,h•..f•\ ... :,;;")!f'>.'.!)"'~N•""i•J~l'",".o.t•'"""''""·t..S•'h""·:,. rnr.l"::<'f'"-'"" {r''1 .-.,,.,~,.,,.,.,d~o..·;o •. -:~'_.;....,. .. ,..t'..;-• ,.,,,.,-,.1 .~~·'·•·~·,."-.•~.. • ~ e •.-«: .. •i., :-,,;, ~.V.~ .• ,, • , 
what he considers the most memorable speeches ( a~toµvT]µ6vevTov, 
,, !,-. .. .,.1.~ •• ,.·~,,,.,,. " ,,.,. . •. ,·, ., .. ·,, .. :,·,·· •' .-~ .• · ·' ! ,,,-.) •. ,..,,,,.,,.~;·;•.;.:,,~{'.-_ •• ,_,(,!<·'..~·"~-·· . ..,,,., •. 
178a5).22 
Both the failure and success of narration can be explained if we 
adopt Diotima's view of Eros. For her, Eros is a daemon who never 
achieves perfection--or as soon as he achieves it, loses it (203d8-e5). 
Thus, all philosophers (who by definition take after Eros) are not 
perfect (204a1-2, b1-5), nor will they be able to transmit knowledge 
perfectly to other people. Not surprisingly, then, neither of the 
1 9173b5-6: µot wµoA6yet Ka86:nep EKElVOS (viz, 
'AptoT68T]µos) 0tT]yeTTo. 
20Rosen, 9. 
21 Rosen, 17, cites 185c4: n avoaviov OE navoaµEvov--
8t86:oKovm yap µe '(oa AEyetv ouTwol ol oocpoi. 
22As Mitchell, 4, notes, this raises the question whether 
Apollodorus' account is any more accurate than any other account 
Glaucon has heard or would be likely to hear. 
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narrators in the dialogue is infallible. Yet, like all men under the 
influence of Eros, they strive to gain what they are missing or have 
lost. For just as all men are constantly forgetting and relearning what 
they know (207e5-208b2), so narrators must practice (µEAETav) to 
retain their narration.23 Because of their natural forgetfulness, 
however, narrators will not be able to grasp and maintain the content 
of the whole dialogue. 
The fault lies, then, not with the process of narration itself, but 
with the human beings who narrate it. When narration is portrayed in 
the prologue to be not completely reliable, this does not so much 
refute as confirm Plato's "official" view that narration is erotic. The 
narrators and their narration must be imperfect, for the erotic is by 
definition imperfect. Thus, Halperin is wrong to hold that the failure of 
narration in the Symposium is an "unofficial" doctrine that refutes the 
"official" doctrine of the dialogue, which holds that narration is always 
successful.24 Failure in narration is rather a confirmation of the 
"official" doctrine of Eros. 
23Thus, Apollodorus in the prologue emphasizes that he is not 
unpracticed (8oKw µoL. .. OVK aµEAETTJTOS ELVOL, 172a1-2; OUK 
aµEAETIJTC.US exc.u, 173c1 ). 
24ct Halperin, "Narrativity," 107, 113-114. To Halperin, the 
problem of the narration of the dialogue is connected with the 
question of Plato's beliefs about written philosophy. Thus, Halperin 
points out the difficulties of narration in the Symposium in order to 
show how difficult it is to interpret Plato since Plato is a 
"deconstructionist avant la lettre," tor Plato "exhibits a series of 
alternating doctrinal and counterdoctrinal pressures" which cannot be 
resolved; Halperin, "Narrativity," 114. 
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If narration often fails to communicate true knowledge, where 
does that leave the reader of Plato's dialogues? Plato's dialogues, 
after all, are narrations--Plato's narrations--whether or not they have 
a narrative frame. Halperin argues that the failure of narration in the 
Symposium is Plato's way of undermining his own work. Plato makes 
philosophical statements and then disproves them--if not by logic, 
then by drama. Thus the reader gains no direct instruction from the 
dialogue nor even food for thought. For according to Halperin, the 
dialogues do not offer theories for readers to debate or even an 
occasional flash of insight that is all too quickly dimmed.25 
Can we then, as Halperin implies, really learn nothing from the 
Symposium? Perhaps we cannot learn a definite teaching about a 
particular philosophical issue, but we are exposed to the process of 
acquiring knowledge. As the dialogue makes clear, that process is 
fraught with difficulties. Learning takes place when Eros-like--and 
Eros-driven--men recognize a lack of wisdom in themselves and 
pursue it through Beauty or the Good. But Beauty is not easily 
discerned; men are far more likely to confuse Absolute Beauty with its 
kin, the beauty to be found in bodies or individual ideas. Absolute 
Beauty--the only kind that can inspire true knowledge--must be 
described primarily in negative terms: Absolute Beauty neither comes 
to be nor perishes, neither waxes nor wanes; it is not restricted to one 
particular aspect of time; it is not a relative or partial beauty or one 
recognized by only some observers; it does not take a physical form; it 
25Halperin, "Narrativity," 115-117. 
58 
cannot even be described as a word (A6yos) or piece of knowledge 
(entaTf\µ11).26 Because Absolute Beauty, the source of all wisdom, 
cannot be described directly, Socrates cannot explain to Agathon his 
thoughts on the porch (175d3-7), nor can Plato teach any 
philosophical insight derived from Beauty. In fact, Plato cannot even 
describe in positive terms the sort of Beauty one ought to pursue to 
acquire knowledge. Plato can only sketch an outline and speak to his 
readers as uninitiated people (21 Oa1-2). Thus, Plato through 
Socrates can claim to know all about erotics (177d7-8) and still not be 
able to communicate in his Symposium the definitive explanation of 
Eros and Beauty. 
By reading the Symposium, however, we do gain something: 
not a positive doctrine, but a philosophical process, which is portrayed 
more than it is explained. In Socrates' speech Plato outlines, to the 
extent language can, the Ascent to Beauty. Then in the prologue's 
and Alcibiades' depictions of Socrates, Plato shows how the ascent 
looks to others. Lest the reader confuse the ascent with some inferior 
manner of acquiring wisdom, Plato introduces men in the prologue 
who ape Socrates, but fail to arrive at Absolute Beauty. Thus, by 
examining the explicit teaching of Eros as outlined by Socrates, by 
pondering the dramatic elements found in the prologue, and by 
26symp. 210e2-b5. In this passage, the only positive 
description of Absolute Beauty is that it is eternal (aEl ov, 211a1) and 
marvelous (8avµaaT6v, 21 Oe4-5). 
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evaluating our own attempt to ascend to Beauty, we can learn how 
Plato says philosophers acquire knowledge.27 
In all this discussion we {like Halperin) have assumed that 
Socrates' views on Eros are close to those held by Plato. We have 
assumed this, not because Socrates ought always to be taken as the 
mouthpiece of Plato, but because in this dialogue Socrates offers the 
most comprehensive explanation of Eros. Socrates' theory of Eros 
can explain the behavior of all the guests, but the other speeches do 
not explain the behavior of Socrates. To Phaedrus, Pausanias, 
Aristophanes, and Agathon, Eros is equated with desire for sex. 
These four guests, to be sure, claim that Eros has positive side 
effects. Phaedrus says Eros inspires heroic deeds (178e1-179b5). 
Pausanias claims a noble Eros will educate youths (184b6-e4). 
Aristophanes argues Eros releases mankind from feelings of 
separation (191 a5-d5). Agathon emphasizes Eros' power in creating 
poetry {196d6-197b3). Yet the circle of lovers defined by these 
guests is much smaller than that offered by Socrates (205b6-7). By 
Phaedrus' definition, only Socrates is a true lover and Alcibiades a 
true beloved, since these are the only men whose exploits in battle 
are described at the symposium {219e5-221 c1 ). Pausanias' 
27Belfiore insightfully argues that the purpose of the dialogue is 
to open up the words of Socrates (as Alcibiades attempts to do in the 
epilogue) and examine their application in our lives. All the while, 
Socrates refuses to become an authority, that is, to teach virtue by 
expounding a doctrine. Instead, our own efforts at apprehending 
Absolute Beauty (aided by a study of Plato's words) must direct us to 
the truth. Elizabeth Belfiore, "Dialectic with the Reader in Plato's 
Symposium," Maia 36 (1984): 149. 
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definition is little better, for despite his emphasis on Eros' pedagogical 
benefits, Pausanias is chiefly concerned with the gratification of the 
lover. In Pausanias' analysis, Socrates must be an odd lover, for 
Socrates sees education as an erotic experience rather than as a 
means to one. Aristophanes, similarly, would reject Socrates' erotics 
because it does not express itself in a physical longing for union with 
another body. Of all the guests, Eryximachus, with his notion of Eros 
as cosmic force (186a3-7), comes closest to Socrates' all-inclusive 
theory. Yet Eryximachus related Eros to bodies and fields of learning 
(TexvaL, not ETILaTfjµaL as in Socrates' speech)--and then only to four 
fields: medicine, music, prophecy, and astronomy. Thus, none of 
these speeches comes close to explaining the erotic behavior of all 
the guests, especially Socrates. To the degree that knowledge of 
Eros and Beauty can be communicated, Socrates comes closest to 
an all-inclusive explanation of "erotic" behavior. 
At the same time as we affirm that Socrates gives the most 
comprehensive speech and, thus, ostensibly the official viewpoint of 
the dialogue, we ought not to limit Plato's philosophy to the 
statements made by Socrates. To give primacy to Socrates' speech 
does not require reducing the whole dialogue to that speech. First, 
Socrates builds on the speeches of his predecessors; without them 
Socrates' discussion would certainly be different. For example, if 
Pausanias had not distinguished between a base and noble Eros, or if 
Eryximachus had not universalized Eros as a cosmic force, Socrates 
would have had to spend more of his speech defending the notion 
that Eros did not operate entirely on the physical level. Similarly, if 
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Agathon had not confused Eros with what Eros desired and if 
Aristophanes had not stated that love is finding one's other half, 
Socrates would not have had to refute these beliefs (199d1-202e1, 
205d10-206a1). Thus, the speeches of the other guests influence the 
content of Socrates' speech. 
Second--and more importantly--Socrates' speech presumes 
that direct experience in the Ascent to Beauty is of greater value than 
talk about it. By this principle, evaluation of people as they attempt to 
ascend to Beauty is more helpful than merely reading an outline of the 
Ascent. Here is where the dramatic portions of the dialogue are 
helpful. The prologue and the epilogue (Alcibiades' speech and the 
breakup of the party) offer a different perspective of Socratic Eros: 
the prologue shows Socratic Eros as seen by his fanatic pupils; the 
epilogue, as seen by a disgruntled one. These perspectives are 
necessary for the reader to get the full picture of Socratic/Platonic 
Eros as caricatured by his friend and mocked by his rivals. Thus, 
although Socrates' speech may form the heart of the dialogue, the 
rest of the dialogue is not without significance. 
The prologue, then, offers another perspective on Socratic 
Eros. All the characters in the narrative frame are in some sense 
students and EpaaTat of Socrates. Their successes in pursuing 
Beauty are instructive, while their failures in imitating Socrates portray 
the pitfalls that one can encounter on the Ascent to Beauty. Of equal 
importance for the reader is the historical setting of the narrative 
frame, for two reasons. First, the setting of the narrative is a culturally 
and politically more impoverished time than that of the body of the 
62 
dialogue; the setting of the narrative dramatizes Socrates' point of 
Eros as lack. Second, the historical setting of 172a 1-17 4a2 
influences the narration of the dialogue; then the reader ought to ask 
whether such influences also affect him or her. Since these points 
need explanation, the rest of this chapter will examine the 
characters28 involved in the dialogue's narration and then the 
historical setting of the narration, in order to determine how they 
manifest Eros. 
The Characters of the Narrative Frame 
The chief character involved in the dialogue's narration is the 
narrator Apollodorus. He has been a devoted pupil of Socrates for 
three years (172c4-6).29 Naturally, he is acquainted with Socrates' 
views on many subjects (172c5-6). Presumably, the symposium is 
not the only conversation of Socrates that he has tried to memorize. 
Apollodorus, moreover, stays with Socrates until the latter dies.30 
Apollodorus' interest in philosophy seems genuine: Unlike his 
28As we evaluate the characters, we must be careful not to pit 
the "imperfect pupils" such as Apollodorus against their "wise 
teacher," Socrates; the characters in the prologue are too complex to 
be simply foils for Socrates. Nor is it helpful to analyze the characters 
as representatives of a particular vice. They are philosophers who 
have some frailties, which any student of philosophy may share. Cf. 
Plochmann's criticism of Rosen, 34, 38; Gallagher, 40-42. 
29Socrates in the Apology (34a2; 38b7) names Apollodorus as 
one of his followers at the time of the trial. 
30This is attested by both Plato (Phd. 59a-b, 117d) and 
Xenophon (Ap. 28). 
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contemporaries mentioned in the Apology (23c2-7), he is not merely 
interested in watching Socrates prove the learned men wrong, but 
desires philosophy for its usefulness (Symposium 173c2-5). 
Apollodorus, nonetheless, has two key weaknesses. First, he is 
highly emotional, as is evident from his nickname µaAaK6s, "softy"31; 
he not only bawls at Socrates' death (Phd. 117d3-4), but he also goes 
on lengthy tirades against his friends.32 Second, in his zeal to honor 
Socrates he distorts Socrates' philosophy. Apollodorus ascribes 
more bliss and knowledge to Socrates than Socrates himself would 
311s the proper reading µaAaK6s, "softy," or µavtK6s, "mad 
man"? For the textual evidence, see Georg Ferdinand Rettig, 
platonis symposium in usum studiosae uventutis et scholarum cum 
commentario critico (Halle: Libraria Orphanotrophei, 1875), 3. For 
an evaluation of the evidence, see Bury, 6; Dover, Symposium, 79; 
Friedlander 3:3, 431 fn. 5; Leonardo Paganelli, "Plat. Symp. 173d 
(µaAaK6s/µav1K6s)," Museum Criticum 18 (1983): 193-196. Rettig 
and Bury prefer µavtK6s, Dover and Paganelli, µaAaK6s. It is easier to 
see why µaAaK6s would be emended by a later editor to µavtK6s than 
vice versa: µaAaK6s, as Paganelli has documented, came to have an 
obscene meaning in Byzantine Greek. Yet, though I prefer µaAaK6s, 
either reading makes sense in the context of the passage. If µaAaK6s 
is the preferred reading, the friend of Apollodorus is asking why he 
got the nickname of "softy," when he rants and raves so much. If 
µavtK6s is correct, the friend says that he does not know how he 
acquired the nickname, but agrees that it is an apt one. 
32Apollodorus, though a pupil of Socrates for approximately 
eight years by the time of Socrates' death, still had not adopted a 
more stoic attitude to death. On Apollodorus elsewhere in Plato, see 
Guthrie, 366; Rosen, 11; Friedlander 3:2-3. Arieti, 96, sees the tirades 
of Apollodorus as a parody of would-be followers of Socrates. More 
insightfully, Allen, 5, notes that the narration of the dialogue through 
. Apollodorus highlights the Symposium's connections with the 
dialogues on death (the Apology and the Phaedo). 
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admit. Although Socrates claims only to be a seeker after the truth 
and to know nothing at all--or erotics at most (177d7-8)--Apollodorus 
believes that Socrates has escaped the wretchedness of most 
mortals.33 In a similar way, Apollodorus mistakes Socratic irony for 
rudeness: Apollodorus criticizes his non-philosophical friends 
(173a 1-3, c5-d3), while Socrates bestows ironic praise upon Agathon 
(175d7-e6).34 Apollodorus in effect congratulates himself, whereas 
Socrates deprecates himself.35 Consequently, when Apollodorus 
begins to boast of his happiness as a philosopher (173a 1-3), Glaucon 
rightly tells him to stop jesting (173a3-4); Apollodorus is not so close 
to the Socrates he adores as he believes himself to be.36 
33Diotima remarks that the wise do not philosophize because 
they already possess wisdom {204a1-4), but Apollodorus believes 
that Socrates has escaped from the wretches of ignorance (173d4-5). 
Socrates' self-deprecation is, admittedly, ironic; he always seems to 
know more than he lets on. For example, Socrates claims that his 
knowledge is inferior to Agathon's (175e1 -6; 198b1-c5) and then 
upstages him with his own encomium. Yet Socrates would be the first 
to admit that he has not achieved his goal as a philosopher (212b1-8). 
34Cf. Rosen, 14, who notes that whereas Socrates in the 
Republic uses irony with Polemarchus and Cephalus, Apollodorus is 
actually rude to his friends. Warner, 161, notes that the best picture 
we get of Socrates is not from his pupil Apollodorus, but from "the 
unconverted Alcibiades"; similarly, in the prologue we are more apt to 
identify with the unnamed "friends" than with "mad" Apollodorus. 
35Apollodorus is willing to concede that he has not entered total 
bliss and that he is probably KaKo8aiµwv (173d1-2). But his 
statement that his friends are certainly KaKo8a iµovEs (173d2-3) 
reflects a presumptuous attitude on his part. 
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Apollodorus finds a counterpart to himself in Aristodemus. 
Aristodemus, like Apollodorus, has several admirable qualities. He 
follows Socrates closely, down to imitating such details as being 
shoeless (173b2).37 He is so faithful to Socrates that he is even 
called an epaaTfts (lover) of Socrates--even though Aristodemus, as 
the junior of the two, should technically be called the epwµEvos.38 For 
these reasons he evokes the reader's respect and admiration. 
Yet Aristodemus is not without his faults. Like Apollodorus, he 
appears to have acquired the demeanor of Socrates without his 
wisdom. He is shoeless, for example, just as Socrates usually is, even 
though Socrates knows enough to come well dressed for Agathon's 
36Anderson, 11 O, insightfully notes that Apollodorus is "more 
concerned with form than with understanding." Though he is a faithful 
narrator of the events of the symposium, he does not seem to 
comprehend their significance. 
37Bury, xvi, sees Aristodemus as another "Boswell" in his 
fascination with the smallest details of his teacher's life. Although 
such a reading is a bit simplistic, it does account for one aspect of 
Aristodemus' character. 
38Although, as Bury, 4, notes, the word epaaTfJS can be used in 
a broader sense, i.e., "admirer," almost as a synonym for eTa'lpos, the 
epaaTiJS, properly speaking, is the active partner in the sexual 
relationship; the epc.0µEvos, the passive one. That the younger man, 
Aristodemus, is called the epaaTfJS in 173b3, shows that the more 
aggressive individual in this relationship was Aristodemus, in spite of 
the fact that Socrates was well known for his fondness for young lads. 
Cf. Alcibiades' aggressive quest to be the passive partner in an 
epaaTfis-epwµEvos relationship and Nussbaum's commentary on it, 
188-189. As Alcibiades complains, Socrates forces his TTalOlKa (i.e., 
his EpWµEVOl) tO become his EpaaTat (222b3-4). 
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symposium.39 Aristodemus, moreover, probably left the Socratic 
circle by the time Apollodorus narrates the symposium.4 O 
Aristodemus' credibility is further undermined by his inability to recall 
all the speeches (178a 1-5) and by his falling asleep during part of the 
symposium (223b8-c1 ). He may even have an ulterior motive for his 
interest in narrating the symposium: According to Xenophon, 
39Allen, 6, observes that Aristodemus lacks all the qualities the 
other self-invited guest--Alcibiades--possesses. As the first speaker, 
by virtue of his being a narrator, he stands in fitting contrast to 
Alcibiades, the last speaker. Allen, 105, adds that, while Aristodemus 
will praise Eros by narrating the dialogue, Alcibiades will only praise 
Socrates. 
It is not necessary to allegorize Socrates' and Aristodemus' 
shoelessness to make sense of it. Social norms and the roughness of 
the physical terrain suggested that one ought to wear shoes, but on 
most occasions Socrates was impervious to the world about him. 
When he does put on shoes for the banquet, it is a sign that he can 
conform to society's rules, when necessary. More importantly, 
Socrates demonstrates that he can accommodate himself to society, 
while Aristodemus cannot. 
Nussbaum, 185-186, argues along these lines, but adds that 
Socrates' shoelessness reflects how impervious he is to the world 
when he analyzes Eros. Socrates analyzes Eros in the abstract, not 
as it takes place among real people. Thus, he and his Ascent to 
Beauty seems ridiculous to other people. Thus, he and his Ascent to 
Beauty seems ridiculous to other people. Nussbaum, 184, argues: 
"We are not allowed to have the cozy thought that the transformed 
people will be just like us, only happier. Socrates is weird." Rosen, 17, 
however, goes further. He claims that Aristodemus' shoelessness 
shows "lack of prudence or a courting of danger" since unprotected 
feet are more prone to injury. But Rosen is reading more into the text 
than is there. 
40His defection from Socrates is implied by the words epaoTfis 
wv ev Toi's µaALoTa Twv TOTE (173b3-4). It can also be surmised 
from the fact that he is not the narrator of this dialogue and is not 
present at Socrates' death or in any other Platonic dialogue. 
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Aristodemus was an atheist41; thus, he may have been as interested 
in how men portray a god as he was in Socrates' philosophy. This 
theory is supported by the absence of any speech by Aristodemus in 
the dialogue. Although Aristodemus may have notionally delivered a 
speech at the symposium and then excluded it from his narrative out 
of modesty, it is more likely that he declined to praise a god in whom 
he did not believe. After all, if Aristodemus was too modest to include 
his speech in his narration, Apollodorus could have learned 
Aristodemus' speech from Socrates.42 In any event, Aristodemus' 
atheism makes his narration seem less trustworthy. 
In short, the narrators have both positive and negative 
attributes. They are Eros-like in that they are philosophers who strive 
after the truth, but never quite attain it. Thus, we cannot judge them 
either entirely positively or negatively. We cannot, for example, follow 
Bury's wholly positive evaluation of the two, especially his assumption 
that Apollodorus' fanaticism proves that his account of the dialogue is 
41Xen. Mem. 1.4.2, 11. 
42Cf. Rosen, 17-20, for a similar argument. Aristodemus' 
account does not even hint that he gave a speech. He states that he 
sat next to Eryximachus, although it is unclear whether he sat 
between Aristophanes and Eryximachus or between Eryximachus 
and Agathon. Mitchell, 48, argues on the basis of 193e1 -2 that 
Aristodemus must be seated between Eryximachus and Agathon. But 
Aristodemus claims that Eryximachus ought to have followed 
immediately after Aristophanes (185c5-d2), suggesting that 
Aristodemus would have been seated between Eryximachus and 
Agathon. Thus, the evidence drawn from 185c5-d2 cancels out the 
evidence of 193e1-2. It is as if Aristodemus had forgotten about not 
only his speech, but even his presence at the symposium. 
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trustworthy.43 For although a fanatic like Apollodorus may memorize 
the words of his teacher verbatim, he may not understand what he 
has memorized.44 Yet we cannot dismiss Apollodorus and 
Aristodemus as two people who "gehoren zu jener leiderschaftlich 
anhanglichen aber unproduktiven und etwas lacherlichen Art von 
SchOlern, die im Gefolge keines groBen Mannes fehlt."4 5 
Apollodorus and Aristodemus may have their faults, but they are not 
mere "groupies" of Socrates. They are, in fact, properly called 
philosophers. As Diotima observes, philosophers do not possess 
perfect knowledge, but pursue it. They stand between ignorance and 
knowledge, but strive for knowledge (204a1-b2).46 
Through Apollodorus and Aristodemus, Plato shows that 
Socrates' Ascent to Beauty is no simple procedure with guaranteed 
results. As Diotima warns Socrates (21Oa1-2), not all people who 
hear the Ascent outlined are able to follow it. Even people intimately 
43Bury, xvi. 
44Rosen, 10-11. 
45Friedlander, 3:3. 
46Rosen, 14-15, observes that Apollodorus is an Eros-figure: 
neither a true philosopher nor one far removed from philosophy. But 
philosophers, according to Diotima, are Eros-figures (204a-b5). 
Although Diotima does not directly state whether there are different 
degrees among the oaiµovEs, such a view would seem to accord well 
with her outline of the Ascent to Beauty and her distinction between 
lovers of the body and lovers of the soul. If there are oaiµovEs on 
different levels, then Apollodorus would be a oaiµc:.uv of a lower 
degree than Socrates. 
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associated with philosophy may not attain this goal. If Apollodorus 
and Aristodemus, who knew the dialogue by heart, can err, casual 
readers of Plato are even more likely to err.4 7 Furthermore, the 
casual reader cannot assume that he knows how to engage in 
dialectic merely because he has read some dialogues of Plato. After 
all, Apollodorus, too, engages in dialectic, but his method of dialectic 
does not contain the same nuanced irony that Socrates' does.48 
Through Apollodorus and Aristodemus, therefore, Plato 
demonstrates that neither mere recitation of a teacher's words nor 
unguided argument with friends leads to wisdom. Aristodemus and 
Apollodorus portray to the reader how philosophers too easily 
confuse Absolute Beauty with inferior forms of beauty. Although 
neither man is attracted to Socrates' body--the lowliest type of beauty 
47The curious phenomenon of pupils memorizing a dialogue 
and repeating it to other people appears in other dialogues: Euclides 
relates the Theaetetus to Terpsion by having a slave read the 
dialogue he had heard from Socrates, transcribed, and then changed 
from a narrative to conversational form; Cephalus, the narrator of the 
Parmenides, has also memorized Antiphon's account of that 
dialogue. Cf. also Phaedrus' memorization of Lysias' speech in the 
Phaedrus. This phenomenon is not necessarily all bad. At least these 
men are paying attention to the words of Socrates, as Rosen, 11, 
remarks. But since it is people like Aristodemus and Apollodorus who 
are memorizing and repeating these dialogues, it is clear that mere 
reading of a dialogue cannot take the place of dialectic. 
4B1n the Apology Socrates says that many young men saw him 
questioning their elders with the result that they were unable to 
answer him. The youths, pleased with the results, took up dialectic, 
not with a desire to find the truth, but to humiliate others (23c2-7). For 
this reason Plato in the Republic (7.537c9-539d7) forbids. people 
from studying dialectic until they are thirty years old and have had 
extensive preparatory training. Cf. Rosen, 11. 
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in Diotima's scheme (21 Oa4-7)--they do desire the wisdom of his soul. 
Thus, Aristodemus and Apollodorus are better philosophers/lovers 
than most of the guests at the symposium, who think about beauty in 
purely physical terms. Apollodorus, moreover, desires beautiful ideas 
(bnT118evµaTa, µa8fiµaTa and v6µ01 in Diotima's scheme: 21 Oc3-4; 
211 cS-6),49 which are certainly more noble than beautiful souls, but 
still are not Absolute Beauty. Thus, setting out in search of Absolute 
Beauty, even with the help of a good teacher (Socrates or the Platonic 
dialogue), does not guarantee success. 
If the narrators of the dialogue are not perfect people to transmit 
the dialogue, their audience is no better. There are two audiences in 
the prologue to whom Apollodorus recounts the dialogue: Glaucon 
and some unnamed friends. The unnamed friends are the current 
audience; Glaucon was Apollodorus' audience two days earlier. 
Who is this Glaucon? Presumably, he is the same Glaucon as 
in the Parmenides and the Republic,50 and so one of Plato's 
brothers. He is a follower of Socrates and is somewhat interested in 
philosophy, as his participation in the Republic and Parmenides and 
49Apollodorus' fondness for ideas is found in his statement of 
173c2-5: "Apart from considering any practical benefits of 
philosophy, I really get excited, whenever I philosophize or hear 
others doing so." 
50Friedlander, 3:3-4, concurs with this judgment. One cannot 
state with absolute certainty that the Symposium's Glaucon is the 
same one as in the other two dialogues, but it is the most natural 
explanation. 
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his interest in the symposium indicate. He may be less informed 
concerning matters of culture.51 
Glaucon has several motives for hearing this dialogue. First, he 
is fond enough of philosophy and Socrates to want to hear any 
conversations he can. Glaucon, thus, does not deserve Apollodorus' 
insinuation that he is not a philosopher (173a2). But Glaucon does 
have another reason for inquiring into that dialogue, as his calling the 
dialogue the "symposium of Agathon, Socrates, and Alcibiades" 
reveals. By that phrase Glaucon reveals that he is interested in the 
political implications of the symposium and, more specifically, in the 
relationship between Alcibiades and Socrates. Although the reader of 
the Symposium knows that Alcibiades does not appear until late in the 
dialogue, Glaucon does not. He, therefore, overemphasizes the role 
Alcibiades plays in this dialogue. 52 
Why is Glaucon so concerned about Alcibiades? In all 
likelihood, Glaucon sees the symposium as at least partly a political 
gathering--a natural assumption for Glaucon to make. Often 
symposia were occasions for the formation and strengthening of 
51 Nussbaum, 168, argues that Glaucon is uninterested in 
philosophy and literature because he does not know that Agathon has 
left town and Aristodemus has been a pupil of Socrates for only three 
years. But Glaucon may not be quite so uninterested in those matters 
as Nussbaum thinks. Apollodorus asks, "Don't you know that Agathon 
has not lived here for many years and it has not yet been three years 
since I began spending time with Socrates?" The ovK in the question 
implies that Glaucon knows these facts, but in his excitement may 
have forgotten them. 
52Cf. Warner, 161. 
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political alliances.53 Glaucon would naturally be curious about what 
Alcibiades might have been doing at this symposium. Since 
Alcibiades espoused at different times oligarchy and democracy,54 
fought for Athens, Sparta, and Persia,55 and was simultaneously 
loved and hated by Athens,56 any Athenian would naturally be 
curious about Alcibiades' plans for the future. Glaucon may be even 
more concerned because he (mistakenly) believes that this 
symposium took place recently during the turmoil that followed the 
defeat of Athens.57 
53Qn the political aspects of ancient symposia, see Oswyn 
Murray, "The Affair of the Mysteries: Democracy and the Drinking 
Group," in Sympotica, ed. Oswyn Murray, 157-160; George Paul, 
"Symposia and Deipna in Plutarch's Lives and in Other Historical 
Writings," in Dining in a Classical Context, ed. William J. Slater (Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1991 ), 162-164. Murray, 
159, observes that many symposia were composed of dissidents 
who, like their counterparts in seventeenth and eighteenth century 
England, came together for "secret political activity, extempore 
poetry, sexual licence [sic], and exhibitionism under the influence of 
alcohol." 
54Although he was thought to be pro-oligarchy in his younger 
days (Thucydides 6.60), he later was credited with bringing about the 
fall of the oligarchy of the Four Hundred (Thucydides 8.86). 
55Alcibiades claimed that he originally was fond of Sparta, but 
felt rebuffed when the Spartans made the treaty through the agency 
of Nicias, not himself. See Thucydides 5.43; 6.89. 
56Aristophanes, Frogs, 1425. See Thucydides' overall 
evaluation of him in 6.15. 
57Nussbaum, 170, assumes that Glaucon is oligarchical in 
outlook and is interested in discovering if Alcibiades is plotting with the 
democrats against the Thirty. But there is little evidence with which to 
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Glaucon presumably believes that he may deduce Alcibiades' 
plans, if he can determine how Socrates is influencing Alcibiades. 
Hence Glaucon is interested in the E:pwTtKol :\6yot. Is Socrates' truly 
Alcibiades' lover? If so, will Socrates' philosophy govern Alcibiades' 
actions? Glaucon may hope to discover the answers by listening to 
their speeches on Eros and by hearing how the two interacted at the 
symposium. 
Glaucon is a listener governed by both philosophical and 
political interests. The same combination of philosophical and non-
philosophical interests exists in the other people who hear this 
dialogue, the unnamed friends of Apollodorus in the prologue. Like 
Glaucon, they love to dabble in philosophy even though they are 
businessmen (xp11µaTLOTLKol, 173c6), not full-time followers of 
Socrates. They protest as much as Glaucon did, when Apollodorus 
claims that they are not serious enough about philosophy. 
Presumably they are interested in the dialogue because of the 
prospect of Alcibiades' return to Athens during the crisis of 404 B.C. or 
because of his recent death58; they, like Glaucon, want to know how 
ascertain Glaucon's politics. In Xenophon's Memorabilia (3.6) his 
political program consists solely of a claim to be able to advise the 
government well. Nor does his kinship with Critias imply anything. 
Like his brother Plato, he may have been dissatisfied with the Thirty, 
even though his uncle Critias was the head of that government. His 
exact political affiliations, in any case, are somewhat irrelevant 
because politicians of all persuasions would be interested in knowing 
Alcibiades' plans. 
581f Alcibiades is still alive at this time, Apollodorus' friends may 
be interested in the prospect of Alcibiades' return. The narration must 
take place around 404 B.C., as we will see later (pages 77-77,, 
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Socrates may have influenced Alcibiades. Unlike Glaucon, however, 
they seem to have fewer misunderstandings about the nature and 
time of the symposium.59 
Through these two audiences Plato rouses the interest of his 
readers. This symposium has been of great interest to many people: 
Aristodemus, Apollodorus, Phoenix, Glaucon and his friend and the 
friends of Apollodorus. The reasons for their interest--philosophical, 
theological, and political--may vary, but the dialogue speaks to all of 
them. Similarly, Plato's readers may have different reasons for 
reading the dialogue, but the prologue nevertheless encourages 
them all to read it. Apollodorus' statements challenge the readers to 
examine their motives for reading the dialogue (173a1-3, c2-d3): Are 
the readers serious philosophers or not? The presence of Glaucon 
and Apollodorus' friends in the prologue shows that one need not be a 
full-time philosopher to derive benefit from the dialogue. All one must 
be is an Eros-like individual who yearns for wisdom. Indeed, Glaucon 
especially fn. 68). Whether this takes place before or after the news of 
Alcibiades' assassination arrives in Athens is difficult to say. 
59Qne other character mentioned in the dialogue who has 
heard and then passed on the dialogue is Phoenix. Rosen, 15, 
footnote 39, suggests that since the phoenix was thought to 
reproduce asexually, Phoenix represents "the possible rebirth of the 
Socratic circle through the instrumentality of the publication of the 
dialogue." Rosen's suggestion, however, is too fanciful. Perhaps 
Phoenix was better known to Plato's contemporaries and his 
presence in the dialogue was meaningful to them. Unfortunately, to 
modern readers he has no significance; he is merely one more 
Athenian interested in Socrates, although not a member of his 
philosophical circle. 
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and Apollodorus' friends prevent the philosophers (such as even 
Plato himself) from scaring off the reader. 60 
Both the narrators and the audiences of the dialogue, then, 
portray how philosophy is done in concreto. Although Socrates may 
expound on Absolute Beauty, the characters of the narrative frame 
reveal how difficult in practice it is to discern it. One can see beautiful 
bodies, but Absolute Beauty is beyond the power of the human eye. 
Even if one assents to the abstract nature of Absolute Beauty, the 
temptation to see Absolute Beauty as a beautiful idea or thought 
(A6yos or µa8nµa) remains. Absolute Beauty, as Diotima warns us, 
may be beyond our comprehension (21 Oa1-2) and Plato's ability to 
teach us (210a3-4). 
The Setting of the Narrative Frame 
As we have seen, Plato demonstrates the working of Eros 
through the characters of the narrative frame. Through narrator and 
audience, the reader is invited to see how Eros works upon the 
reader, too. Yet Eros is seen at work not only in the characters of the 
prologue, but also in its setting. For Plato uses the contrast between 
the setting of the narration and the setting of the dialogue proper (i.e., 
the symposium) to underscore the effects of Eros. 
60G.-J. de Vries, "Apollodore dans le 'banquet' de Platon," 
Revue des etudes grecques 48 (1935): 65-69, argues with great 
insight that through the fanaticism of Apollodorus Plato intends to 
mock his own devotion to Socrates and philosophy: Plato recognizes 
that his obsession with philosophy makes him appear odd to his fellow 
citizens and, therefore, makes fun of himself through the character of 
Apollodorus. 
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To understand this, we must first pinpoint the two settings of the 
dialogue. The symposium is set in 416 B.C., on the second night after 
the close of the Lenaea, as the reference to Agathon's first victory 
makes clear (173a5-6). 61 No such clue establishes the date of the 
dialogue's retelling by Apollodorus; that date, nonetheless, can be 
deduced from the data given in the dialogue. Apollodorus' retelling 
takes place long enough after the symposium for him to have grown 
from childhood and to have become a student of Socrates for three 
years. 62 It also takes place several years after Agathon left 
Athens. 63 By these criteria a date much earlier than 405 B.C. is 
unlikely. Nor can the retelling have occurred later than Socrates' 
death in 399 B.C. because Apollodorus implies that Socrates is still 
alive.64 
61 The date of Agathon's first victory is given by Athenaeus 
5.217a. 
62Apollodorus states that he was a child when the symposium 
occurred (173a5). This statement confirms his claim that this 
dialogue took place before he began studying with Socrates three 
years earlier (172c3-7). If Apollodorus were a young man of 
approximately twenty years at the time of the retelling and a child of 
ten years at the time of the dialogue, the retelling could take place 
anytime after 406 B.C. 
63The exact year of Agathon's departure is uncertain. Bury, 
lxvi, places his departure around 408 B.C. In any case he had long 
since left Athens when Aristophanes wrote his Frogs in 405 B.C. 
64As Bury, lxvi, rightly notes, the present tense in the clause a<p' 
OU S' eyw LUJKpclTEl avv8LaTpi[3w, "since I have started spending 
time with Socrates," (172c5) indicates that Socrates is still alive. 
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Most scholars conclude from this evidence that the retelling of 
the dialogue took place around 401 or 400 B.C. Bury, in particular, 
argues for such a late date in order to ensure that there is plenty of 
time for Apollodorus to grow up.65 But Glaucon's belief that "the 
meeting of Agathon, Socrates, and Alcibiades" (172a7-b1) was 
recent implies that the three are alive at the time of the dramatic date 
of the first prologue or that Alcibiades, who was the first of the three to 
die, had only recently died.66 The retelling, then, must take place in 
404 or 403 B.C. Any later date would imply that Glaucon's chronology 
concerning Alcibiades is all wrong, which is unlikely. Glaucon may 
have had little interest in Agathon (172c3-4) and the inner circle of 
Socrates (172c4-6), but if Glaucon followed politics at a11,67 he must 
have paid attention to Alcibiades' career. 68 
65Bury, lxvi. See also Guthrie, 4:366; Rosen, 7; Friedlander, 
3:2, 432 n. 4. Cf. also Allen, 4 (who dates the prologue around 402 
B.C.), and Mitchell, 4-5 (who states that the prologue must be 
sometime before 400 B.C.). 
66Alcibiades died in 404 B.C. See Diod. Sic. 14.11; Plut. Vit. Ale., 
37-39. 
67 Glaucon seems to have been interested in politics at least at 
one point in his life; see Xen. Mem. 3.6. 
68 Nussbaum agrees with this date, but also attempts to 
pinpoint the exact day: Apollodorus narrates the symposium to his 
friends the day after Alcibiades' death is announced in Athens. She 
argues that Glaucon is interested in the symposium because he 
thinks that Alcibiades is still alive and has recently come back into 
town, whereas the unnamed friends in the prologue are interested in 
the dialogue because they have heard of the assassination of 
Alcibiades. See Nussbaum, 168-170. Nussbaum's argument 
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The setting of the narration (404 or 403 B.C.) is in sharp contrast 
to the setting of the symposium (416 B.C.). The symposium was held 
when Athens was mightiest and all the characters were at the peaks 
of their careers, but was retold when the glory of Athens and of the 
symposiasts was all but gone. By late 404 B.C., the Athenians had 
been starved into surrendering to Sparta. Athens was beleaguered 
by enemies within and without: The Thirty ruled Athens tyrannically 
while a Spartan garrison occupied Attica. Alcibiades, a potential 
threat to this constitution, had been assassinated. Although 
opposition to the Thirty had arisen, the Thirty and their enemies were 
locked in stalemate. 
The retelling of the dialogue took place, then, at the nadir of 
Athens' power, while the symposium itself occurred at its zenith. The 
symposium occurred when philosophy was popular and the 
participants at the symposium were in political ascendancy. 
Apollodorus' narration occurred when philosophy was unpopular, the 
symposium's participants dead or disgraced, and the political 
ambitions of Alcibiades permanently ended.69 The contrast between 
suggests that the news of Alcibiades' death reached Athens 
sometime in the two day interval between Apollodorus' conversation 
with Glaucon and his talk with his unnamed friends. Although such a 
chronology is not impossible, a far simpler solution is to assume that 
both Glaucon and the unnamed friends ask about the symposium 
shortly after hearing the news of Alcibiades' death. If Glaucon is 
oligarchically inclined (as Nussbaum argues and Glaucon's kinship 
with Critias suggests), it may not be fear of Alcibiades that motivates 
his inquiry into the symposium, but his curiosity of what his teacher 
Socrates had to say to him shortly before his death. 
69Cf. Hoffman n's description of the anti-philosophical state of 
mind in Athens in 401-400 B.C., which mutatis mutandis is also apt for 
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the settings emphasizes how much philosophy depends upon the 
cultural milieu. The philosophers of 416 B.C. discuss Eros at a 
banquet with great flair and originality, while the philosophers of 404 
B.C. can only repeat the words of 416 B.C. The philosophers of 416 
B.C. are grandiose in their treatment of love, even as they live in the 
last of the Golden Age of Athens. No such creativity is possible in the 
midst of defeat and tyranny.70 
This poverty of philosophy in the setting of the narration is due 
to the erotic nature of philosophers as outlined in Socrates' speech. 
On occasion, philosophers, like other daemonic creatures, may attain 
the beauty and truth they seek (203e2-5). More often than not, 
the turmoil of 404-403 B.C. Hoffmann, Ober Platons Symposion 
(Heidelberg, 1947), 27. Of course, it is an over-simplification to say 
that the Athens of Socrates' last days were uniquely anti-
philosophical, since Aristotle nearly suffered the same fate as 
Socrates a century later. Moreover, already in 423 B.C. Aristophanes' 
Clouds and Ameipsias' Connus had lampooned Socrates as a 
sophist. Yet though philosophy in general and Socrates in particular 
never received universal acclaim in Athens, 416 B.C. was by far a 
better year for Socrates than 404. Certainly, 416 B.C. was better than 
404 B.C. for Eryximachus and Phaedrus, who had fled into exile the 
year after the symposium. By 404 B.C. Pausanias had disappeared 
from history and Agathon had left Athens. Only Aristophanes and 
Socrates remained in Athens, and Socrates was soon to die. 
70The seeming lack of inspiration that characterized Athens in 
404 B.C. intensified in the fourth century B.C. The fourth century was 
keenly interested in the fifth century, as can be seen in the revival of 
fifth century tragedies and Athens' nostalgia for the pre-
Peloponnesian War empire. A key piece of evidence for this nostalgia 
is Plato's dialogues, which are nearly all set in the fifth century, even 
though they were written in the fourth century. 
Mitchell, 5, finds it significant that the "Best-of-the-People" 
(Aristodemus) of 416 cannot offer a speech to the Athenians after 
their defeat in 404 B.C. 
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however, they do not possess it. So, too, the wretched, defeated 
Athens longed to hear the beautiful words of philosophers and poets 
spoken in a triumphal age. The Athenians themselves cannot 
produce wisdom any more than Eros himself possesses wisdom. 
Instead the Athenians must turn to older and wiser sources, even as 
Socrates consults Diotima. 
Yet, as the prologue makes clear, seeking wisdom from older 
sources is not without its difficulties. Apollodorus may rightly see that 
he and his friends do not possess wisdom and cannot attain it by their 
own power (173d1-3), but Apollodorus does not even make the effort. 
Rather than venture out in search of wisdom, he repeats words of 
wisdom spoken twelve years earlier--or whatever he is able to 
remember of it. Consequently, Apollodorus does not find truths that 
may fill in the gaps left by the speakers of the symposium, but his 
account of the symposium disintegrates over time. The message of 
the symposium becomes garbled and has no lasting effect on his 
thought or behavior. Such is the effect of glorifying a past era and 
giving up on the present. Plato thereby warns his readers not to take 
the words of the late Socrates as the final answer to the questions 
under discussion, but to pursue the investigation further.71 
The setting of the narrative frame, then, challenges the reader 
to evaluate the interplay between philosophy and external factors, 
71 Socrates, of course, continues to philosophize in this gloomy 
era. The Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo are set when 
Athens is still suffering ill fortune and Socrates faces death. Even his 
death sentence cannot lessen Socrates' attention to philosophy. 
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especially nostalgia. As the narrative frame demonstrates, nostalgia 
--especially nostalgia for a wiser era--can be an expression of Eros. 
For nostalgia is a recognition that the current era lacks something. 
Nostalgia attempts to reacquire what has been lost and to make it a 
permanent possession (cf. 200d8-10; 205a6-7). At the same time, 
nostalgia has hidden dangers. It may prevent an individual from 
engaging in philosophy and reduce him to citing past authorities. It 
may emphasize the lack found in the present situation rather than 
lead to any positive steps to fill the lack. Thus, nostalgia is daemonic: 
It may lead to wisdom or reduce one to perpetual ignorance. 
Conclusion 
When we began this chapter, we asked how the narrative frame 
fit in with the rest of the dialogue. In this chapter we have seen that 
the characters and setting of the narrative frame, as well as the 
process of narration, demonstrate the workings of Eros and, thus, are 
an integral part of the dialogue. The characters are "erotic," i.e., 
philosophers. They love the beauty of speeches and noble ideas and 
long to possess them forever. The narrators desire to procreate in 
beauty and the audience wants to satisfy a longing. As erotic men, 
the characters of the narrative frame have as much right to be 
included in this dialogue about Eros as the guests at the symposium 
do. In fact, Apollodorus and Aristodemus are arguably better lovers in 
the Socratic sense than some of the guests assembled at the 
symposium, since they do not equate Eros with sex or physical desire. 
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Not only the characters but also the setting of the narrative 
frame is erotic. The setting of the narrative frame lacks the glory of 
the setting of the symposium (416 B.C.); nonetheless, the people who 
retell and listen to the retelling of the symposium long for this past 
golden age. In so doing, they exemplify in one more way how Eros 
operates. Eros is a lack longing to be fulfilled--not only the longing for 
sexual satisfaction, but also the longing to acquire wisdom and a 
stable political situation. Thus, the contrast between the setting of the 
symposium and that of the narrative frame underscores the 
universality of the longing associated with Eros and applies this truth 
to the political, cultural, and philosophical arenas. 
The prologue, furthermore, demonstrates how the process of 
narration is related to philosophy. Both are manifestations of Eros 
who longs for and. procreates in beauty. The physical beauty of 
Agathon inspires the guests at the symposium to procreate beautiful 
ideas, but the beauty of the ideas expressed at the symposium 
inspires the dialogue's narration. Thus, the narration of philosophical 
dialogue is akin to philosophical discourse inspired by physical 
beauty. In light of the narrators of the Symposium, one can question 
whether the philosophical dialogue in Plato's mind is as erotic as 
philosophical discourse, but one cannot deny the essential eroticism 
of narration. Narration, like philosophy, may fail, but its practitioners 
exhibit the erotic longing found in all men. 
When we see these literary and philosophical connections with 
the rest of the dialogue, the first two Stephanus pages of the 
Symposium are no longer an obstacle to our thesis that the prologue 
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is organically connected to the entire dialogue, but rather a 
confirmation of our thesis. For in the narrative frame Plato has shown 
the power and limits of Eros as clearly as Socrates does in the body of 
the dialogue. 
CHAPTER THREE 
EROS OF BEAUTY AND THE GOOD: 
THE CHARACTERS AND DRAMA OF THE PROLOGUE 
In the last chapter we saw that a seemingly unnecessary 
element in the prologue--Apollodorus' narration of the dialogue--does 
bear significant relation to the rest of the dialogue. In fact, his 
narration demonstrates the "official" doctrine about Eros in action: All 
men strive to apprehend beauty and to procreate in beauty. Beauty 
exists in handsome bodies, but a nobler beauty can be found by 
pursuing truth and the good, especially by hearing such dialogues as 
the Symposium. Because mankind in general and philosophers in 
particular are daemonic beings, they rarely, if ever, arrive at Absolute 
Beauty and cannot permanently possess it. Thus, Apollodorus and 
his audience strive for Absolute Beauty, but encounter obstacles 
before they can attain their goal. By both their successes and their 
failures, Apollodorus and his friends demonstrate concretely what 
Socrates theorizes about Eros in the abstract. Since some readers 
may learn more by a story than by an abstract discussion, the 
prologue dramatizes the effects of Eros. Through their behavior, 
Apollodorus and company expound Socrates' view of Eros as clearly 
as Socrates does in his speech. 
We ought not, then, underestimate the importance of the 
characters and drama of the prologue. For if the seemingly most 
84 
85 
unnecessary element of the prologue--the narration of Apollodorus--
tu rns out to be integrally connected with the main theme of the 
dialogue, then the other elements of the prologue deserve to be 
analyzed in terms of the dialogue's philosophy. In this chapter, 
therefore, we will examine how the characters, drama, and words of 
the second half of the prologue (174b3-178a5) exemplify the 
dialogue's philosophy of Eros as process.1 Specifically, we will see 
how each guest's behavior in the prologue exemplifies his own 
portrayal of Eros while vindicating Socrates' explanation of Eros as 
the most comprehensive theory. Moreover, we will see that the 
ascent to Athens in the prologue illustrates the Ascent to Beauty 
outlined by Socrates in the body of the dialogue. Thus, even among 
the actions that are not at first glance erotic, Eros is at work. 
Beauty as Defined by the Characters in the Prologue 
As Socrates observes, each guest at the symposium believes 
that he is an expert on Eros (177d6-e2}. Phaedrus and Eryximachus, 
by suggesting Eros as a subject for encomium, demonstrate 
confidence in their expertise. Pausanias, Agathon, and Aristophanes 
also claim expertise in this field, since drama is the province of 
Aphrodite and Dionysus (177d8-e2). Socrates himself claims that 
Eros is the only subject on which he is an expert (177d7-8). So many 
1 The prologue of the Symposium can be divided into two parts: 
The first half, namely, Apollodorus' narration (172a1-174a2), and the 
second half, namely, Aristodemus' description of the setting of the 
symposium (174a3-178a5). · 
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experts have assembled at the symposium that Socrates fears that 
the first speakers will say all that can be said about Eros, leaving no 
material for the later speakers (177e3-5). 
The multitude of self-appointed experts on Eros validates 
Socrates' claim that all men are under Eros' sway (205a5-8; 206c1 -2). 
As Socrates observes and all the guests prove, all people strive for 
the Beautiful (To KaA6v) and the Good (To aya06v).2 Most of the 
guests are moved by the beauty of bodies: Pausanias loves Agathon, 
21n 204d3-205a4 Diotima outlines the ultimate goal: happiness 
that comes about by possession of the Good. F.C. White, "Love and 
Beauty in Plato's Symposium," Journal of Hellenic Studies 109 
(1989): 149-157, has questioned, however, whether Diotima means 
to identify the Good with the Beautiful; he argues that Diotima 
substitutes the Good for the Beautiful, so that Socrates can better 
answer her question why people seek Beauty, but does not equate 
the two. Similarly, Soble argues that beauty is an instrumental, not an 
intrinsic goal; see Alan Soble, "Love is not Beautiful: Symposium 
200e-201 c," Apeiron 19 (1985), 43. Mitchell, 130-132, also raises the 
question of the relationship between Good and Beauty. 
There are good reasons, however, to assume that Beauty and 
the Good, while not identical, ought not to be separated. The ancient 
Greeks associated the two with one another; the ideal was to be 
KaAos Kaya06s. Plato himself underscores this association when he 
calls Agathon KaA6v (174a9), while emphasizing the etymology of 
Agathon's name (174b4); thus, in Agathon he associates Beauty with 
the Good. Moreover, as Allen, 54, observes, Socrates links Good with 
Beauty in 201 c, where "lack of beautiful things implies lack of good 
things." Moreover, if we separate the two, we run into difficulties. As 
Anderson, 82, notes, if Good is a higher value than Beauty, the 
Ascent should have the Good, not Absolute Beauty, as its goal. If 
Beauty and the Good are disassociated in 204d3-205a4, the question 
of why men desire Beauty is never answered. Perhaps it is best to say 
with Allen, 45, that "beauty is the sensuous aspect of goodness, what 
is good to look at or good to hear, and, by an easy extension, 
goodness in thought or discourse." 
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Eryximachus loves Phaedrus, and Socrates cannot keep his hands 
off handsome young men (213c3-5; 216d2-3).3 The beauty of words 
also moves a number of the guests--Phaedrus, Pausanias, 
Aristophanes, Agathon, and even Socrates. Nor is it words in general 
that impress them, but rather the tales of the deeds of Eros (as 
expressed through Dionysus and Aphrodite--177e1-3). The guests 
are lovers of Beauty, indeed. 
Since, however, each guest has a different understanding of 
what Beauty is, not all of these "experts" agree about Eros and its 
goal. Although each guest builds on the speeches of his 
predecessors, some of the guests openly criticize previous 
speakers.4 This difference among the guests, however, is not 
surprising, as Diotima's description of the Ascent to Beauty 
demonstrates: There are several possible objects of beauty, some 
nobler, some less so.5 All who pursue beauty of any kind are to be 
3Qn the relationship between Phaedrus and Agathon, see 
Georg Wissowa, Wilhelm Kroll, and Kurt Witte, eds., Paulys 
Rea/encycylopadie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft (hereafter 
PW) s.v. "Agathon" 1 :761; for the relationship between Eryximachus 
and Phaedrus, see PW s.v. "Phaedrus" 38:1556. 
4Pausanias criticizes Phaedrus for assuming there is only one 
Eros (180c4-d1 ); Agathon criticizes Phaedrus for saying that Eros is 
an ancient deity ( 195a8); and Socrates refutes a point made by 
Aristophanes (205d10-206a 1) and Agathon's entire argument 
(199c3-201 c9). 
5Nehemas rightly observes that it is the Ascent to Beauty that 
radically differentiates Socrates' speech from the others. The rest of 
his speech is typical for an encomium, but when Diotima speaking 
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counted lovers, whether or not they pursue beautiful bodies. Their 
contemporaries may not apply the label of epaaTiJS to them because 
the semantic field of epO:v and epaaTfis has been narrowed to exclude 
certain forms of desire (especially the "higher," more abstract forms 
of Eros or desire). Nonetheless, lovers of all objects of beauty, 
Socrates avers, deserve the name epaaTfis, "lover."6 
Not surprisingly, each expert maintains a view about Eros and 
Beauty that accords well with his lifestyle. It is appropriate, therefore, 
to examine how Plato characterizes each of the guests in the 
prologue, in order to determine how each guest's claim to expertise is 
influenced by his own personality. We must examine for what object 
of desire each guest seeks, and we must ask how Plato evaluates 
those objects, even as we examined in the last chapter the implicit 
theories of Eros that govern the behavior of Apollodorus and 
Aristodemus. 7 
through Socrates comes to the Ascent, she states that all that 
preceded was preliminary to the real knowledge of Eros. See Plato, 
Symposium, tr. Alexander Nehemas and Paul Woodruff, with an 
introduction by Alexander Nehemas (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1989), xx-xxi. Thus, it is appropriate for us to keep the 
Ascent to Beauty foremost in our mind, as we examine the characters 
of the prologue and, later, the physical ascent mentioned in the 
prologue. 
6Socrates cites TTOtTJats, "poetry," as a parallel example (205a9-
d8). Originally, it meant any "creation" or "production", but it has 
come to refer to only a limited range of artistic creations. LSJ, 1429. 
71n examining the characters we will avoid type-casting the 
speakers as representatives of different professions or schools of 
philosophy, as Plochmann, 34, 38, criticizes Rosen for doing. 
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Before looking at Plato's depiction of the guests, however, we 
ought to note that Plato is selective in introducing the characters of 
the prologue. Plato does not have all the guests who were 
supposedly at this banquet speak in the prologue, but only the most 
notable lovers--those who gave the most memorable speeches in 
honor of Eros (178a 1-3). Thus, only those guests whose speeches 
are narrated by Aristodemus have a speaking part in the prologue. 8 
The guests who sit between Phaedrus and Pausanias (180c1 -2) are 
silent not only in the body of the dialogue, but also in the prologue, so 
that Plato may introduce the erotic character of those individuals who 
best portray Eros. It is as if only those who give noteworthy encomia 
of Eros are worthy of having their behavior portrayed in the prologue. 
(Compare the typecasting done by Edmund L. Erde, "Comedy and 
Tragedy and Philosophy in the Symposium: An Ethical Vision," 
Southwest Journal of Philosophy? (1976), 161-167, who discusses 
Aristophanes and Agathon exclusively as representatives of their 
profession.) Instead, we will focus on the objects of their desire and 
will endeavor to draw a well rounded picture of the individuals. In 
particular, we will take to hear Gallagher's remarks concerning the 
dialectical nature of the characters. See Gallagher, 40-42. 
Moreover, it ought to be clear that there are several fruitful ways 
in which the relationship between the speakers and the order of their 
speeches can be analyzed. See Bury, lii-lvi; Duncan, 277-288; Miller, 
19-25. The intent of the scheme proposed in this chapter is not so 
much to deny the legitimacy of opposing arrangements of the 
speakers as to analyze the speakers in terms of Socrates' speech. 
8Plato does mention in the prologue, in addition to the guests, 
some servants: the cooks (175b5-c1) and the servant who greeted 
Aristodemus (174e2; 175a3, 6). One other servant speaks briefly, 
after having discovered Socrates on the neighbor's porch (175a7-9). 
These individuals are the only exceptions to the rule stated above. 
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The 'EpaaTai of Pleasure: Pausanias and Aristophanes 
In modern parlance "Platonic love" means a love that finds no 
physical expression. 9 This definition at first glance seems not entirely 
unjustified, since Diotima in the Ascent to Beauty prefers an abstract, 
incorporeal Beauty to the beauty found in human bodies. Diotima, 
however, never denies a proper place for physical beauty in her 
scheme. In fact, she recognizes desire for beautiful bodies as a 
legitimate form of Eros (206b7-c5; 21 Oa5-b6). Furthermore, she 
maintains that love of physical beauty is a prerequisite for the desire 
for Absolute Beauty. Before a lover can progress to higher objects of 
love, he must pursue beautiful bodies (Ta KaAa awµaTa, 21 Oa6). 
Even promiscuity, the love of many beautiful bodies, has a proper, 
albeit limited, place in the Ascent to Beauty: It teaches a young man 
to discover beauty as a universal phenomenon. 
Thus, the love of physical beauty is truly called Eros and 
gratifying oneself with physical beauty is not necessarily wrong. 
Although not the highest possible expression of Eros, it is a form of it. 
Yet there are a number of dangers associated with this type of Eros: 
Because of its emphasis on physical beauty, the love equated with 
sex can be reduced to one of several sensual pleasures. From this 
9 The Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989), s.v. 'Platonic,' 11 :1006: "2a. Applied to love or affection 
for one of the opposite sex of a purely spiritual character, and free 
from sensual desire. Also of affection for one of the same sex." 
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perspective, Eros is synonymous with wine and sex (Dionysus and 
Aphrodite}, as Socrates intimates (177d7-e3).1 O 
Two guests are present whose speeches emphasize the 
physical side of Eros: Pausanias and Aristophanes.11 Although in 
their speeches they touch on other purposes of desire--including its 
social value (Pausanias) and its psychological and theological 
implications (Aristophanes)--they see Eros as primarily love of the 
body. For Pausanias, the question is ultimately whether or not a 
10Anderson, 11, observes that in effect Dionysus has already 
passed judgment on them (as Agathon had requested)--and the 
judgment is not favorable. 
11To an extent Phaedrus and Agathon assume that the goal of 
Eros is sex. Yet by the showmanship of their speeches, they 
demonstrate that a true epaoTfis is as concerned with the beauty of 
words as with the beauty of bodies. See the discussion on pages 99-
101. 
Duncan, 277-286, has set up a different paradigm of the 
speeches. According to him, Phaedrus and Eryximachus emphasize 
the human ("horizontal") aspects of love, while Pausanias and 
Agathon emphasize its virtuous ("vertical") aspects. Aristophanes 
modifies the arguments of Phaedrus and Eryximachus to make a 
more cogent system of the "horizontal" view, while Socrates develops 
Pausanias' and Eryximachus' ''vertical" view, purging it of sophistic 
errors. In Duncan's scheme, Aristophanes' speech counterbalances 
Socrates'. 
Duncan's division of the speakers into those influenced by the 
naturalistic school of Hippias (Phaedrus and Eryximachus) and those 
influenced by the ethically and rhetorically minded school of Prodicus 
(Pausanias and Agathon) is insightful, but ignores some facts. 
Though Eryximachus may believe in "reciprocity" among lovers, his 
speech does not allude to sex, but has made it an abstract endeavor. 
In contrast, despite Pausanias' evaluation of Eros in ethical terms, his 
idea of gratification is more earthy than that of the al_legedly 
"horizontalist" Eryximachus. 
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beloved ought to gratify (xapii;Ea8at) his lover.12 Although the 
beloved must attempt to improve himself morally by his choice of 
lover ( 184a5-b3; 185a5-b5}, 13 the lover himself learns nothing in the 
experience but merely has his sexual urges gratified.14 
Similarly, Aristophanes views Eros primarily as the joining of two 
halves. Although such a joining ameliorates man's psychological 
state and makes his punishment from the gods easier to bear, 
Aristophanes does not envision a higher goal than intercourse 
(191 b5-c8).15 To be sure, Aristophanes' speech is not without 
12Mitchell, 42, rightly notes that in the end Pausanias forgets 
his distinction between uranian and pandemic love; moreover, he 
makes the beloved, not the lover, responsible for distinguishing 
between the two types of love, since the lover is too blinded by love to 
make the distinction. See Bury, xxvi, for a similar judgment: "The 
nakedness of this proposition is cloked [sic] by the device of 
distinguishing between a noble and a base Eros, and by the addition 
of the saving clause apETflS evEKa. Nonetheless, it would seem that 
the speaker's main interest is in xapil;Ea8at, rather than in accruing 
apETi}, and that fundamentally he is a sensualist.. .. " In this light, it is 
significant that we know absolutely nothing about Pausanias except 
his love affair with Agathon. See Allen, 14; Mitchell, 29. 
13 Finding a lover who will improve the beloved morally is 
difficult, as Alcibiades' speech demonstrates. Thus, Wolz, 329, notes 
that although Alcibiades searched for a lover who would improve him 
morally and intellectually, Socrates declined to be that lover, since he 
could not communicate his wisdom to Alcibiades. 
14Warner, 169, criticizes Pausanias also for not explaining the 
commonality between base and noble love and for not integrating 
physical love (sex) with other aspects of desire. 
1 Soover argues that Plato intended Aristophanes' speech as a 
parody of Aristophanes, much as Aristophanes' Clouds parodied 
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philosophical merit. As Duncan observes, Aristophanes presents the 
clearest argument of the "horizontal" notion of love, since he "purifies 
the horizontal view of love of its materialism, Hippias' materialism," 
since the Hippian school (represented by Phaedrus and 
Eryximachus) "tends to reduce the human to the non-human." 
Duncan also observes that contra Socrates the striving for the 
''vertical" is what got mankind in trouble in the first place.16 Moreover, 
as Hani observes, his discussion of an androgynous sex is not entirely 
his own comic creation, but draws from earlier Greek mythology--
from Hesiod's Chaos to the god Hermaphroditus of the fourth century 
B.C.--as attested to in text and art (e.g., the Stockholm 
Hermaphroditus and Berlin Hermaphroditus). Furthermore, 
Aristophanes uses the myth of original androgynous beings to 
describe the origin of Eros, not of humanity. Hani argues that by 
describing how Eros' existence is due to human weakness that longs 
for something greater than mere self, Aristophanes is not far from 
Socrates. Plato had Aristophanes draw on elements from folklore 
(e.g., the etiologic myth cast in an Aesopic style), so that 
Aristophanes' speech would differ from all the rest in emphasizing the 
individual over the abstract. Since Plato believed that "the individual, 
the particular, and the familiar"--the stock of comedy--were 
antithetical to the pursuit of philosophy, he sets up this contrast 
between Aristophanes and the other speakers. See K.J. Dover, 
"Aristophanes' Speech in Plato's Symposium," (hereafter, Dover, 
"Aristophanes") Journal of Hellenic Studies 86 (1966) 41-50. Cf. K.J. 
Dover, Symposium , 113. 
16Duncan, 283-284. 
94 
Diotima's position, viz., that Eros exists because humans strive for 
immortality.17 
Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that Aristophanes emphasizes 
primarily the physical aspect of Eros. Although the welding together 
that a couple desires involves more than sex, 18 the union of lover and 
beloved is expressed solely in physical terms in Aristophanes' 
speech. 
By not discussing the moral implications of Eros for the lover, 
Pausanias and Aristophanes differ markedly from Diotima. Her 
Ascent to Beauty is chiefly concerned with the moral education of the 
lover, not the beloved.19 The Ascent is described primarily from the 
lover's point of view, not from that of the beloved: The lover, not the 
beloved, progresses through the various stages of seeking beauty. 
To the extent that any of her theory about the Ascent applies to the 
17See Jean Hani, "Le Mythe de l'Androgyne dans le Banquet 
de Platon," Euphrosyne 11 (1981/1982): 94-101. 
18Cf. Anderson, 44. 
19As Nehemas, xix, observes, the ancient Greeks presumed 
that the lover possessed wisdom which he then imparted to the 
beloved. Socrates, however, "has turned the lover from a purveyor 
into a pursuer of wisdom." Similarly, Phaedrus alludes to the power of 
Eros to improve not only the behavior of the young, impressionable 
beloveds, but also that of their lovers. Since lovers would not want 
their beloveds to see them in a bad light, lovers are inspired to act 
more courageously than if they were merely fighting before their 
peers (178d4-e1 ). Thus, an army of lovers and beloveds (178e3-
179a2) would not only train the beloveds in heroic action, but would 
incite the lovers to uphold the heroic code themselves. 
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beloved, it is that the search for Beauty can be undertaken as a lover 
(To 6p8ws brl Ta epwTlKa ieval, 211 b7-c1) or as a beloved (fi vTT· 
&A.A.ov &yea8al, 211 c1 ). In all of this Diotima differs from Pausanias 
who is ultimately unconcerned about the moral formation of the lover, 
and Aristophanes, for whom Eros provides relief, not education. 
Aristophanes' and Pausanias' views about Eros are determined 
in large part by who they are. Aristophanes, who cudgeled his 
opponents with sexual lampoon in his comedies, recognized, as did 
the comedians before him, that men are often made vulnerable by 
sex. To charge that a man is effeminate can be more effective in 
humiliating an opponent than bringing charges of political 
misconduct.20 One would expect, therefore, that Aristophanes would 
emphasize the fragility of the human condition in his encomium of 
Eros. Pausanias, in contrast, equates Eros with sex because of his 
20Kaibel notes in PW s.v. Aristophanes (13:985): Der 
Komodiendichter jener Zeit war ein privilegierter Censor nicht nur des 
qffentlichen Lebens, sondern auch des privaten, soweit es in der 
Offentlichkeit erkennbar wurde. Er war an sich ein einzelner 
Privatmann, aber sobald er, vom Staate gewissermassen im Auftrage 
des Gottes bestellt, die Buhne des Staates betrat, war er der Vertreter 
eines durch den Schutz der Religion geheiligten Princips. Alles, was 
Anstoss gab, fiel seiner Kritik zu, das µeµcpea8al, das Aufdecken einer 
v6aos, und, wenigstens idell, auch die Heilung derselben war sein 
Element: was tadellos schien, ging ihn nichts an. 
Erde, 165, adds that "comedy denies the cosmic order and 
suggests paying any price to get along" --as Socrates refuses to do in 
the Apology. Thus, it is "cruel jesting at the expense of humanity." 
Hence Socrates' rebuttal of comedy in 223d3-6. Erde perhaps 
overstates the case, but one cannot deny the comedian's interest in 
sexuality as a means to exploit his opponents' weaknesses. 
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own vices. As Gallagher has observed, Pausanias desires to be 
taken seriously as a philosopher, but is addicted to vice. Although he 
wishes to treat the topic in all philosophical earnest, his personality 
dictates that he attempt to modify existing v6µoL concerning erotic 
desire to suit his own purposes. Pausanias distinguishes between 
base and noble love--a philosophical advancement over Phaedrus' 
presentation--but in the end says that anything done in the name of 
love is justifiable, if only the lover or beloved claims to have a noble 
goal.21 Thus, Pausanias appears in the end to be a scoundrel 
cloaking his vice with virtue.22 
Not surprisingly, then, Pausanias and Aristophanes are 
portrayed in the prologue as revelers in sensual pleasures. They, 
along with Agathon, have overindulged themselves in alcohol the 
previous night. In fact, the only time Pausanias and Aristophanes 
speak in the prologue is to complain about their hangovers (176a5-
b4). Pausanias complains that he is really (Tct'J ovTL) in a very (TTavv) 
bad way and needs a rest before (presumably) overindulging in wine 
21 Gallagher, 40, 52; see also Rosen, 88; Bury, xxvi. Nola, 68-
72, argues for a more positive interpretation of Pausanias' speech, 
but without the counterbalancing of philosophy and vice that 
Gallagher sees in Pausanias. To the degree that Nola does not take 
the vice-ridden nature of Pausanias into consideration, his 
interpretation of Pausanias' speech is flawed. 
22As Rosen, 63, puts it: "Pausanias, however, is seriously 
concerned with neither logic nor morality. He is engaged in an 
intricate and sophistic attempt to secure his own erotic advantage." 
For an analysis of the sophistic style of Pausanias, see Bury, xxvii-
xxviii. 
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again (176a6-8). Aristophanes numbers himself among the 
{3E{3aTTTLaµevoL (176b4); like Pausanias, he eagerly seeks relief from 
drinking that night in whatever way he can (TTavTl Tp6TT~, 176b3).23 
Judged by the criterion of drunkenness, Agathon would have to 
be numbered among the lovers of sensual pleasure. After all, 
Agathon professes that he is not strong enough to survive another 
round of drinking (176b8). Agathon, however, does not belong 
among the lovers of mere sensual beauty, since other, nobler aspects 
of his character are revealed in the prologue, as we will see. What 
marks Pausanias and Aristophanes in the prologue as lovers of a 
particularly base beauty is that they speak only of their over-
indulgence in wine the previous night. 
The prologue, then, introduces Pausanias and Aristophanes as 
the lowest form of the sophist and poet, respectively. The base 
Pausanias finds a more noble counterpart in Eryximachus; while 
Pausanias complains in the prologue about his hangovers, 
Eryximachus proposes an intellectual exercise. Similarly, Phaedrus 
and Agathon are better representatives of poetry and rhetoric than 
Aristophanes. Phaedrus, by his intellectual interest in Eros and 
encomia, is ultimately the person responsible for the symposium's 
23As Hani, 89, notes: "La bouffonnerie dans l'expose du mythe 
est en harmonie avec I' attitude de son 'auteur'. C'est sous les traits 
d'un ivrogne qu'il se presente lui-meme, en disant qu'il est un de ceux 
qui, la veille, ont bu le plus copieusement Kal yap avT6s ElµL Twv 
xees {3E{3aTTTLOµEVUJV 176 B, ce qui l'afflige, au milieu des discours 
serieux sur l'amour, d'un hoquet rebelle dont ii ne vient a bout qu'en 
se chatouillant les narine (189 A)." 
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choice of topic. Agathon is as much concerned with great ideas 
(175c7-d2) as he is with adulation and wine. Thus, the prologue 
establishes a hierarchy among the guests. Phaedrus, Eryximachus, 
and even Agathon are greater than Pausanias and Aristophanes.24 
Although all of the other guests may have speeches inferior to that of 
Socrates,25 they are not all equal to one another. 
The prologue is Plato's evaluation of the lovers of sensual 
Beauty and sensual pleasure, demonstrating the folly of equating 
Eros exclusively with the desire for physical Beauty. Those who 
pursue base pleasure will find the consequences unpleasant, as the 
overindulgent Aristophanes and Pausanias discover. Nonetheless, 
the prologue reveals that the two are true lovers, even as all men are. 
Even if their view of Eros is a baser one than that held by Socrates, 
they are still under Eros' sway. Aristophanes and Pausanias are 
concerned solely with Dionysus and Aphrodite, which makes 
Socrates attribute to them the title EpaaTa[ (177e1 -2). 
24This does not imply that Phaedrus' and Agathon's speeches 
succeed in their attempt to speak more intelligently about Eros. 
Agathon's speech, after all, turns out to be filled more with Gorgianic 
rhetoric than serious content, as Socrates' interrogation of him 
reveals. Nonetheless, Phaedrus and Agathon are more concerned 
with the abstract side of Eros than Pausanias and Aristophanes are. 
25The customary interpretation of the dialogue is that Socrates' 
speech is the climax of the dialogue. See, for example, Krischer, 51-
53. As we have seen (pages 59-61 ), this point is well taken, so long 
as we understand that Socrates' speech is not the whole dialogue or 
the philosophically perfect description of Eros. By their natures, Eros 
and Absolute Beauty cannot be explained perfectly. 
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The 'EpaaTa[ of Rhetoric and Sophistry: 
Phaedrus, Eryximachus, and Agathon 
Not all the guests, however, view Eros solely as the desire for 
beautiful bodies or pleasure. Most of the guests, in fact, use the term 
Eros to denote any intense longing, including the longings for non-
sensual beauty. Socrates, of course, prefers a non-sensual beauty, 
or rather a sensual beauty that leads to a transcendent Beauty. In 
Diotima's scheme, as outlined by Socrates, Eros leads ultimately to 
an incorporeal Absolute Beauty. In between sensual beauty and 
Absolute Beauty, however, there are several objects of beauty: souls 
(\Vvxai, 21 Ob7), intellectual pursuits (bnTfJOEvµaTa, 21 Oc3), laws 
(v6µot, 21 Oc4), pieces of knowledge (bnaTf)µat, 21 Oc6), and the 
thought of beauty (bnaTfiµnv µ[av TotavTf)v, fl EaTtv Ka.Aov TotouoE, 
21 Od7-e1 ). These objects of beauty vary in scope, but are all in some 
sense abstract or incorporeal. While none of them--including the 
thought of beauty--is Absolute Beauty, the desire for these objects is 
a nobler manifestation of Eros than desire for the body is. 
Although all the guests aver that Eros involves more than sex, 
only three guests besides Socrates emphasize a non-physical beauty 
and its Eros: Phaedrus, Eryximachus, and Agathon. At first glance, 
Pausanias and Aristophanes seem worthy to be on the list, since 
Pausanias was a pupil of Prodicus, and Aristophanes was a comic 
poet well known for his treatment of contemporary intellectual 
debates. Yet Pausanias and Aristophanes differ greatly from the 
other guests in the emphasis that they put on sex. As we saw in the 
last section, Pausanias and Aristophanes view copulation as the 
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ultimate goal of Eros. In contrast, Phaedrus and Agathon are more 
rhetorical in their analysis of Eros, while Eryximachus avoids entirely 
any discussion of intercourse in his description of Eros. 
To some degree, these three guests emphasize beauty 
because of their situation in life. Eryximachus is a physician, whose 
profession demands that he treat the human body in a detached 
manner.26 Thus, he treats sexual attraction as merely one of several 
drives in man. Sexual attraction becomes merely a paradigm for all 
forces of attraction; Eros then becomes a cosmic, not a bodily, force. 
Agathon and Phaedrus, meanwhile, are afforded a unique 
perspective on Eros because they are epwµEvoL (beloveds). Since 
they cannot, properly speaking, love their lovers, they must find a 
different object of desire.27 Thus, they more than their lovers turn to 
26Allen notes, 30, that Eryximachus practiced a profession that 
was remarkably advanced by modern standards--a profession of 
which he was rightfully proud. Anderson, 11, adds that as a physician 
Eryximachus would fall under the aegis of Apollo, the rival of Dionysus 
(and hence Eros, since for Anderson Eros is a mask worn by 
Dionysus). Although Anderson puts more emphasis on the tension 
between the Apollonian and Dionysian in the dialogue, thus betraying 
his interest in Nietzsche, it is fitting to distinguish the more orderly 
concept of Eros held by Eryximachus from that held by Pausanias and 
Aristophanes. 
27 As Warner, 165, notes, Phaedrus' speech does not indicate 
''first-hand experience of love," since he looks at it through the eyes of 
a beloved. Not surprisingly, then, Phaedrus praises the effects of the 
love relationship more than the relationship itself, as Anderson, 24-
26, observes; moreover, to the extent that Phaedrus praises the 
beloved, he is praising himself. With his emphasis on the beloved, 
Phaedrus nearly arrives at a reciprocal relationship of love, although 
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incorporeal beauty and express their desire in a non-physical or 
abstract way. Primarily, their Eros has as its object beautiful words--
especially the words about Eros. Phaedrus' constant desire is to 
praise Eros in an encomium (177a5-b1 ), while Agathon speaks 
"beautifully" (KaAws; 201 c1) about Eros, employing every Gorgianic 
device he can muster in his peroration (197c1 -e5). Because they 
long to have the command of beautiful words, their speeches are not 
only about Eros but are themselves expressions of Eros, EpwTtKol 
.A6yot (172b2).28 
The interest of these three guests in incorporeal beauty is 
manifest already in the prologue. Nowhere is this more easily seen 
than in the case of Phaedrus. The prologue demonstrates that 
Phaedrus is essentially a man of books and learning,29 an aspect of 
his personality that would not be manifest, if one judged solely by the 
content of his speech. In his speech Phaedrus praises Eros' effect on 
Achilles (179e1-180a4) and Alcestis (179b5-d2) and treats the bard 
Orpheus with contempt (179d2-7). Nonetheless, the prologue 
reveals that Phaedrus is more akin to the Orpheus he despises than 
this is expressed in the traditional terms of EpaaTfis-Epc.0µevos. See 
Nola, 59-63. 
28As Allen, 8-11, notes, the main characters (except for 
Aristophanes) were present also at the Protagoras, which is 
essentially concerned with the value of sophistic education; hence the 
emphasis some of the guests in the Symposium place on rhetoric. 
29Rosen, 40-44, has traced the influence of the polymath 
Hippias on Phaedrus. This judgment is drawn from the Protagoras. 
See PWs.v. Phaedrus (38:1556). 
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to a Homeric hero like Achilles. Phaedrus is a talker and reader, not a 
doer. He has read a number of books containing encomia and is well 
aware of the sophists' habit of praising trivial items (177b5-c1 ). He is 
familiar with the sophist Prodicus (177b4). In the speech of his 
narrated by Eryximachus in the prologue, he demonstrates a 
fascination with rhetoric (177a5-c4): He employs alliteration of 7t's 
with assonance of omegas (.II.ai~vas Elvat v.II.o T~v .II.OLTJTC:>v, 
177a7), then alliteration of 't's (T:rlAtKovT~ ovTt Kal ToaovT~ !iec;:>, 
177a8), as well as polyptoton (11otT)TC:>v 11otnµevovs, 177a7; 
1TOLT)TC:>v 1TE1TOLT)KEVat, 177b1 ).30 
Since the prologue shows a different--a literary--side to 
Phaedrus, it offers the reader a different perspective from which to 
interpret Phaedrus' speech. By portraying Phaedrus as a man fond of 
reading and making fine speeches, the prologue alerts the reader to 
focus as much attention on the rhetorical style of the speech as on its 
contents.31 Indeed, from the prologue's characterization of 
Phaedrus, the reader ought to expect to see his theory of Eros not so 
much in his explicit statements about Eros but in his use of fine 
oratory on behalf of Eros. 
30To some degree, Phaedrus shows the same rhetorical flair in 
his speech in the body of the dialogue. As Bury, xxv-xxvi, observes, 
the speech of Phaedrus is filled with mythological allusions, chiasms, 
paronomasia, special compound verbs, and anacolutha. 
31 Interestingly, Phaedrus is a man of the same character in the 
dialogue named for him. His chief preoccupation in that dialogue, as 
well as that of the Phaedrus, is not so much Eros, but speeches about 
Eros. 
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The prologue likewise prepares the reader to expect Agathon to 
be a man who will honor Eros not so much by expounding well 
thought out theories about him, but by crafting a speech full of 
beautiful words, thereby revealing the power of Eros. To be sure, the 
name Agathon evokes in the reader, whether modern or ancient, the 
image of a man more concerned about style than substance. The 
modern reader is likely to think of Aristophanes' characterization of 
him in the Thesmophoriazusae as an effete poet.32 Plato's 
contemporaries would have had a somewhat similar image of 
Agathon, which would have reinforced by first-hand acquaintance 
with his plays. 33 
32See especially lines 39-265. Cf. Socrates' comment in the 
Symposium {194b1 }, where he states that Agathon's manliness 
{avopeiav} in the theater surprised him and makes him fearful that he 
will be unable to give a speech after Agathon. From these sources we 
learn of Agathon's effeminate appearance. From Prt. 315d and 
Symp. 193b6-7 and Xen. Symp. 8.32 we learn that he was the beloved 
of Pausanias. Cf . .PW, s.v. Agathon {1 :761 }. 
Apparently, he earned some respect as a playwright: The 
character Dionysus in Aristophanes' Frogs {84} calls him a good poet 
{aya8os TIOLTJTiJs}, much missed by his friends. To be sure, 
Aristophanes alludes to Agathon so that he can make a pun on his 
name {'Aya8c.uv is aya86s). Yet Aristophanes' treatment of him in the 
Thesmophoriazusae implies that he was noteworthy enough to be the 
butt of Aristophanes' satire. The judgment of antiquity was that his 
style was KaAAtETITJS {Aristophanes, Thesm. 49, 60). Moreover, he 
was known as an innovator of plots; see Mitchell, 91. The only source 
for the particulars of his style is Plato, who portrays him as heavily 
influenced by Prodicus (Prt. 31 Sd) and Gorgias {Symposium 198c}. 
For an analysis of his style, see Bury, xxv-xxvi. 
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The prologue portrays to some degree those unflattering 
qualities often ascribed to him. He is a dashing young man, whose 
handsomeness demands that even the ugly and habitually dirty 
Socrates must attempt to pretty himself. He is a man who 
overindulges himself in the manner of Pausanias and Aristophanes 
(176a-b). And he derives his self-worth from the acclaim of crowds; 
he has spent one night indulging with the ox.hos (174a7) and intends 
to spend another being fawned over by learned men. Because of his 
love for acclamation, he presents himself as a liberal master who is 
loved and respected by his slaves (175b5-c1}. For the same reason, 
he is impatient with Socrates' tardiness (175a10-11, c3-4}, since it 
makes Socrates, not him, the object of attention. 
Nonetheless, a positive picture of Agathon also emerges in the 
prologue. Agathon is a serious enough poet to be able to invite a 
number of intellectuals to an intimate party. Agathon desires to know 
the thoughts of Socrates, since Agathon is as interested in acquiring 
33The people of Athens may have respected Agathon more 
than we are inclined to believe. The evidence from comedy (primarily 
from Ar. Thesm.) is naturally hostile to Agathon, since comedy must 
make sport of contemporary figures. To conclude on the basis of 
Aristophanes' portrayal of Agathon that Agathon was not a talented 
tragedian or was largely detested by his contemporaries is to go 
beyond the evidence. Although it is likely that Agathon, like Euripides 
a few years later, withdrew to Macedonia because he felt 
unappreciated at Athens, we cannot be certain this is the case. 
Aristophanes gives no reason for Agathon's departure (Ran. 83-85), 
but simply states the fact. Furthermore, Agathon did have some 
success in Athens: He won first place in 416 B.C. Like Euripides, he 
may not have been popular enough always to win first place, but he 
was often granted a right to be one of the three tragedians to offer his 
plays. 
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greater knowledge as he is in indulging himself at a party. Even 
Aristodemus, a devotee of Socrates, calls Agathon a aocpos avftp 
(174c7) and is glad to finagle an invitation to his party. In fact, 
Aristodemus doubts that he would be a fit guest for Agathon. 
Aristodemus calls himself cpavAos when compared with the wise 
Agathon (174c7). Socrates, of course, makes similar comments 
about Agathon: Socrates' thoughts are trivial when compared to the 
dignified wisdom that impressed over thirty thousand people; 
Socrates' wisdom is dream-like, while Agathon's is brilliant; Socrates 
wishes he could obtain the wisdom of Agathon through osmosis; 
Socrates is an empty vessel that needs filling with Agathon's wisdom 
(175d3-e7). 
Of course, these statements praising Agathon's wisdom are full 
of irony. Yet the irony in these statements does not negate the fact 
that Agathon is viewed by his contemporaries and by himself to be a 
learned man, indeed, an intellectual celebrity. Agathon recognizes 
the irony in Socrates' flattery and chides Socrates for treating him 
insolently. Agathon will not tolerate Socrates questioning his wisdom 
or talents; Agathon expects that he will defeat Socrates outright in a 
battle of wits to be conducted later that evening (175e7-9). Thus, the 
irony in Socrates' remarks only underscores Agathon's esteemed 
status among his peers. 
Even Socrates--however ironic he intends his words to be--
recognizes Agathon's stature as an intellectual. In fact, the irony in his 
words actually supports Agathon's standing. Ironic flattery would not 
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be effective if there were no basis for that flattery. Socrates must 
recognize some intellectual capacity in Agathon--overestimated 
though it may be by most Athenians--if Socrates is to deprecate it. 
Far from assuming that Socrates' interlocutors are dunces, the irony 
used by the character Socrates throughout Plato's dialogues 
assumes that the interlocutors Socrates encounters are the most 
knowledgeable in their fields. The highest dramatic effect is achieved 
when an uneducated, self-professed ignoramus upstages all the 
experts. 
The ironic praise of Agathon, then, is in line with the character 
Socrates' treatment of his interlocutors in Plato's earlier dialogues. As 
Plato has Socrates explain in the Apology (21 b-23c), Socrates always 
searches for those whom he believes to be experts in their fields. 
After conversing with them, he always discovers that the experts are 
never able to prove fully the tenets of their science or art. Nor can 
they give an adequate definition of one of the most elementary 
objects in their profession. Accordingly, the reader of Plato's 
dialogues may come to believe that Socrates is wholly insincere in his 
flattery of the abilities of his interlocutors: Socrates already knows 
more than his interlocutors and uses them as foils to demonstrate his 
superior wisdom. 34 Such a conclusion, however, is unwarranted. In 
his search for wisdom, Socrates looks only to those people who are 
likely to be able to help him, since he cannot produce any ideas of his 
34For example, Ap. 21c-23b; Meno aoa-b. 
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own. His process of eAeyxos can only test and refine ideas, not 
produce them. Hence without the beauty of some other noble soul, 
he cannot beget any ideas of his own ( Theaetetus 149a-151 d), since 
he--an Eros-like 8a[µc:uv--does not possess in himself the beauty that 
could generate such ideas.35 The problem is that no other person 
can beget truly beautiful ideas. In the end, Socrates is shown to have 
greater knowledge because he is aware of his ignorance, while the 
self-professed experts are shown to have no knowledge. Hence 
Socrates' praise of his interlocutors becomes ironical. 
Thus, Socrates does appreciate Agathon's wisdom, even if the 
dialogue ultimately refutes it.36 Agathon's speech, after all, merely 
expounds a belief Socrates himself naively holds in the prologue, 
namely, that the beautiful seek the beautiful (174a9). Consequently, 
if we fault Agathon for thoughtlessly assuming that Eros works only in 
the beautiful (195a7-8; 196a8-b3) and for confusing the object of Eros 
with the people in whom Eros works, we must also censure Socrates 
for the same error.37 It is better, therefore, to grant Agathon a 
35Cf. Richard Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1941 ), 7-20, on the purposes and 
difficulties typically associated with Socratic elenchus. 
36Agathon is Socrates• main opponent, as 194a1-4 and 198a1-
7 reveal. Thus, when Socrates says in the prologue that he fears for 
those who will speak last (177e3-5), he really means that he fears for 
himself who must speak after Agathon. 
37Cf. Lowenstam, "Parodoxes," 86. 
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measure of intelligence and to take his encomium seriously, despite 
the irony in Socrates' praise. 
Ironic praise, moreover, is a tool used not only by Socrates 
against Agathon, but one used by Agathon against Socrates. 
Agathon seats Socrates next to himself; this move seemingly honors 
Socrates by placing him next to the host, but it also reinforces 
Agathon's status: Agathon is brilliant enough to have Socrates as his 
honored guest and to sit next to so esteemed an intellectual. 3 8 
Although Agathon's interest in Socrates' thoughts is to a large degree 
genuine, Agathon does assume that he can defeat Socrates in a 
battle of wits (175e7-10); whatever thoughts have come to Socrates 
on the road are, in Agathon's mind, inferior to his own.39 Thus, both 
Agathon and Socrates belittle one another with flattery to a degree 
done by no other set of characters in the prologue.40 Not 
surprisingly, then, Socrates will later use Agathon's speech as a foil 
38Von Blanckenhagen, 55, notes that single occupancy of a 
couch is more common in Attic red-figure vases, unless the pair on a 
couch are lovers (i.e., an older man and a youth or woman). Thus, 
Agathon by placing Socrates next to him is stating that Socrates is his 
lover. 
39Not surprisingly, then, Agathon in his speech berates 
Socrates by describing Eros as a supple youth with great beauty--the 
exact opposite of Socrates. See Anderson, 47. 
40Phaedrus flatters Eryximachus (176d5-e3) and Eryximachus 
praises the suggestion of Phaedrus (177a2-d5), as is only fitting for a 
lover and a beloved to act towards one another. But this does not 
match Socrates' and Agathon's somewhat ironic flattery of each 
other, that occupies 175c6-e6. 
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for his own. In so doing, he is continuing the argument he had with 
Agathon in the prologue (175d3-e10) and is taking up Agathon's 
challenge for a battle of wits (175c6-10). By implication, then, 
Agathon must be an interlocutor worthy of Socrates. If Agathon's 
speech fails to measure up fully to Socrates' or our standards, it 
nonetheless exemplifies a system of education and thought that was 
popular with the intellectuals of the late fifth century B.C. Athens. 
If Agathon has grounds for claiming to be an intellectual whose 
speech is worth consideration, Eryximachus has an even greater 
claim. For although Agathon was among those who had overindulged 
the previous night, Eryximachus clearly excludes himself from oi 
ouvaTwTaToL 11[vELv (176c2-3). His sobriety hints that his speech will 
have less rhetoric and more content than Agathon's. Thus, 
Eryximachus deserves a place among the lovers of ideas and, to be 
more specific, among those who do not mistake showy rhetoric for 
beautiful ideas.41 
These qualities of Eryximachus are most apparent in his self-
classification in the prologue. He distinguishes himself from those 
who constantly overdrink and force others to do so, too (176c2-3). He 
does, however, find some allies in his plea for moderation or 
abstinence in drinking: Phaedrus, Aristodemus, and some unnamed 
guests. Phaedrus, naturally, is an ally of Eryximachus; he is 
41 As PW (11 :607) indicates, all that we know about 
Eryximachus is drawn from the Platonic corpus, namely the Prt., the 
Symposium, and the Phaedrus. 
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Eryximachus' epwµevos and, as we have already seen, a man fonder 
of books than the sensual life. Aristodemus, too, shares with 
Eryximachus a devotion to learning; Aristodemus is devoted to 
Socratic philosophy, while Eryximachus is a man of medicine and 
science. But the most interesting allies of Eryximachus are the 
unnamed To'laoe {176c1). Without doubt, these men are the guests 
whose speeches Aristodemus was unable to recall at a later time. 
Apparently, they were men of moderation, but also men whose 
speeches were not memorable.42 
By choosing these anonymous guests as his allies, 
Eryximachus demonstrates a weakness of his: though a man of 
ideas, he presents them in a pedantic fashion. 43 As brilliant as his 
42Mitchell, 15, wrongly understands the unnamed speakers to 
be the heavy drinkers. But the vµe'ls oi OUVOTWTOTOl lTlVElV of 176c2-
3 are Pausanias, Aristophanes, and Agathon, since Eryximachus is 
replying to their statements in 176a5-b1 and 176b2-4, and 176b8, 
respectively. If the unnamed speakers were the heavy drinkers, there 
would be no referent for the word To'laoe (176c2), since all the known 
guests are accounted for elsewhere in 172c. Thus, the To'la8e must 
be the unknown guests, which means they cannot be the o i 
8uvaTWTOTOl lTlVElV. 
43Mitchell, 63, notes that " 'pedant' is often just a jealous way of 
referring to someone who knows something. That's the case here. 
Eryximachus knows something." Allen, 27-28, also defends 
Eryximachus by arguing that he anticipates Socrates' notion of Eros 
as a universal force. Konstan and Young-Bruehl argue further that 
Eryximachus' speech is second in sophistication only to that of 
Socrates. Eryximachus distinguishes between two loves: eTit8uµia, 
which can be either good or bad, and <ptAia, which is always good, 
since it creates a harmony out of opposing forces. Moreover, 
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universalizing of Eros may be, Eryximachus' speech fails to inspire 
the reader since it is overly technical and ignores sexual passion as 
an expression of Eros.44 He takes a quotation from Heraclitus on 
harmony and through some leaps in logic uses it to prove that 
harmony consists of being in unison, not in having two 
complementary tones (187a5-c1 ). This misunderstanding reveals 
the serious flaw in his personality: Eryximachus prefers a bland 
unison over a well-tensioned harmony. Furthermore, he begins his 
speech by drawing on his medical expertise--to describe not sexual 
passion, but the healthy and unhealthy urges of the body (186b3-7). 
Regulation of bodily urges, he maintains, is something that belongs to 
medicine (186c5-e3). Thus, love is removed from the realm of the 
Konstan and Young-Bruehl, 40-46, clear Eryximachus of the charge 
of misinterpretation of Heraclitus commonly leveled against him. 
In reply, we must grant that Eryximachus' pedantry has its 
positive elements: it demonstrates that he has a fair amount of 
knowledge. But a pedant does not know as much as the person who 
is able to communicate his ideas in a more interesting fashion. Thus, 
Socrates must be held in higher esteem than Eryximachus, since the 
farmer's speech, though learned, communicates a more compelling 
vision of Eros. By comparison, few readers would name the latter's 
speech as the most memorable one of the dialogue. In large part, this 
is due to Eryximachus' refusal to discuss Eros in terms of sex and his 
use of physics and other TexvaL to explain Eros. As Duncan argues, 
278-281, Eryximachus stresses a "vertical view of Eros," which sees 
Eros as a manifestation of abstract concepts rather than as a 
relationship between human beings. As a student of Hippias, 
Eryximachus prefers the simplicity found in nature rather than the 
complexity found in human society. 
44Cf. Wolz, 333. Dover, Symposium, 105, posits that 
Eryximachus exemplifies the habit of ancient scientists to over-
generalize to the point of absurdity. 
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lover; instead, erotic forces are directed by an expert: the physician 
(186e4-187a1), musician (187c2-5), or prophet (188b6-d3}. 
Eryximachus' pedantry is demonstrated already in the prologue. 
He is overjoyed to lecture the guests about the dangers of 
drunkenness (176c7-8); he smirks, as he sees a group of men who 
must concede that his medical advice is correct. As the expert in this 
field, he holds such sway over the crowd that none of the guests 
dares to chafe at his lecture or object when he dismisses the flute-girl, 
sets the terms of drinking, and establishes the agenda for the 
evening. It is his medical expertise alone that sways the crowd, since 
he can muster no moral arguments, only medical ones, against 
overdrinking. His vision of life is narrowed by his devotion to 
medicine. 45 
Eryximachus' pedantry is in marked contrast to Socrates' 
attitude. Although both men pursue the intellectual life, Socrates 
neither specializes in a narrow field of learning nor withdraws from 
sensual pleasure, as Eryximachus does.46 Socrates never adopts 
45Bury, xxviii, comments that Eryximachus "seizes every 
possible occasion to air his medical lore," not only concerning 
drunkenness but also hiccoughs. Bury, xxix, adds that there is little 
literary adornment in Eryximachus' speech, as befits such a pedant. 
46Cf. Warner's judgment, 167: "Great pains are taken to 
distance Socrates from Eryximachus; the latter is presented as 
pompous and insensitive, with no apparent first-hand experience of 
love, and without a clear grasp of the issues in question." Though 
Warner overstates the case--Eryximachus has had first-hand 
experience in love with Phaedrus--he is correct in observing 
Eryximachus' pedantry. 
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the jargon of a specialized profession: In other dialogues of Plato, 
Socrates speaks with generals about courage, with teachers about 
wisdom, and with statesmen about justice4 7; in this dialogue 
Alcibiades accuses Socrates of talking about non-technical matters 
("pack mules and certain bronze smiths, cobblers, and tanners," 
221 e4-5). Nor does Socrates equate the intellectual life with flight 
from pleasure, as Eryximachus does. Socrates can drink with the 
best or he can forego drink altogether (176c3-5). Socrates can enjoy 
sensual pleasure without being seduced by it, but Eryximachus is as 
easily influenced by alcohol as the overindulgent are. Eryximachus 
avoids being seduced by sensual pleasure only by avoiding all 
contact with sensual pleasure. 
Eryximachus, then, is a caricature of Socrates. He seems to 
have Socrates' moderation and learning, but the appearance is 
deceptive. For true appreciation of Beauty comes not by embracing 
intellectual beauty alone and ignoring physical beauty, but by using 
physical beauty to lead oneself to the beauty of ideas--and beyond. In 
fact, all three lovers of rhetoric and sophistry are caricatures of 
Socrates. Like Socrates, they are Eros-like in their longing for a non-
sensual beauty, but unlike Socrates, they have confused the beauty 
47For example, in the Laches, Socrates argues with two 
generals, Nicias and Laches. In the Gorgias, Socrates discusses 
issues of morality with Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles, all of whom claim 
to know and teach where true happiness lies. In the Protagoras, 
Socrates discusses the relation between knowledge and virtue with 
the sophist Protagoras and other assembled intellectuals. 
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of words or pieces of information with Absolute Beauty. Their love is 
nobler than that of Pausanias and Aristophanes, but they fail to 
discern as lofty a goal of love as Socrates does. 
The 'Epacr-nls of Absolute Beauty: Socrates 
As we observed in the last section, Socrates is unique among 
the guests. He neither allows himself to be overcome by drink (as do 
Pausanias and Aristophanes) nor does he retreat from pleasures into 
his own specialized world (as does Eryximachus). No matter how 
much he is surrounded by drink or by beautiful bodies, his mind is 
never overcome by them. He can drink without letting the alcohol 
govern his head; he can enjoy the beautiful young men around him in 
a non-sexual manner. He is prevented from being seduced by the 
pleasures of sensuous beauty because his first desire is for Absolute 
Beauty. The beauty observed by the senses, as far as Socrates is 
concerned, serves only to lead to a higher beauty; to perceive beauty 
only with the senses or to gratify oneself with that beauty is to rob 
oneself of enjoyment of the greater beauty. 
Socrates' preference for Absolute Beauty over the beauty of the 
body can be seen as merely a defense of Socrates' character against 
those who slandered him for seducing the youth of Athens. One 
cannot deny that Alcibiades' speech portrays Socrates in a positive 
light; the "scandal" of Socrates, according to Alcibiades, is that there is 
no scandal to be found, despite Alcibiades' persistent attempts to 
seduce him (219c7-d2). Although Alcibiades attempts to_ portray 
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Socrates as hybristic, the reader soon discovers that Socrates' 
mistreatment of Alcibiades lies in Socrates' refusal to seduce 
Alcibiades rather than in any wanton seduction of Alcibiades. 
Socrates' good behavior can be nothing but offensive to men like 
Alcibiades who are of rather offensive moral character.48 
Socrates' character, however, also serves a deeper purpose: 
Socrates dramatizes Plato's conception of the perfect Eros, who 
seeks Absolute Beauty. The notion of a perfect Eros may at first 
glance seem somewhat contradictory, since Eros by nature is 
imperfect, but calling Socrates a perfect Eros figure does not imply 
that Socrates is perfect. Rather, it means that he best dramatizes the 
quest for perfection, illustrating for the reader Eros' quest for 
Absolute Beauty. 49 
This quest begins with the appreciation of beautiful bodies. 
Thus, when Socrates first appears in the dialogue, he is preoccupied 
with the prospect of seeing the beautiful Agathon. Agathon has 
invited him to a banquet and Socrates has accepted the invitation, on 
the provision that he can attend the less crowded of the two parties. 
The more intimate setting of the second party will allow Socrates 
48Similarly, the dialogue portrays Socrates as being on more 
cordial terms with his critic Aristophanes than history--or 
Aristophanes' comedies--would have us believe. 
49This phenomenon is not surprising, since of all the guests 
Socrates has the most comprehensive theory of Eros. See pages 59-
61. 
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more of an opportunity to enjoy, among other things, Agathon's 
beauty. 
The prospect of encountering sensuous beauty changes 
Socrates' demeanor. No longer can Socrates neglect his own 
appearance, running around barefoot and unwashed (174a4). Now 
he must beautify himself so that he can attend the party of handsome 
Agathon. He must go KaAos TTapa KaA6v (174a9). Socrates 
demonstrates thereby the beautifying and ennobling force of 
sensuous beauty, a truth observed by Phaedrus and Agathon. Eros, 
in awe of Beauty, even the beauty of the body, must make itself 
equally beautiful. As Phaedrus notes, a lover shirks the ugliness of 
cowardice and strives to be as beautiful in performing heroic deeds as 
his beloved is beautiful ( 178d4-e1; 179a3-b5}, and, as Agathon 
notes, Eros transforms lovers to be more musical and graceful 
(196d6-e3). By beautifying his appearance, Socrates demonstrates 
that beauty, even of the sensuous kind, has a transforming power. 
If beauty ennobles the lover, however, he must not have been 
noble and beautiful previously. This is a truth that escapes all the 
other guests in the dialogue, but especially Agathon. Although 
Agathon believes that Eros can make an unmusical man brim with 
poetry, Agathon does not think Eros can influence old, ugly, or harsh 
men (195b1-4, e5-196a4). Thus, when Agathon speaks of the great 
benefits Eros brings to lovers, he assumes that the lovers already 
possess these qualities, but must have them nurtured and developed. 
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As Socrates argues in his encomium, however, only those who lack 
beauty desire beauty. 
Learning this truth is a crucial step on the Ascent to Beauty 
because it redefines the goal of Eros and redirects the search for 
Absolute Beauty. Eros becomes a search for acquisition of beauty 
rather than mere enjoyment of the sensuous beauty of others. Eros 
ultimately leads to Absolute Beauty, which alone can give enduring 
beauty to a lover. The beauty of the body is all too fleeting for a lover 
to rely upon. The beauty of ideas, though more enduring than 
sensuous beauty, cannot compare to the Absolute Beauty that gives 
them their beauty. Thus, the best lover must recognize his need for 
beauty in its most permanent form, if he is not merely to deceive 
himself with imitations of Beauty. 
Crucial as this insight is for one to be a perfect lover, only 
Socrates understands this truth--and he learns or relearns this truth in 
the prologue.SO Instinctively, Socrates knows he is not beautiful but 
50Whether Socrates learns or relearns it depends on what we 
make of Socrates' use of Diotima. Does Plato intend the reader to 
understand that Socrates is inventing a conversation with Diotima, 
since the conversation seems tailor-made for the symposium? Or 
does Plato intend the conversation with Diotima to represent a "fact" 
in the fictional world he has created in the Symposium? In either 
case, the Symposium and all its events are fictional; the question is 
whether the speech of Diotima is a fictional fiction or a fictional fact. If 
it is a fictional fiction, the character Socrates (not the Socrates of 
history) has learned a truth on the way to the banquet, which he is 
presenting to the symposiasts. If it is a fictional fact, the character 
Socrates has relearned a truth he was taught fifteen years ago, but 
which he had forgotten until he meditated on the way to see Agathon. 
Since Diotima's speech builds on items discussed previously, it is best 
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must become so {yEyEvvn µEvos, 17 4a5; cf. the factitive verb 
KaAAc.urrtaaµnv in 174a8-9). Yet, at first, Socrates is somewhat 
oblivious to the lack of beauty in himself apart from the beauty in the 
objects of his desire. He includes himself among the aya8oi who 
naturally go to the feast of the good51 and playfully chides those like 
Homer who have a <pav.Aos man go to the home of a good man. By 
the time Socrates delivers his encomium to Eros, however, he has 
changed his mind. He realizes that it is not the good and the beautiful 
who seek Good and Beauty, but rather people who recognize they 
lack such qualities. By recognizing this truth, Socrates has become 
the perfect lover of Beauty. 
What gives Socrates this insight? The most natural answer is 
that Socrates contemplates on this matter as he goes to Agathon's 
house. He has already begun thinking on this topic before he meets 
Aristodemus, as is indicated by his giving a thoughtful reason for 
beautifying himself {174a8-9). When Aristodemus comes, Socrates 
to see her as a fictional fiction, as Anderson, 51, and Warner, 170, 
argue. 
Lowenstam, "Paradoxes," 86, argues for a similar 
understanding of Diotima. He adds that in Socrates' speech "Plato 
presents a unique opportunity for us to see how Socrates, whether it 
be the historical one or not, came to conclusions. We see Socrates 
flippantly choose one view-point, change views after some thought, 
and then explain for us the process by which he arrived at his 
conclusion." Thus, the character Socrates uses Diotima as a means 
to expound a conclusion that he himself had reached only a few hours 
earlier. 
51 There is a pun involved here, but Socrates has the proverb in 
this fashion in mind. See Renehan, 120-121. 
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begins contemplating critically about the ideas behind a particular 
incident in Homer. Socrates, thus, starts with the prospect of seeing 
KaA6s Agathon and progresses higher on the ladder of beauty by 
contemplating beautiful ideas. But the central thought on Socrates' 
mind is the precise nature of Beauty and its lovers: Who loves Beauty 
and what effect does Beauty have on its lovers? Because this 
question is Socrates' object of thought, he is quickly led to 
contemplate Absolute Beauty--more quickly than if he had been 
thinking of some other matter. Physical beauty has spurred Socrates 
on to question who truly possesses beauty. In turn, pondering this 
question has led him to see a vision of Absolute Beauty. Thus, it is 
contemplation on the nature of beauty that leads ultimately to a 
glimpse of Absolute Beauty. 
Although Socrates is the only guest to be so moved by Beauty 
so as to attain this goal and although insights from the contemplation 
of Absolute Beauty are not readily shared, he nonetheless attempts to 
lead one of his beloveds, Aristodemus, up with him on the Ascent to 
Beauty. In this way, he follows the outline of Diotima, who sees the 
Ascent as usually involving a lover who guides his beloved, as is 
implied by 210a4-8, b4-6.52 The lover (Socrates in this case) begins 
52These passages imply that a young man pursues Beauty by 
acting as a lover; cf. Sta To 6p6ws TiatSepaaTel'v eTiavtwv (211 b5-6) 
and ETTL Tel epc.uTlKCx leval (211 b7-c1 ). Other passages, however, 
suggest that a beloved, too, can ascend to Absolute Beauty: One can 
be a lover himself or be led by another (vTI' aAAov ayea6at, 211 c1 ). 
To confuse matters even further, the lover often needs the guidance 
of someone else, the i}yovµevos (21 Oa6-7), who is perhaps a lover. 
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with one beloved (Agathon) but soon realizes the beauty to be found 
in many bodies (Aristodemus and Agathon).53 Next, the lover looks 
for the beauty in the soul and discusses beautiful ideas with the 
beloved. Socrates performs this task in 174b3-d4, where he 
discusses whether the good or the bad go to the banquets of the 
good. But at a particular stage, Socrates acquires a vision of Absolute 
Beauty, which he cannot impart to his beloved, for Absolute Beauty is 
not an idea that can be expressed or a vision that can be described 
with words. He stands in deep thought on the porch, entranced by 
Absolute Beauty (174d4-175c6). If the beauty of gold, clothes, and 
lads can leave one speechless and unable to eat or drink, but only 
able to stare, Absolute Beauty renders one even more incapable of 
expression (211 d3-e4). Thus, Socrates lets Aristodemus go ahead to 
the party and does not answer Agathon's questions, since he cannot 
communicate to either of them his glimpse of Absolute Beauty. Since 
Thus, the person ascending to Beauty may be involved in several 
relationships: He may be an epc.0µevos being led by his lover. Or he 
may be a lover who, on the one hand, is being taught by a i]yovµevos 
how to pursue beauty properly, while, on the other hand, having an 
epc.0µevos whom he attempts to raise to a higher awareness of 
beauty, as he himself ascends higher. Anderson's remarks, 61, offer 
help in understanding this: "[G]uidance comes from beauty," not from 
the lover or beloved; "since this is an active pursuit of the beauty, both 
[epaaTfis and epc.0µevos ] are in that sense lovers." 
53To be sure, Aristodemus is not as beautiful as Agathon, since 
the former is called aµtKp6s and maintains Socrates' unkempt 
appearance (173b2). Nonetheless, since the beauty in all bodies 
(21 Ob3) is akin, a true lover will find beauty even in less beautiful 
bodies. Thus, Socrates deems even Aristodemus as a man capable 
of begetting beautiful ideas with himself. 
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Socrates cannot describe in words his vision of Absolute Beauty, he 
wishes that he could impart his knowledge by osmosis (175d3-7).54 
Socrates demonstrates that, although the quest for Absolute 
Beauty must begin with social intercourse, it must be completed in 
isolation. This isolation caused by the pursuit of Absolute Beauty is 
seen in the prologue as Socrates stands apart from the rest of the 
guests on the porch during half of the meal (175a7-c6). Although 
Socrates had earlier been eager to dine with handsome Agathon, his 
pursuit of Absolute Beauty sidetracked him. As soon as Socrates got 
a glimpse of Absolute Beauty, he preferred it to the charm of Agathon. 
54Qne should not conclude from the difficulties of imparting 
philosophical truth that philosophy must be solipsistic or nihilistic. 
Roochnik, 127, aptly describes Platonic philosophy in this way: 
"Philosophical discourse never reaches its desired terminus. It is 
forever the love, and not the possession, of wisdom. To formulate 
this, and much of the above, succinctly, philosophical discourse is 
fundamentally interrogative. Its paradigmatic sentence is the 
question, and not the assertion. This is not to say that all philosophers 
do is ask questions: that would be absurd. They ask questions, 
entertain possible answers, review such answers, and then proceed 
forward once again. To describe philosophical discourse as 
interrogative is thus very close to calling it dialectical or, more 
precisely, dialogical." Roochnik adds, 126, that the philosopher 
differs from the sophist in that the latter disowns reason and objective 
knowledge, while the philosopher is always pursuing objective truth. 
Although Lowenstam, "Paradoxes," 87, sees a similar outline 
between the journey to Agathon's house and the Ascent to Beauty, he 
argues that Socrates plays the role of Eros, guiding the philosopher 
(Aristodemus) along the path to the Good, then at the last moment 
abandoning him so that he can discover the Good (Agathon) on his 
own. But surely Socrates is the philosopher (who by definition is also 
an Eros-figure), who guides his beloved along the path to the good. 
Moreover, nowhere does Diotima mention that Eros disappears 
during a stage of the Ascent to Beauty. 
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Yet despite the higher nature of Absolute Beauty, it is difficult to 
pursue because it is so ephemeral. The beauty of a body or even an 
idea or speech is readily manifest to the observer, as often as he 
cares to observe it. Absolute Beauty, however, does not readily 
appear, but can be glimpsed only after much labor and then for a brief 
time only. For this reason, Socrates calls his wisdom cpavA.n (175e3). 
Although it is really life that becomes cpaOA.ov (211 e4-212a2), when 
compared to Absolute Beauty, those who pursue Absolute Beauty 
must feel frustrated since they cannot possess it permanently. It may 
seem better to enjoy a more down-to-earth beauty and wisdom (as 
Agathon does) rather than to pursue an ephemeral Absolute 
Beauty.55 
55Scholars have observed flaws in Socrates' concept of Eros 
and Beauty. In particular, Nussbaum, 166-167, and Vlastos, Platonic 
Studies 2d. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981 ), 31, 
have argued that Socratic love ignores the reality of inter-personal 
relationships in favor of an ethereal, non-altruistic love. Defenders of 
Socrates include Nye, ''The Subject of Love: Diotima and her Critics," 
(hereafter Nye, "Love") Journal of Value Inquiry 24 (1990) 133-153, 
who argues that Diotima is not urging a lover to leave the beloved as 
he or she progresses toward Absolute Beauty, but rather to 
understand that love involves more than just love of a beloved, but 
love of his or her friends, ideas, and politics. In a slightly different vein, 
Wolz, 347, argues that just as "the absolutely asocial state in the 
Protagoras and the absolutely perfect city in the Republic are merely 
devices which Plato employs to block all possible escape from reality 
and to induce men resolutely to face the human condition," so the 
Ascent to Beauty in the Symposium forces the reader away from an 
other-worldly ascent back into human relationships. 
To be sure, the dialogue, including Alcibiades' speech, does 
show an ethereal form of love is unable to lead others to virtue; 
moreover, Socrates calls his wisdom cpavATJ for the reasons states 
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Thus, as I have argued earlier, Socrates' praise of Agathon in 
175d3-e6 must be taken both in an ironic and in a straightforward 
manner. Socrates does believe that his knowledge of Absolute 
Beauty makes Agathon's wisdom appear shallow and we, like 
Agathon, are correct in finding irony in Socrates' words. To the 
extent, however, that Socrates cannot communicate his insight into 
Absolute Beauty and cannot maintain his glimpse of it, Socrates' 
wisdom is indeed cpavATJ. It demonstrates that Socrates remains a 
perfect lover, not a perfect possessor, of Beauty. 
The Ascent to Beauty Itself Dramatized 
To some degree, each of the characters has demonstrated the 
proper way to pursue Eros. In particular, Socrates has personified the 
quest for Absolute Beauty, as we saw on pages 115-122. To the 
above. However, these elements do not demonstrate the error of 
Socrates as much as the tension in the human condition between the 
longing for the absolute and its rare fulfillment. A better explanation, 
then, is that the dialogue urges the search for an abstract Beauty 
while demonstrating the difficulties in putting such a search into 
practice. Thus, Duncan, 287-289, argues that the Symposium is an 
aporetic dialogue, in that it offers two views of love, one stressing the 
horizontal or human aspect, the other the vertical aspect or the 
striving for virtue. If Aristophanes deprives lovers of growth in 
knowledge and virtue because he overemphasizes the physical 
aspects of love, Socrates treats his beloveds hubristically because he 
denies the physical side of love. 
The difficulty of the Socratic concept of Eros lies in human 
nature itself, as Roochnik, 128, aptly notes. Eros "is not an object but 
a capacity to enter into relationships with objects .... Socrates 
understands how various objects satisfy different kinds of human 
beings. He understands how logos is the principle motor of 
satisfaction for those moving beyond the first stage of_ human 
development." 
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degree that the Ascent has been dramatized in this fashion, there is 
no need to reiterate the notion of Socrates as Eros (or for that matter 
any of the other characters as lesser Erotes). 
Plato, however, also hints in a more indirect manner at how to 
pursue Beauty. He does so by making an allusion to the Ascent to 
Beauty: the ascent of Apollodorus and Glaucon into town. The 
behavior of the prologue's characters alludes to the Ascent, not in so 
much as they themselves are participating in the Ascent or are 
objects of true Beauty, but rather in so far as Plato endows their 
purely mundane actions with philosophical, almost allegorical, 
significance. Thus, in this section we will not be looking at how the 
characters act qua characters or how the plot is overtly erotic, as we 
did earlier in the chapter. Rather, we will examine how even utterly 
unerotic men can manifest the longings of Eros and how even men 
dispossessed of true Beauty can nonetheless serve as examples of it, 
if only in word. 
Such an example can be seen in the geography of the 
Apollodoran prologue (172a1-174a2). As the dialogue begins, 
Apollodorus is on his way up into town, coming from the deme 
Phalerum.56 His journey into town requires that he physically ascend 
from the sea level to a higher elevation; hence cx.vicov, "ascending," is 
an appropriate description. As he is on his way up into town, Glaucon 
greets him from behind (chncr8ev, 172a3) and from quite a distance 
56oover, Symposium, 77: "Phalerum lies on the coas~ east of 
Piraeus and two miles southwest of the city perimeter." 
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(n6ppc.u6ev, 172a3}. This necessarily places him closer to the sea, 
further from Athens, and on a lower level than Apollodorus. 
Nonetheless, Glaucon seems to have intended to go into town; he 
must have been heading in the same direction as Apollodorus in 
order for him to espy Apollodorus. Furthermore, he raises no 
objections when Apollodorus suggests that Glaucon accompany him 
into town so that Apollodorus may relate the speeches of Eros along 
the way (173b7-c1). 
This ascent of two characters into Athens would seem 
insignificant, were it not for the emphasis on the Ascent to Beauty in 
the climax of Socrates' speech. Since, however, Plato emphasizes 
the concept of ascent in the body of the dialogue, the literal ascent of 
Apollodorus and Glaucon gains new meaning, even if Apollodorus 
and Glaucon are not perfect embodiments of Eros. Apollodorus' 
ascent into town thus exemplifies the attempt to ascend to Beauty as 
carried out by those entranced by Socratic dialogue. Since Glaucon is 
ignorant of this particular dialogue, he must stand on a lower plane 
and, thus, behind Apollodorus. Since he is a pupil of Socrates, 
however, it is only right that he also should be en route to the city. 
Then, as Apollodorus relates the story, the two walk to town and 
arrive there at the same time, for when Apollodorus has told Glaucon 
all that he knows about the symposium, the two are on the same 
plane. Furthermore, by hearing a dialogue about Eros, they both 
have ascended, at least to some degree, on the Ladder of Beauty, as 
is exemplified by their ascending to Athens. 
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This interpretation of geography as indicative of philosophical 
process would seem overly subtle, were it not for a couple of factors. 
Firstly, Plato rarely sets any dialogue outside Athens.57 Thus, when 
the prologue of the Symposium portrays two people outside Athens, 
it is already worth noting. Secondly, and more importantly, Plato uses 
the geography of the Symposium in the same way he uses that of the 
Republic. As we observed in the first chapter,58 Plato uses the 
descent in the prologue of the Republic to dramatize the descent into 
the cave. Socrates and Glaucon attempt to go up to the city, but are 
dragged down once again to the Piraeus by Polemarchus. The body 
of the Republic then portrays Socrates descending into ordinary 
human society (the cave) to persuade his interlocutors that their 
concept of justice is a mere shadow of the truth. The Symposium, in 
contrast, portrays Socrates leading men upward in the pursuit of 
beauty. The reader ought not to be surprised, then, that in a dialogue 
devoted to the Ascent to Beauty, the prologue would describe a 
geographical ascent. 
The use of geography as metaphor for philosophical process is 
underscored by the verbal parallels between the two prologues, as 
57The only dialogues in which he does are the Republic, which 
is set in the Piraeus, the harbor of Athens; the Phaedrus, which is set 
in the countryside; the Phaedo, whose narration takes place in Phlius 
(after Socrates is dead); and the Laws, which is set in Crete. 
58See pages 21-23. 
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seen in the similarities between the second sentence of the 
Symposium and the first sentence of the Republic. 
Kal yap ETvyxavov TTP~flV ELS aaTv OlK06Ev CxVlWV 
<PaAnp66Ev ( Symp. 172a2-3) 
KaTe(3nv xees ELS nEtpaTa µETCx rAaVKUJVOS TOV 'ApiaTUJVOS 
(Resp. 1.327a1) 
In both cases there is a verb which either by itself (KaTe(3nv) or with a 
supplementary participle (eTvyxavov ... avtwv) denotes travel, 
followed by an adverb of time (np~nv, xees), followed by a 
prepositional phrase indicating destination (Eis aaTU, ELS nEtpaTa). In 
the Symposium Glaucon espies Apollodorus from afar (KaTtowv µE 
n6ppw6Ev, 172a3), while in the Republic Polemarchus espies 
Glaucon and Socrates (KaTtowv ovv n6ppw6Ev i]µO:s, 1.327b2). In 
both cases the participle of KaTtCEtv and the adverb n6ppw6Ev are 
used. In both dialogues the interlocutor hails the narrator from behind 
(onta6Ev; Symp. 172a3, Resp. 327b4) and asks him to nEptµevat 
(Symp. 172a5, Resp. 1.327b3).59 
59Qther similarities exist. Glaucon is present in both dialogues. 
In the Symposium he accosts Apollodorus, but in the Republic he is 
accosted along with Socrates by Polemarchus. (Indeed, the parallel 
between the Republic and the Symposium may be the joke [172a4] 
that eludes modern commentators: Glaucon is treating Apollodorus 
as Glaucon was treated by Polemarchus in the Republic. Certainly, 
Dover's explanation [Symposium, 77], that the joke lies in Glaucon's 
"feigned urgency," is inadequate.) Furthermore, both dialogues are 
set shortly after a sacrifice has been made: In the Republic Socrates 
is on his way back to Athens after making sacrifice to the goddess 
(1.327a2); in the Symposium Socrates attends Agathon's party after 
Agathon made the victory sacrifices (173a6-7). Although Allen, 9, 
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In both dialogues, then, a character briefly stops and for a 
moment the reader does not know whether the character will continue 
his upward journey or change course; in the Symposium, Apollodorus 
continues his ascent to Athens, while in the Republic Socrates is 
forced to return to the Piraeus. Since both dialogues portray learning 
as an ascent from the material world to the immaterial, 60 each 
prologue's description of a physical ascent reflects the metaphysical 
ascent taking place in the dialogue. 
One could argue that the literal journeys of the prologues add 
nothing to the dialogues, since the reader must rely on the 
"philosophical" portions of the dialogue to explicate these journeys 
and even then the interpretation is more allegorical than a direct 
application of philosophical principles to a concrete situation. Yet the 
interpreter's reliance on the body of the dialogue for interpretation of 
the prologue does not undermine this way of looking at Apollodorus' 
journey. The "philosophical" portion of the dialogue turns us away 
from the "philosophical": The philosophy of the dialogue reveals that 
Eros is not a force solely apprehended by philosophy. Even in 
Socrates' scheme, Eros remains an irrational force that affects not 
only men, but animals (207a8-c1 ). Thus, while the body of the 
dialogue may explain Eros with intellectual arguments, the prologue 
admits that the Symposium bears an affinity with the Phaedo, "Its 
main philosophical filiation is with the Republic: the account of Beauty 
itself at 21 Oa-212a anticipates the account of the Good in Resp. 6 
( 506b-509b). 
60symp. 210a4-212b7; Resp. 7.514a1-517a6. 
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illustrates the work of Eros. It does so not only by showing men acting 
under the sway of Eros, but also by portraying in a more abstract way 
man's desire to ascend to Beauty. 
Moreover, interpreting the ascent to Athens in both dialogues 
as symbolic of the philosophical ascent is the best way of "preserving 
the data." Plato has set the prologue of both dialogues in specific 
geographical circumstances. Since there is no other ostensible way 
to explain the necessity of these geographical details--which are not 
simply made in passing--and since the motif of ascent and descent 
appears in crucial passages of these dialogues, the simplest solution 
is to understand that the geography of the prologues reflects the 
content of the dialogue. It underscores the allusions in the prologue 
to the Ascent to Beauty already noted. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen that the behavior of the characters 
in the prologue illustrates their attitudes toward Beauty and, thus, the 
way in which Eros works in them. We have seen that each character 
in the prologue prepares the reader for the way in which he will 
describe Eros; moreover, the prologue alerts the reader to certain 
nuances in those speeches that would have escaped the reader's 
attention, if the prologue were omitted. 
The prologue allows us to see these nuances, since the guests 
speak without the restraints imposed upon them later, as they follow 
the rules of giving an encomium. The reader gets more of a glimpse 
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into their personalities and can see how the personalities of the 
guests color their understanding of Eros. More importantly, the 
reader sees in the prologue actions motivated by Eros. If the reader 
adopts the broad definition of Eros held by Socrates, he is able to 
observe a wide range of behavior that can be called erotic. In line with 
the Socratic definition, the reader can then discern a hierarchy among 
the guests, with the lovers of the sensual on the bottom and the lover 
of Absolute Beauty on the top. 
Since Socrates invites the other guests to attempt to ascend to 
Absolute Beauty, it is fitting that the prologue make two allusions to 
the ascent. First, there is the allusion to the ascent in the Apollodorus' 
journey up to Athens in the first half of the prologue. Second, and 
more importantly, there is a demonstration of the ascent by Socrates, 
who begins with the prospect of physical beauty and then gets a 
glimpse of Absolute Beauty. In both instances, Plato is inviting the 
reader to examine what the Ascent entails and how it appears to the 
external observer. 
Thus, the character and dramas of the prologue are examples 
of individuals searching for Beauty and the Good. Although the body 
of the dialogue will give detailed and rational explanations of the 
search, the characters and drama of the prologue demonstrate the 
importance and universality of the search. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
EROS OF BEAUTY AND THE GOOD: 
EROS IN THE DICTION OF THE PROLOGUE 
So far we have argued that each of the characters manifests 
Eros in a unique way. The behavior of each character in the prologue 
either foreshadows his theory of Eros or reveals a dimension to his 
speech that would have perhaps gone unnoticed had there been no 
dramatic prologue to the encomia. Not only, however, does the 
characterization of the dramatis personae manifest Eros, but so do 
many of the words in the prologue. Through his choice of diction, 
Plato constantly interweaves allusions to Eros and his work with the 
drama of the dialogue. 
In his use of words, Plato can be so subtle that many of his 
allusions to Eros may escape the reader. In large part, the subtlety of 
the allusions arises from Plato's lack of a technical vocabulary. Unlike 
Aristotle and later philosophers, Plato does not have a set vocabulary 
that he employs only for philosophical matters; even some of his 
technical vocabulary, such as o6~a, he uses in a non-technical 
sense.1 Instead, he draws on common words to describe intricate 
1 For example, Guthrie has observed that Plato does not 
consistently use the word eloos to refer to the Forms or Ideas. Indeed, 
if one takes the e'lon of Republic 3.402b-c to refer to the Forms, then 
Socrates' statement would contradict with his arguments elsewhere in 
the dialogue. As Guthrie demonstrates, however non-technical 
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philosophical concepts and processes. As Alcibiades puts it, 
Socrates' words--that is, the words of Plato's Socrates--are full of 
"pack mules and certain bronze smiths, cobblers, and tanners" 
(221 e4-5), which, however, point to a larger reality. Thus, the words 
Plato employs to describe his most important philosophical concepts 
are frequently ordinary terms that derive a weightier philosophical 
sense from the context. Even Plato's most technical term--e1oos or 
iOea--at its heart merely denotes something that is seen.2 
Not surprisingly, then, the Symposium contains many words 
that are used to describe both erotic and ordinary human activity. 
occurrences of e1oos abound in this dialogue noted for its use of e1oos 
in its t~chnical sense. See Guthrie, 4:459-460, 498, 509. 
Eduoard Des Places, S.J., ed. Lexique de la langue 
philosophique et re}igieuse de Platon (hereafter Lexique de Platon) 
(Paris: Societe d' Edition "Les belles lettres," 1970), s.v. "doos ," pp. 
159-160, demonstrates the range of meaning for that word: (1) form, 
aspect, (2) geometrical figure, {3) image, (4) category or class (as in 
Symposium 205b4), (5) general category, and (6) Idea. Cf. Mitchell, 
xii, on Platonic vocabulary. 
2e18os can merely mean the exterior appearance of an object, 
as in Chrm. 154d4: ovTc.us To e1oos TiayKaA6s EoTtv. The 
interchangeability of technical and non-technical senses of words in 
Plato should not surprise the astute reader, since Plato can be 
horribly imprecise, even when he is using technical vocabulary. In 
202a2-9, Diotima sets forth the distinction between ignorance and 
knowledge, and posits an intermediate state between the two, 
namely, right opinion. As she puts forth this theory, she uses different 
words for knowledge and right opinion: 
passage ignorance right opinion knowledge 
202a3: aµa0(a not mentioned oocp(a 
202a5-8: aµa0(a TO 6p0a oo~al;ElV E1TLOTao0at/ ElTlOTTJµT} 
202a9: aµa0ia iJ 6p0a o6~a cpp6vT}otS -
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Furthermore, since Plato argues throughout the dialogue that the 
presence of Eros is not confined only to one branch of human activity, 
it is not inappropriate to see the "ordinary'' uses of a word as having 
an erotic overtone. There can be no hard and fast line of demarcation 
between a word's technical and ordinary senses. 
Of course, one may object that it is not Plato's use of allusion 
that is subtle, but rather the interpreter's discovery of it. The reader, 
nonetheless, ought not to be deterred from attempting to discover 
erotic overtones to ordinary words in the dialogue, especially in light 
of the hermeneutical arguments set forth in the first chapter of this 
dissertation. This hermeneutic is confirmed by Plato's use of word 
play, which indicates that Plato is well aware of a word's several 
senses. For example, Plato has Socrates "abuse" the common 
proverb, aya6wv ETTL 8atTas '(aaLV avT6µaTOl aya6o( (174b4-5). In 
place of aya6wv Socrates substitutes · Aya6c.0vc.uv. 3 Plato is aware 
3This is the most credible explanation of the passage. Dover, 
Symposium, 81-82, completely misunderstands the proverb 
(TTapoLµia), believing that Socrates has substituted ayaewv for 
8eLAwv. Bury, 8-9, makes the same error. He notes that the proverb 
existed in antiquity in both forms, but argues that the original proverb 
had aya6wv, which was parodied by Cratinus and Eupolis to read 
8eLAwv; nonetheless, says Bury, Socrates assumes that 8eLAwv is the 
older form of the proverb and parodies it by changing 8eLAwv to 
ayaewv. Bury's explanation, however, does not hold up under 
scrutiny. What would be Socrates' purpose in corrupting the proverb 
by changing 8eLAwv to aya6wv? The example that Socrates cites, 
that of Menelaus going to Agamemnon's banquet, assumes that the 
proverb has the good, not the cowardly, going to the feast of the 
good, with the incident in Homer being a violation of the rule. 
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that Agathon's name sounds like the word for "good" in Greek. Since 
he will connect Beauty and Good later in the dialogue (204e1 -2), 
Plato uses Agathon's name to allude to the quest for the Good that is 
inherent in the quest for Beauty. 
For the sake of the pun we must forget certain aspects of 
Agathon's nature. As far as the pun is concerned, Agathon is no 
longer to be thought of as the overindulgent poetaster whose beauty 
is only skin deep. Rather he is a manifestation of the Absolute Beauty, 
from which all beauty is derived. Through the pun, Agathon has 
become aya86s. Thus, although Plato portrays Agathon elsewhere 
as a less than ideal lover of Beauty, Plato here treats him as if he were 
Absolute Beauty personified. 
Agathon, nonetheless, remains Agathon, despite Socrates' pun. 
Therefore, we must distinguish between word play or allusion from 
allegory. When Plato makes a pun or an allusion, he makes a 
tangential connection between an ordinary person or object and 
another person, object, or a philosophical idea. If Plato's word-plays 
Nonetheless, Socrates has changed the proverb in some 
fashion. But how? The most common explanation is that he has 
substituted the dative · Ay6:8wv' (i.e., · Ay6:8wvt} for the expected 
genitive aya8wv. Yet, as Renehan, 120-121, has observed, it is not 
good Greek grammar to use the dative to state a person's destination. 
Therefore, Renehan suggests that Plato originally wrote 'Aya8wvwv, · 
which later by haplology was reduced to 'Ay6:8wv. 
As Anderson, 67, notes, this is not the only occasion when Plato 
makes a pun on Agathon's name. Agathon boasts in his speech that 
"Eros 'cared for the good [bnµe:Afis aya8wv]." Later, Socrates 
compels Agathon "to admit that Eros lacks the good (aya8wv 
evoefis)." 
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were to lead the reader to allegorize the people and objects in the 
dialogue, they would become mere ciphers for philosophical ideas or 
phenomena. This would lead the reader to face countless difficulties 
of interpretation. It is possible, for example, to see a tangential 
connection between Agathon and the Good, but it is impossible to see 
Agathon as the embodiment of the Good in the dialogue. Every deed 
that Agathon performs is not an example of the sort of behavior 
expected from the Good. Rather, Plato continues to endow Agathon 
with those traits that a fourth century BC reader would have expected 
to find in Agathon. Thus, we cannot allegorize Agathon to stand for 
the Good throughout the dialogue, but we can recognize that in one 
particular instance (174b4-5) Agathon's name has become 
something greater than Agathon himself. 
Thus, we must distinguish sometimes between what is 
happening in re and what is happening in verbo. Agathon's name 
alludes to the good, but Socrates in going to his house is not 
ascending to the good, but to a man who is µaA8aK6s (174c1). Hence 
the complexity of interpretation: Plato hints at a deeper meaning 
behind some of the names and events, but the history of the 
characters intrudes often enough to prevent the reader from reading 
the story as mere allegory. Is Agathon an ideal picture of the Good? 
Or is he a man utterly devoid of true Beauty? Plato answers "yes" to 
both questions. To the degree that he is effeminate and his speech 
sophistic, he resembles Socrates' portrait of Menelaus4 and, 
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consequently, is not truly good. Yet to the degree that his name 
alludes to the Good, Agathon represents the Good. Agathon's house 
is Socrates' destination, even as the Good is the destination of all 
lovers.5 
Plato's word play, therefore, ought to open the readers' eyes to 
possible erotic overtones in the ordinary phrases of the prologue. But 
as readers pursue these overtones, they ought not to allegorize the 
text, i.e., to turn the possible erotic overtones into the chief aim of 
exegesis of the text. The overtones, to shift the metaphor slightly, are 
4Socrates' cites Apollo's rebuke of Menelaus in Iliad 17 as 
proof that Menelaus was an inferior warrior, even though the rest of 
the Iliad and the context of Apollo's speech does not support that 
evaluation. Dover, Symposium, 82, aptly notes: "A Greek citing 
poetry seldom takes notice of the context in which the words were 
uttered, by whom, to whom, or (most important of all) for what 
purpose." 
5Here I assume that the Good is either to be identified with 
Beauty or, though distinct from Beauty, to be closely associated with 
it. White, 149-157, has challenged those who assume that Plato 
identifies Beauty with the Good. White notes that Diotima does not 
equate the two in 204e1-3, but substitutes the Good for Beauty to 
make it easier to get an answer from Socrates. As I argued on page 
86, fn. 2, however, White is not entirely on the mark with his criticism. 
The exchange of Beauty for the Good can be used to argue their 
identity as well as their distinction. Furthermore, one must grant that 
Plato is playing on the close connection between Beauty and the 
Good; if the two terms are not identical, they are at least closely 
related. The affinity of the two notions was already inherent in the 
classical idiom of Ka:hos Kaya86s, the goal of nobility. What Plato 
intends with that phrase is, to be sure, different from the aristocratic 
ideal, even as the Platonic Socrates' concept of the pursuit of Beauty 
differs from that of his contemporary society. Nonetheless, Plato 
begins with the current idiom and finds it useful to discover in one 
man, Agathon, both beauty (as is his attribute) and goodness (as is 
derived from his name). 
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like a faint harmony that is not meant to obscure the melody, but 
rather to supplement and support it. 
Thus, one ought not to expect an erotic overtone in every word 
of the prologue that may be used to describe Eros later in the 
dialogue. Sometimes the ordinary meaning of a word is so strong in a 
particular context that it is difficult to let the word have any erotic 
overtones without doing an injustice to the passage. Even when a 
word does have an erotic overtone, we must remember that it is 
merely an overtone, not the full melody of the dialogue. 
In the rest of this chapter, we will examine individual words in 
the prologue that have erotic overtones, especially in the light of the 
rest of the dialogue. We will divide the discussion into two parts: First, 
we will examine adjectives associated with Eros, as well as nouns that 
describe the attributes of Eros; then, we will examine the verbs (and 
deverbative nouns) which describe the actions of Eros. I have chosen 
to divide the words into these two groups since it follows the pattern 
laid down by Socrates and Agathon of first stating the qualities of Eros 
(as best seen in adjectives) and of then stating the actions and 
benefits of Eros (as can be best seen in the verbs). I have selected 
the words below after examining those words in the prologue which 
appear later in the dialogue. 6 Then, I removed from consideration 
such words as Tip~nv (172a2, 175e6, 213e4), Tiai~c.uv (172a4 and 
216e4), and aµa (172a4, 173b9 and seventeen times in the rest of 
61 was aided in this endeavor by the Thesaurus Linguae 
Graecae. 
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the dialogue) that have at best a tangential connection to the 
dialogue's central theme, 7 so that the words discussed below will be 
the clearest examples of words with philosophical or erotic overtones. 
The six adjectives we will examine are KaA6s, cpavAos, µtKp6s, 
&8.Atos, veos, and µa.AaK6s. All of them describe attributes that Eros 
seeks to possess or to avoid. Then we will examine thirteen verbs. 
Five of the verbs ((3ovAEa6at, sflTELV, 11vveavEa8at, Sta11vveavEa6at, 
and ayEtv) refer to Eros' longing and search for Beauty. Two verbs 
?some words which I have omitted, most notably o(Katos, may 
have some significance for the dialogue's exposition of Eros, but are 
too tangential or insubstantial to justify inclusion in this study. 
Nonetheless, a case can be made for understanding the word 
8tKa t6TaTos in 172b5ras a word that echoes ideas raised elsewhere 
in the dialogue, since the dialogue does concern itself to a fair degree 
with issues of justice. Eryximachus argues that Eros accomplishes 
the good with sobriety and justice (8tKatoavvns, 188d6). Agathon 
avers that Eros makes the laws just (196c3). Socrates, meanwhile, 
states that the most beautiful of thoughts that Eros can beget is the 
concern for the matters of the state, which is called sobriety and 
justice (209a8). He also argues that by seeking Absolute Beauty, one 
discovers the beauty of laws, which is a greater beauty than that of 
bodies (21 Oc2-6). 
Given the dialogue's preoccupation with justice, the word 
8tKat6TaTos in 172b5 gains new importance. There Glaucon tells 
Apollodorus, "It would be most fair for you to report the words of your 
friend." (otKOLOTOTOS yap ET TOVS TOU ETa(pov .A6yovs a11ayyeAELV. 
On the idiomatic use of otKat6TaTos, see Dover, Symposium, 78.) 
Because Socrates' speech can assist Glaucon in the pursuit of 
Beauty, Apollodorus is duty-bound to narrate it. Although Apollodorus 
may not technically be the most proper man (8tKat6TaTos) to narrate 
the symposium to Glaucon--he was not present when the dialogue 
was first told and is relating it years after the event--his acquaintance 
with Socrates and his circle makes it incumbent upon him to narrate 
the dialogue. To the degree that he is an erotic being moved by 
Beauty, he is the proper Oust) man to narrate the dialogue. · 
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(ooKe'i'v, o'lea8at) explain the middle state of Eros, while three describe 
his ultimate goal (eioevat, Ka8opav, avve'lvat). Finally, three verbs 
describe the way in which Eros-driven men reach their goal 
(TVyxavetv, xap(l;ea8at, and otacpevyetv). 
Allusions to Eros and Erotic Processes 
in Adjectives. Adverbs. and Nouns Derived from Adjectives 
Adjectives of Beauty and its Antonyms 
KaA6s and its cognates. If Eros is associated with one adjective 
above all others, it is the word KaA6s. Whether the guests state that 
Eros is himself KaA6s or makes things KaAa or seeks after KaA6v, 
they always associate Eros with To KaA6v or To KaAAos. Phaedrus 
argues that the goal of life is to live beautifully or nobly (KaA&s 
(3tc.0aea8at, 178c6), which Eros more than any other force leads one 
to do (178c7). Pausanias, however, states that nothing is KaA6v in 
itself, but the manner in which something is done determines if it is 
KaA6v or not (181 a2). Thus, Pausanias endeavors in his speech to 
find the Eros that is truly KaA6s (181 a5). Agathon says that Eros is 
KaAAtaTos (195a7-b3), while Socrates states that Eros seeks To 
KaA6v but does not himself possess To KaAAos (200e2-201 c5). 
How are we to translate KaA6s? When KaA6s describes a visible 
object or person, it usually means "beautiful"; in other contexts, 
however, KaA6s can mean "honorable" or "noble." Because the 
encomiasts of Eros are largely concerned with human bodies, the 
most common translation of KaA6s in the dialogue will be "beautiful." 
The other nuances of the word, however, are not to be forgotten. As 
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Warner aptly notes, "the usual translation, 'beautiful' is too narrow; for 
the beauty in question can not only be physical but also moral, where 
a word like 'noble' or 'fine' would be more in place; indeed, the word, 
can be used in certain contexts even more generally to mean 
'admirable' or even 'good'."8 Moreover, as Dover notes, KaA6s 
"expresses a favorable reaction" to a person, object, or idea. "This 
word, when applied to a person, means 'beautiful', 'pretty', 
'handsome', 'attractive', and its antonym is aicrxp6s, 'ugly'. The words 
are also applied to objects, sights, and sounds and whatever can be 
heard about and thought about, such as an institution, an 
achievement or:Aailure, or a virtuous or vicious action." Here KaA6s 
means "'admirable', 'creditable', 'honorable"' and its antonym 
aicrxp6s means "'disgraceful', 'repulsive', 'contemptible'."9 Since the 
ancient Greeks did not differentiate between the grandeur of beauty, 
honor, and nobility, the possessor of any of the three was KaA6s. If we 
use "beautiful" to describe what the Greeks called KaA6s, we must 
remember that a Greek could use aesthetic terms to describe ethical 
decisions. 1 O 
Swarner, 164. 
9Dover, Symposium, 2. Cf. Nehemas, xxvii. 
1 O Lexique de Platon, s.v. KaA6s (277), gives the range of 
meanings: As an adjective, KaA6s means "beautiful," whether 
physically or morally. As a substantive, it can mean "physical beauty," 
"honor," "moral good or duty," or "the Idea of beauty." Similarly, 
KaAAos, as Lexique de Pia ton, 276, notes, can be taken in a physical, 
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Not surprisingly, the prologue shows as much preoccupation 
with beauty as the body of the dialogue does. Socrates has become 
beautiful (ouTcu Ka.hos yeyevnµevos, 174a5) so that he may go as a 
handsome man (Ka.A6s) to a handsome man (KaA6v, 174a9). By 
having Socrates beautify himself and use the vocabulary of beauty, 
Plato has already hinted at what a major topic of the dialogue will be, 
namely, beauty. This is especially made apparent to the reader when 
Plato states that Socrates rarely preoccupied himself with becoming 
beautiful, at least not as far as physical hygiene was concerned 
(174a4).11 
It is not, however, solely physical beauty with which the 
prologue concerns itself: Wisdom, too, is characterized as beautiful. 
Socrates is the first to hint at this truth, when he with some irony calls 
Agathon's wisdom KaAfi (175e2). Although Socrates can be 
moral, or metaphysical sense. H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, eds. A Greek 
English Lexicon, 9d ed., rev. H. Stuart Jones and R. McKenzie, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), , s. v. KaA6s, 870, includes the 
following definitions: "beautiful, of outward form, freq. of 
persons; ... .freq. of parts of the body, fair, shapely, ... with ref. to use, 
good, of fine qua/ity, ... of sacrifices, auspicious; .. .in a moral sense, 
beautiful, noble, honorable." Hence "To Ka.A6v, moral beauty, virtue, 
honor." The adverb Ka.Aws is usually translated "well," not 
"beautifully," even though the adjectival form Ka.A6s can be translated 
"good" or "beautiful." The affinity between the two concepts 
expressed by KaA6s can be seen in colloquial English, where 
"beautiful" can substitute for "good." 
11 Friedlander, 3:5, notes that the narration of the symposium 
begins with a discussion of beauty, much as the Hippias Major, which 
also is concerned with beauty, begins with the words, "Hippias the 
beautiful." 
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understood merely to be referring to Agathon's ability to craft beautiful 
words, this is not Socrates' point, since he argues in his encomium 
that ideas themselves can possess Ka.A.hos (21 Ob6-c6). By praising 
the wisdom of Agathon, Socrates has introduced into the dialogue the 
notion that wisdom may be judged by the criterion of To Ka.A.hos. 
This notion that wisdom (and thus ethics and discourse) can be 
judged by the criterion of beauty is carried forth in two other instances 
in the prologue. Eryximachus, when hearing that the crowd will not 
overdrink, says that Pausanias has spoken Ka.Aws (176b2). Later, 
Socrates states that the goal of the evening's discourse will be to 
speak sufficiently and beautifully (iKavws Ka\ Ka.Aws; 177e4). 
Although both occurrences of Ka.Aws are idiomatic and almost 
formulaic, they do allude to the beauty desired by Eros: In both cases 
an act of speaking is judged to be beautiful because of its contents. 
Pausanias has spoken beautifully because he has urged the virtue of 
moderation. Similarly, Socrates describes a beautiful encomium as 
one that covers the material sufficiently. 
Although all of these uses of Ka.A6s and its cognates can be 
understood apart from Socrates' theory of beauty, they receive their 
full import when understood in the light of the Ascent to Beauty 
outlined by Socrates. The search for beauty takes place everywhere; 
even the most unerotic men are always searching for beauty. 
Although beauty can be found in many items, the beauty discovered 
by the mind (e.g., wisdom, good laws) is superior to that observed by 
the senses. 
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Thus, even the most ordinary uses of KaA6s in the prologue 
remind the reader of the quest for Absolute Beauty. Aristodemus, by 
choosing to come to the symposium, is told that he has acted 
beautifully (KaA&s ... not&v; 17 4e12). Although that phrase can be 
understood to mean simply "I'm glad you came," it does express a 
philosophical truth: By coming to the symposium, Aristodemus has 
been guided by and to Beauty: Aristodemus, moved by the same 
beauty which moved Socrates (cf 174c7}, has been led to undertake 
a noble task, namely, coming to the house where Beauty will be 
seen .12 It is not Aristodemus' crashing of the party in itself that is 
beautiful, but rather his intention to get a glimpse of Beauty. Though 
Agathon believes that he is the beauty which moves all his guests to 
come to the party, Socrates will reveal that there is a higher Beauty. 
Thus, Agathon's words mean more than he realizes. In a similar 
fashion, Agathon's words els KaAov flKets, ''you have come at a 
beautiful time"(174e5), ring truer than Agathon realizes. Given the 
evening's discussion, Aristodemus has come at a more beautiful time 
than Agathon can know at the time he utters those words. 
q>avAos and its synonyms. To appreciate the Beauty revealed in 
the dialogue, one must by implication avoid what is "base" or "ugly". 
Thus, <pavAos and its synonyms contrast with the Beauty yearned for 
by Eros. As Pausanias argues, there are two ways of loving: there is 
an Eros that loves KaA&s (181a3) and there is a love which base men 
12LSJ, s.v. KaA&s 5 (p 870) translates the idiom KaA.ro~ 7toirov 
as "rightly, deservedly." 
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(q>avAot, 181b2) employ. Socrates adopts the distinction, but for a 
different purpose: Whenever Eros finds Absolute Beauty, everything 
else appears q>avAov (211 e4).13 
Since the lover seeks to possess Beauty, he is forced to 
confront whether or not there is any ugliness in himself .14 In the 
13Dover, Symposium, 2, notes that the opposite of KaA6s is 
generally aiaxp6s. Cf. LSJ, s.v. KaA6s Ill 2 (p 870), which cites 
Symposium 183d, where Pausanias distinguishes between KaA6v 
and aiaxp6v actions. q>avAos, in contrast, means "mediocre" or 
"undistinguished" (Dover, Symposium, 82) and can also mean 
"'useless,' 'bad'." As such, q>avAos is the opposite of "any favorable 
evaluative term." LSJ, s.v. q>avAos (1919-1920) includes the following 
definitions: "cheap, easy, slight, paltry, ... simple, ordinary ... but freq. 
with sense poor indifferent, ... mean, common;... inefficient, bad. 
Lexique de Platon (553) defines q>avAos in the following way: "a) 
(choses) 'mediocre, futile' (adj. et subst. n.); b) (personnes) mauvais 
mechant (adj. et subst. m.)." Lexique de Platon adds that q>avAos can 
be used as an antonym for aya86s: "ev µ6vov e~etv TovTo aya86v, 
TclAAa exwv ... q>avAa H[ippias] m[inor] 372b2" and 111TOAAclKlS µev 
aya8ou OVAfJTOU q>aUAOS av Cx1TE[3f), lTOAAclKlS 8' av q>avAov aya86s 
Pr. 327c2-3." 
14Throughout the dialogue, but especially in Socrates' speech, 
the notion of possessing (exetv) beauty is ill-defined. Sometimes it 
refers to the enjoyment of a beauty outside oneself (sense A), while 
other times it refers to possession of beauty by one's own self (sense 
B). By ignoring the ambiguity of that phrase, Socrates can assert that 
only those who do not possess beauty seek beauty. Socrates ignores. 
that one could have beauty oneself (sense B) while seeking to enjoy 
the beauty of another person (sense A). Cf. Anderson, 66. 
Nussbaum, 177-179, explains the ambiguity by noting that Plato is 
stating that the lover does not have a particular instance of beauty 
(i.e., the beloved). Since Plato assumes that "all beauty, qua beauty, 
is uniform" (Nussbaum, 179), then lack of a beloved's beauty implies 
that the lover lacks all beauty. Cf. Allen, 100; Dover, Symposium, 136. 
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prologue, therefore, we discover two men pondering that question. 
Aristodemus thinks of himself as cpavAos, resembling Menelaus who 
went to the banquet of his superior brother, Agamemnon (174c7). 
Likewise, Socrates claims that his wisdom is cpavATJ (175e3) and, 
therefore, he has gone to the house of the brilliant Agathon. Both 
occurrences of the word cpavAos can be understood in a non-
technical sense, but the word also explains the status of both men as 
erotic beings, that is, people who are cpavAot but long to be KaAoL 
Both Socrates and Aristodemus recognize that they do not possess 
Beauty; thus they call themselves cpavAot, even though they know of a 
greater beauty than Agathon does.15 
To recognize one's ugliness is a wretched experience, but the 
truly wretched (&6Atot), according to the prologue, are those who do 
not recognize their lack of beauty. Hence the adjective &6Atos is 
applied to those people who have not yet undertaken the Ascent to 
Beauty--first to Apollodorus in his pre-philosophical stage of life 
(173a2) and then to his friends who pursue business rather than 
philosophy (173d6). Such people live uninterested in the 
philosophical life and, consequently, are still in the wretched state in 
which Eros begins but does not intend to stay. Thus, the reader must 
15Cf. Mitchell, 169: "If greatness is to be measured in 
monuments of stone, law, thought--which is what all our instincts 
guide us to take for greatness, or beauty, itself--then 'paltry' is the last 
word on Socrates. And if, in spite of that, we insist on finding some 
greatness in Socrates, then we must leave aside forever the 'Socratic 
enigma' and busy ourselves with writing books on 'the philosophy of 
Socrates'." 
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distinguish between being cpavAos, where one is far removed from To 
KaAAos, and being a6ALos, a state in which one does not recognize 
that he is cpavAos .16 
In light of the derogatory adjectives applied to those who lack 
beauty, the adjective aµLKp6s, which describes Aristodemus (173b2), 
carries new weight.17 It is not merely a description of his height, but 
of his intellectual stature and progress on the Ascent to Beauty. For 
as Socrates portrays the objects of beauty, each new object makes 
the previous one appear aµLKp6v (21 Ob-c).18 Thus, it is significant 
that the only physical description given of Aristodemus--besides his 
shoelessness--is that he is aµLKp6s. It indicates to the reader that 
Aristodemus, though a pupil of Socrates as his shoelessness 
indicates, is inferior to his teacher in discerning the greater objects of 
beauty. Thus, the smallness of Aristodemus' stature becomes a 
metaphor for his philosophical stature. 
16LSJ, s.v. a SA Los, 32, defines the word as "struggling, 
wretched, miserable," in both a moral and non-moral sense. Cf. 
Lexique de Platon s.v. a6ALOS, 14. 
17LSJ s.v. µLKp6s (1133) observes that µLKp6s can refer to the 
size, quantity, or amount of importance given to an object or person. 
When µLKp6s is applied to people it can be derogatory, as in Ar. Ran. 
709 and Pl. Prt. 323d. 
1 BAs Dover, Symposium, 155, aptly translates aµLKp6v: 
"'trivial', 'of no account'." 
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Other Adjectives 
veo~. The seemingly innocent remark in the prologue about the 
recentness (vewaT(, 172c1) of the symposium alludes to the 
questions of youth and age that dominate the dialogue. Glaucon 
assumes that the symposium must have taken place recently 
(vewaT(, 172c1 ), even as Agathon in his speech assumes that Eros 
must be young (veos, 195a8-c7).19 Glaucon and Agathon make 
these assumptions because they do not believe that something old 
would be of much interest, as the symposium and Eros are. Agathon 
argues that, since Eros is beautiful, he must be one of the youngest of 
the gods (195a8-196a1 ). Likewise, Glaucon assumes that the 
symposium must have been recent and Apollodorus must be an 
eyewitness of the symposium if his account is to have any validity; for 
this reason, Glaucon's first question about the symposium is whether 
or not Apollodorus was present at it (172b7). 
Not every person in the dialogue agrees with the emphasis on 
youth. Phaedrus states that Eros must be one of the oldest of the 
gods, because the antiquity of Eros gives him greater honor. His 
greater age makes him more responsible for all the benefits that 
befall mankind (178c2). Meanwhile, Socrates steers a middle course 
between Phaedrus and Agathon. Since Eros is neither beautiful nor 
ugly, he is neither immortal nor mortal. On the same day he can die 
and reinvigorate himself (203d8-e3). Thus, he is neither young nor 
19As LSJ s.v. veos observes, the word can have not only the 
sense of ''young," but also that of ''youthful." · 
148 
old, but both. Since he longs for the beautiful, he is old while seeking 
to be young. Like all lovers, Eros is inspired by the beauty of youth, for 
only by gazing at beautiful young bodies can a person beget 
offspring, whether literally or mentally (209b1; 210a5). Pregnancy (of 
both kinds) is the chief way in which a person is made new again since 
children and ideas carry on the names of their creators forever. 
Through begetting (207d3) and regeneration (207d7) Eros makes 
new what was old (208b1 ).20 
It is this Socratic concept of youth that explains why Glaucon is 
pleased with Apollodorus' narration, even though the symposium is 
not a recent event (i.e., one that had taken place vewaT[, 172c1) and 
its narrator is not an eyewitness. The symposium has not 
deteriorated with age because narration has kept it alive and young. 
Even as all pieces of knowledge are kept eternally alive and retain 
their youthful vigor through practice (208a4-7), so the symposium is 
kept alive and young through its continued transmission by narration. 
Each time the symposium is narrated it replaces the old narration with 
a newer, fresher one (208a7-b2). Thus, the dialogue is truly "new" or 
20Since Socrates places the conception of Eros at Aphrodite's 
birthday party, his mythology of the origins of Eros reflects a middle 
stance between Agathon and Phaedrus. On the one hand, Socrates 
agrees with Agathon that Eros is not one of the oldest of the gods. His 
conception takes place after the revolt against Uranus and the 
ascension of either Cronus or Zeus to the throne of the deities 
(depending upon whether Socrates is following the Hesiodic or 
Homeric account of the origin of Aphrodite). On the other hand, 
Aphrodite is not one of the more recent gods, e.g., Dionysus; thus, 
Eros cannot be a very recent god, either. Thus, Eros is neither a 
primeval deity nor one of the more recent gods. 
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"young," in the sense that Socrates understands the term. Since 
regeneration is an erotic process, the narration is necessarily a 
manifestation of Eros.21 
uaAaK6s. In a similar way, a "Socratic" understanding of 
softness explains in what sense Apollodorus can deserve the 
nickname "softy" (µa Aa Kos, 173d8)22 and in what sense this 
appellation makes Apollodorus a truly erotic character. As 
Apollodorus' friends observe, the nickname does not fit his habit of 
railing against everyone (173d8-10); Apollodorus is usually not a 
"softy." In Agathon's way of looking at Eros, this would indicate an 
anti-erotic tendency in Apollodorus: Eros and those possessed by 
him must be soft, since Eros dwells only in the softest regions of the 
body and in the softest of people (195e3, 195e7-8). In the Socratic 
understanding, however, Eros and his followers do not possess 
"softness" or any of the qualities ascribed to Beauty, but rather long 
for them or possess them intermittently (203c6-e5): Eros is not 
supple (anaA6s) and beautiful (KaA6s), but hard (aKAfJp6s), squalid 
21 By examining this one word, we have confirmed the 
conclusion reached in the second chapter, namely, that narration is a 
process whereby Eros works in men to obtain a glimpse of Absolute 
Beauty. 
22The reading µaAaK6s is to be preferred to µavLKOS, since the 
former is the lectio difficilior. As Paganelli, 195-196, notes, µaAaK6s 
acquired a vulgar meaning in Byzantine Greek and was, accordingly, 
amended. When applied to persons, µaAaK6s can mean "soft" in the 
sense of "mild" or "gentle" or in the sense of "cowardly," "morally 
weak," "lacking in self control," as LSJ, 1077, notes. 
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(avxµnp6s), shoeless (avvTI68nTos), and homeless (aotKos); when 
he finds good fortune, he flourishes; other times, he dies, but always 
to come back alive. To the degree that Apollodorus has a softer and a 
harsher side, he illustrates the position of the lover, not the 
possessor, of beauty. 
Allusions to Eros and Erotic Processes 
in Verbs and Deverbative Nouns 
Eros' Quest 
§ouAEa8at. Since Eros implies desire, the dialogue often uses 
[3ouAEa8at as a synonym for Epav. This interchange of terms is most 
strikingly illustrated by Socrates in 199e6-200e6, where ETit8uµEtv 
and [3ovAEa8at are used as synonyms for the verb Epav, to avoid 
using the definiendum in the definition.23 The three verbs differ from 
one another, to be sure, but in quantity or intensity, not quality: 
[3ovAEa8at and ETit8vµEtv denote less intense longings than Epav.24 
Thus, [3ovAEa8at ought to be treated as a loose equivalent to 
Epav, even when it occurs in the prologue. Significantly, the four times 
that this word is used in the prologue it establishes a choice among 
23Similarly, Aristophanes in defining Eros says that the split. 
halves always desire ([3ovAovTat) to spend time with one another 
(192c4) and want ([3ovAEa8E) to be united or forged together (192d4). 
24LSJ, 325, translates [3ovAoµat inter alia as "will," "wish," "like" 
and eTit8vµec.u (p 634) "'set one's heart upon a thing, long for, covet, 
desire." Dover, Symposium, 135, cites Lysis 207de as evidence for 
the interchangeability of [3ovAEa8at and ETit8uµEl'v. See also Allen, 56. 
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various objects of desire. The men who want to indulge in drink are 
allowed to do so (176e5) and the flute girl can play to whomever she 
wants (176e7); but the desires of neither group will influence the 
behavior of the rest of the assembly. They, instead, will be willing, i.e., 
will desire, to pass the time through words about Eros {176e9; 177a1). 
CnTetv. Because Eros does not possess what he desires, he 
must constantly seek it. Thus, i;11Tetv (seeking)25 is an important 
erotic action, even if the guests at the symposium do not agree on the 
object of Eros' search. According to Aristophanes, Eros makes one 
seek one's other half, both when people were first split in half (191 b3) 
and now (191d5). Diotima, however, avers that men do not seek their 
other halves {205e1 ), but Eros makes men seek KaTa To ovvaTov 
ae( Te eTvat Kal a86:vaTos (207d1 ). Therefore, men seek beauty in 
order that they might beget in beauty (209b2). If a lover is noble 
enough to love the beauty of the soul, he will be content to seek 
beautiful words, ideas, and souls rather than beautiful bodies (21 Oc2). 
Since Eros seeks Absolute Beauty above all, Socrates' Ascent to 
Beauty is aptly described as his standing still while seeking (i;11Twv, 
210c5). 
In the prologue the verb l;11Tetv occurs twice: Glaucon seeks 
Apollodorus {172a7) and Agathon has sought Aristodemus the 
previous day (174e7). In the first case, Glaucon seeks Apollodorus 
25"Seeking" is the root meaning of the word, but it can bear a 
number of connotations: "search after, search out," "inquire into, 
investigate," "seek after, desire," as LSJ s.v. SllTEc.u, 756, notes. 
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not because Apollodorus is beautiful but because he knows words 
that lead to Beauty. Agathon, meanwhile, in searching for 
Aristodemus, is seeking his object of beauty, namely, the flattery of a 
crowd. In both instances the search is an erotic one, since both men 
are looking for the object they desire most. 
Jivv8avea8at and 5taJivv8avea8at. Apollodorus' interlocutor 
(172a1 ), as well as Glaucon (172a7) inquires about the dialogue 
(Tivv8avea8e and 5taJiv8Ea8at,26 respectively). In 204e2, the only 
other place in the dialogue that Tivv8avea8at occurs, Plato uses it to 
refer to a philosophical inquiry; the question Socrates asks there 
pertains directly to Eros--namely, what the goal of Eros is. Like all 
philosophical questions, it is erotic, that is, a form of seeking after the 
beauty of truth. Likewise, the queries in the prologue are asked 
because of Eros' influence on the questioners. They long for the 
beauty of the dialogue and the Absolute Beauty portrayed therein. 
The force of Eros behind the inquiry is especially underscored by 
Glaucon's use of three verbs together, all of which are associated with 
Eros: ef;fjTOVV (3ou.A6µevos 5taJiv8Ea8at (172a7). Glaucon wants 
((3ou.A6µevos) something, which made him inquire (5taJiv8Ea8at) and 
to search (el;f]Touv) for the person who could answer those queries. 
ayetv. In Diotima's Ascent to Beauty, the pursuit of Absolute 
Beauty is sometimes seen as an activity performed in isolation and 
26oover, Symposium, 77, observes that the thoroughness of 
the inquiry is seen not only in the Sta- prefix but in the aorist tense as 
well. He translates the verb ''to get the whole story." 
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other times as an endeavor undertaken with the help of another 
person. Thus, the Ascent to Beauty is sometimes described as if the 
individual progressed to Absolute Beauty in isolation (ievat brl TovTo 
To Tipayµa, 210a5-6), other times as if he must be led by another to 
Beauty {Tipos TCx epc.uTlKcl 1Tatoayc.uyn8ij, 210 e2; eav 6p8ws i]yiiTaL 
6 i]yovµevos, 210a6-7), and still other times as if he can reach Beauty 
only by leading another person to it (i.e., by adopting a beloved and 
discussing beautiful matters With him: evos avTov awµaTOS epav Kat 
evTavea yevvav A6yovs KaAovs, 210a7-8). As 210a6-8 reveals, a 
lover can apparently have both an i]yovµevos and epwµevos. The 
i]yovµevos instructs him in matters of Eros, which he puts into practice 
with his epwµevos.27 Thus, the Ascent to Beauty can be undertaken 
in isolation or with the help of another: TovTo yap of) eaTt To 6p8ws 
ElTt Tel epc.uTlKcl ievat Ti UTT' aAAov ayea8at (211 b7-c1 ). 
Both possibilities are demonstrated in the prologue. Socrates 
leads Aristodemus to Agathon, who with his good looks exemplifies 
an aspect of Beauty (174c8). The prologue also shows Socrates 
pursuing Absolute Beauty by standing alone in contemplation on a 
nearby porch. He forgets that he was leading Aristodemus; in fact, 
27oover, Symposium, 155, resolves the tension between the 
seeker of Beauty as lover and beloved by implying that at the 
beginning of the ascent the man is the epwµevos, but in the later 
stages of the ascent, the epaaTTJS. This is not entirely an adequate 
explanation, since even the young man is a lover, who pursues 
beautiful bodies (210a6-7). See Anderson, 61, and the discussion in 
the previous chapter, 119, fn. 52. 
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Socrates himself must be led into Agathon's house by Aristodemus 
(174e8) and a servant (175a3). 
Hence the prologue reveals to us that, no matter how erotic a 
process leading another to beauty is, the final steps to Absolute 
Beauty must be taken in isolation. The prologue, thus, confirms two 
impressions Diotima gives in her outline of the Ascent to Beauty. 
First, Diotima's doubt that Socrates would be able to grasp Ta TEAea 
Kal eTioTITtKa (21Oa1) is not meant to insult his intelligence--even 
though she has reproved him throughout her discourse for holding 
erroneous ideas. Rather, she recognizes that she can instruct him 
only so far in Eros and Beauty. He must discern for himself the Beauty 
beyond the beauty of bodies, laws, and thoughts. Whether or not he 
will succeed is beyond her ability to predict. Second, the prologue 
confirms the impression that Diotima has intentionally omitted any 
mention of another person's presence at the sight of Absolute Beauty. 
Although a man may discuss beautiful ideas with his beloved or use 
the beauty of his beloved to spur himself to a higher beauty, the vision 
of Absolute Beauty cannot be shared since it cannot be described as 
the beauty of gold or clothes can {211 d3-5). Leading another person 
to Beauty is an erotic activity, but the true lover of Beauty cannot lead 
a pupil or beloved to the last stage of his quest. 
Eros' Middle State 
8oKelv. To illustrate the middle state in which Eros exists, 
Diotima uses the analogy of 86~a in the realm of knowledge. A6~a or 
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TO 6p8a 8o~ai;ELV Kal aveu TOV EXELV A6yov 8ovvaL (202a5) is not 
the same as ignorance or knowledge. Knowledge requires that a 
person be able to give an account of how he knows what he knows. 
Yet a person who knows something that is true, but cannot explain 
why it is true, still knows something. He cannot be described as 
ignorant. Thus, the realm of seeming and supposing (86~a) is a 
middle state between ignorance (aµa8(a) and wisdom (ao<p(a or 
ETILaTfiµTJ). Like all people in the middle state, a possessor of 86~a 
can be spurred on to attain the higher level, in this case, to proceed 
from a right opinion to knowledge.28 
To the experienced reader of the Symposium, then, the 
opening sentence, LloKc:0 µoL lTEpl WV 1Tvv8avea8e OUK aµEAETTJTOS 
eTvaL (172a1-2) is pregnant with meaning. As we have already seen, 
making an inquiry is a process associated with Eros, since it is 
through a search inspired by Beauty that one can raise an item of the 
middle state (86~a) to the higher level (eTILCJTfiµTJ). Likewise, practice 
(µeAeTav, reflected in the adjective aµeAETTJTOS in 172a1) is an act of 
Eros, since it is through practice that one retains knowledge (208a4-
5). Only through practice does a daemonic person, that is, a person 
28As LSJ s.v. 8oKec.u, 442, notes, the root meaning of 8oKec.u is 
"expect," as its etymology reveals. It is the iterative of 8eKoµaL (cf. 
8exoµa L). From this it derives two primary meanings: "think, 
suppose, imagine" and "seem." Similarly, 86~a has the primary 
meaning of "expectation," from which "notion, opinion, judgment" 
(LSJ, 444) is derived. Cf. Lexique de Platon, s.v. 8oKel'v and 86~a, 
143-146. 
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in the middle state, ascend to the higher realm, since the force of 
forgetfulness drives out knowledge almost as quickly as he has 
acquired it. To add to the erotic overtones of Tivv8avea8e and 
aµeAETTJTOS, the sentence begins with 8oKw. Specifically, this word 
reminds the reader of the intermediate character of the dialogue: The 
dialogue may lead to knowledge, since it describes how one is to 
pursue Beauty, but the dialogue is not itself Beauty. Thus, Plato 
shows the intermediate nature of the dialogue by casting aspersions 
upon its narrator: Apollodorus seems to be a competent narrator, but 
we cannot be certain that he actually is.29 
This doubt raised in the prologue's first sentence is 
underscored by its last sentence. There Apollodorus states that he 
will narrate those items that seem most memorable to him (& 8E 
µaALaTa Kal WV e8o~E µoL a~LOµVT)µOVEVTOV, 178a3); whether or not 
in fact they are cannot be determined. Though one could argue on 
this basis that the dialogue is untrustworthy, the reader ought to be 
encouraged by the fact that an opinion (86~a) is by definition correct, 
even though the holder of it can give no explanation for its 
correctness. Thus, Aristodemus may indeed have chosen the most 
noteworthy speeches, but may not understand why that is the case. 30 
29Lexique de Platon, 143, defines 8oKe'i'v in this sense as 
"'paraitre' (par opposition a 'etre')." 
30There are other times 8oKetv appears in the prologue (173b4, 
174d5, 175b4, 176g5, 176e5, 177g4, 177g7, 177d1 [avv8oKet], 
177d2), but the word does not allude to the more philosophical sense 
as found in these two passages. As we examine the philosophical or 
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oteaea t. Closely related to the notion of opinion and 
appearance (56~a) is that of supposing (o'lea6at). Suppositions are 
not necessarily false. They can serve as the point of departure for 
acquiring knowledge (207a6). They can be the source for 56~a and, 
thus, the impetus to turn the 56~a into knowledge. Sometimes men 
are absolutely correct in their suppositions. The supposition that one 
has a lack, for example, leads one (rightly) to seek to fill that lack 
(204a6-7). Moreover, men beget children on the supposition that 
they are creating for themselves immortality, eternal memory, and 
happiness (208e5); in truth, they are, according to Diotima. In this 
vein, Diotima asks Socrates to speculate on the bliss of seeing 
Absolute Beauty; since Socrates has not yet seen Absolute Beauty, 
she asks if Socrates supposes that her description is true, (211 d8; 
e4). Since the dialogue as a whole presumes that Diotima's 
description is correct, Socrates would be right to make the 
supposition Diotima asks him to make. 
Nonetheless, a few of the suppositions made by the characters 
in the body of the dialogue and all of the suppositions in the prologue 
are wrong; in this respect, a supposition is lower than a true opinion 
(o6~a), which by definition is true. When Socrates is ignorant about 
the middle state, he supposes that Eros must be beautiful since the 
erotic uses of common words, we are not arguing that every 
occurrence of a word sometimes used philosophically must have a 
philosophical or erotic meaning in the prologue. Rather, we are 
arguing that there are several words and phrases that have 
overtones of the philosophical and erotic when they are read in light of 
the entire dialogue. 
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only two possibilities are for Eros to be beautiful or ugly (201 e1 O); his 
supposition is wrong. Mere supposition lies behind the 
misconceptions of Socrates and others, like Agathon, who believe 
that Eros is supple and beautiful (203c7) and loves beauty rather than 
begets in beauty (206e3). In the prologue, Apollodorus supposed 
that he was doing too many important activities to be bothered by 
philosophy, but he has since learned that he was mistaken (173a1-2). 
His friends make the same suppositions about Apollodorus that he 
once wrongly made about philosophy, namely, that philosophy makes 
one a wretch (173d2). Yet, though Apollodorus supposes (o'loµat) 
that his friends are correct in their criticism of him, he knows (o1oa) 
that he is correct in his criticism of them (173d2-3). Thus, although 
suppositions are sometimes true in the body of the dialogue, they are 
always false in the prologue. 
Why is this the case? If a supposition can be a form of opining 
and opining can lead to knowledge, why does the prologue view all its 
suppositions in a negative light? The answer is that a supposition can 
be a manifestation of ignorance rather than an intuitive apprehension 
of knowledge. If one is to make any progress in ascending to Beauty, 
one must not equate any and every supposition (o'lea0at) with right 
opinion (o6~a). For, as Socrates has discovered with the help of 
Diotima, there are many suppositions about Eros that are wrong. 
Nonetheless, since supposition and opinion characterize 
people in a daemonic (middle) state, the suppositions and opinions of 
the characters of the prologue demonstrate how akin to Eros they are. 
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Apollodorus, for example, states that he supposed that he ought to 
pursue everything but philosophy (173a1-2). Apollodorus was wrong 
in supposing that philosophy had nothing to offer him, but 
Apollodorus' search for something that would bring meaning to his life 
was not wrong. Indeed, it demonstrated to him a truth, namely, that 
he had to pursue something. His supposition erred only in that it 
excluded philosophy as a worthy pursuit. 
Eros' Goal 
e\oeva L. As we have observed, a person who has acquired 
knowledge (bnaTi]µn) has arrived at the goal sought by Eros and all 
daemonic beings; a person who has a mere opinion (o6~a) is still in 
the state between ignorance and knowledge. Therefore, the reader 
would do well to consider which characters in the prologue are said to 
know something and what sort of knowledge they possess. 31 The 
reader would also do well to consider the truth of anyone's claim to 
knowledge. In this way, the reader will determine how to pursue the 
knowledge that is associated with Absolute Beauty. 
Apollodorus is presented as the expert in the prologue. 
Glaucon says that, while his friend was unable to say anything clear 
about the dialogue (ovoev ETxe aacpes AeyeLv, 172b4-5), Apollodorus 
31 Strictly speaking, Plato does not use e\oevaL to describe the 
knowledge of Absolute Beauty. Plato does use, however, a wide 
variety of synonyms rather than any one particular word: aocp(a (202 
a3), eTI(aTaa8aL (202a6), ETILaTi]µn (202a7), cpp6vnaLs (202a_9), and 
µa8nµa (211 c7). See fn. 2 in this chapter. 
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knows (aE ei8evat, 172b4) the contents of the dialogue. To the extent 
that Apollodorus has mastered the dialogue, he has apprehended 
Beauty. Glaucon turns to him to acquire knowledge about the 
dialogue because he is searching for Beauty, whether or not he is 
conscious of this desire. 
In turn, Apollodorus' goal is to know (ei8evat) everything that 
Socrates does (172c6). Since Socrates is the perfect manifestation of 
the erotic life, knowing Socrates leads to knowledge of Absolute 
Beauty. That perception of true Beauty leads one to understand the 
worth of various pursuits. Hence, Apollodorus knows for a fact (o18a) 
that his friends are KaKa8a[µoves (1723d3-4). His friends may think 
(fiyeTaee, 173d1) that he is wretched--as people who have not yet 
ascended to Absolute Beauty they cannot know his condition for 
certain--but Apollodorus knows for a fact the wretchedness of his 
friends. 
Ka8o~av. Although Absolute Beauty is not the sort that can be 
seen through human eyes, the metaphor of sight is most appropriate, 
nonetheless, since it is through the eyes that most knowledge is 
apprehended.32 It is also a fitting metaphor because beauty is 
commonly thought of in physical terms. Thus, Socrates states that 
the true lover's goal is to catch sight of (KaTt8ij) the one entaTi)µn . 
which is of Beauty (210d7). Once a lover has glimpsed Absolute 
Beauty, he does not wish to observe anything else (211 b6; e4). 
32As LSJ s.v. e'l8c:.u, 483, notes, o18a is the perfect of the aorist 
e18ov, the present e'l8c:.u being defective and replaced by 6pac:.u. 
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The observation of Beauty, however, must be more than mere 
sight of it. As Anderson has noted, the Eleusinian Mysteries required 
the initiate to do more than view the ear of grain and the other 
ETIOTITtKa. He had to understand the significance of each object that 
was shown. In the same way, the initiates into the mysteries of Eros 
must not only view Absolute Beauty but be able to comprehend it. 33 
The metaphor of sight for apprehension of Beauty clarifies the 
beginning of the prologue when Glaucon catches sight of Apollodorus 
(172a3). Even as the lover is overjoyed to catch sight of Absolute 
Beauty, so Glaucon delights in catching a glimpse of Apollodorus. 
Since Apollodorus will narrate the dialogue to him, Glaucon has in 
33Anderson, 59. Anderson adds that Diotima works herself into 
a corner with her argument. Although she has distinguished 86~a 
from eTitaTiJµTJ by saying that the latter is the former with an 
explanation, she herself cannot explain the Ascent to Beauty to 
Socrates (210a1-2). Socrates, in turn, is convinced of the truth of the 
argument (212b2: TIETIEtaµevos), but does not argue why it must be 
so. Thus, argues Anderson, Socrates espouses a view of Eros and 
Beauty that may be correct but cannot be proved with the certainty 
demanded of eTitaTiJµTJ. Anderson's point is well taken, but he 
overlooks how rarely in Plato's dialogues the character Socrates puts 
the formula of ETitaTiJµTJ = 86~a +To exetv .A6yov 8ovvat into 
practice. It is a convenient formula to trip up opponents, but not 
always one he attempts to use for himself. Moreover, Socrates 
recognizes the slipperiness of his own knowledge. He tells Agathon in 
the prologue (175e2-4) that his own wisdom is fleeting and mediocre. 
Though Socrates understands the value of the sight of Absolute 
Beauty, he also knows that mortals are permitted only a passing 
glance at it. Although sight of such beauty--even with understanding--
is as great an apprehension of knowledge as mankind is permitted, it 
certainly fails to measure up to the absolute knowledge implied by 
Socrates' formula for eTitaTiJµTJ. 
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effect caught a glimpse of Absolute Beauty itself when he espies 
Apollodorus. For through Apollodorus, Glaucon--and the reader--is 
instructed how to pursue Absolute Beauty. 
avve\vat and its cognate avvova(a. Apollodorus and Glaucon 
regularly refer to the symposium as a "gathering" (avvova(a): 172a7, 
b7, c1; 173a4, b3. Eryximachus, likewise, uses avvova(a (176e2) and 
i)µas OE OlCx .A6yc:uv a.A.Afi.Aots avvelvat TO Tf)µepov (176e8-9) to 
describe the symposium. Ironically, the term avµTI6atov does not 
appear in the dialogue, except in the title. 
The word avvova(a, however, can refer to sex as well as to a 
gathering of people, much as the English "intercourse" can refer 
either to sex or to conversation.34 In fact, in the body of the dialogue 
avvova(a is used several times to refer to sexual intercourse: 191 c7 
and 192c5 (i} T&v acppoota(c:uv avvova(a) in Aristophanes' speech; 
206c6 (i} yap avopos Kat yvvatKOS avvova(a TOKOS EOTLV} in 
Socrates' speech. In this light, avve\vat and avvova(a in the prologue 
receive new meaning. These words refer to an "intercourse" that is 
erotic in nature, albeit not in a physical way. The erotic tone of these 
words reinforces the Socratic notion that the search for noble ideas 
34Cf. LSJ s.v. avvova(a I 1 and I 4 (p 1723) and s.v. avvetµt II 2 
and 113 {p 1705). Cf. also Lexique de P/aton s.v. avvova(a 3c (p. 486) 
and s.v. avve\vat 3 (p 481). The Oxford English Dictionary, 7:1094, 
defines intercourse in its primary meanings as "communication to and 
fro between countries" and "social communication between 
individuals; frequent and habitual contact in conversation and· action." 
Under the latter definition is included "sexual connexion." 
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and, above all, Absolute Beauty is one undertaken by Eros and by 
those under his sway. 
Eros' Method 
Tvyxavetv and its cognate EvTvyxavetv. The goal of Eros is 
ultimately to obtain what he desires. Thus, the verbs Tvyxavetv and 
EvTvyxavetv are often used in the dialogue to refer to the completion 
of the erotic process. Eryximachus argues that the seasons change 
because warm and cold acquire a longing for each other (npos 
aAAf)Aa TOV Koaµiov TVXlJ EpC:.UTOS, 188a2-3). Agathon speaks of 
Eros encountering (EvTVXlJ, 195e6) souls of all kinds, but then 
withdrawing from the unlovely ones.35 Aristophanes argues that 
Eros leads mankind to obtain (n'.rxc:.uµev, 193b1) the good things men 
desire most. In particular, this means searching for and encountering 
a person of the same gender as one's other half used to be (191 b4, 
c5; 193c5, c7). Those who end their erotic quest by meeting (Evn'.rxlJ) 
their other half are particularly fortunate (192b5-c2; cf. 192e5; 193c1 ). 
Although Socrates denies Eros leads one to strive to meet one's other 
half (TvyxavlJ; 205e2), he does believe that Eros attempts to meet 
the object of its desire: A lover who encounters (Evn'.rxlJ) a noble soul 
soon begets noble ideas with him (209b6-c2).36 Because Socrates 
35Socrates picks up on this statement of Agathon, when he 
speaks of Agathon meeting sensible men and the senseless crowd 
(194c2-6). 
36Similarly, 86~a in a sense stumbles upon (Tvyxavov) the 
truth and so avoids the charge of ignorance (202a8). 
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so exemplifies this pursuit of Absolute Beauty, he is like no other man 
that Alcibiades has ever met (evTETVXTJK6Ta c'xv6pc~:nry:> TotovTy:> o'(y:> 
eyw OUK &v ~µT)V TTOT' EVTVXEtv; 219d5-6). 
Tvyxavetv and evTvyxavetv are derived from the noun TVXTJ, 
i.e., "fortune," "fate," or "chance." Hence Tvyxavetv has as its root 
meaning "happen to be"; from this arises the secondary meaning of 
"gain one's end or purpose, succeed." Even the latter often has the 
connotation of chance, being translated, "hit upon, light upon."37 
Similarly, evTvyxavetv has the root meaning "light upon."38 At first 
glance, then, these words seem inappropriate to describe the lover's 
actualization of Beauty. Since the lover intentionally pursues Beauty, 
he can hardly be said to obtain it or come across it by accident. 
Nonetheless, there is something "accidental" about the acquisition of 
beauty, especially Absolute Beauty. One can pursue it, but it does not 
always manifest itself it to the beholder. One can be misled in his 
pursuit into thinking that true beauty is found in one's other half (as 
Aristophanes believes) or in youth (as Agathon believes). Even if one 
avoids these pitfalls, there is no guarantee of success. Diotima 
doubts that Socrates will be able to reach the goal of the Ascent to 
Beauty (21Oa1-2). Although she has described Eros' nature and 
origin, his role in procreation, and his relationship to the Good and 
37The definitions are taken from LSJ s.v. TVYXavc.u, 1832-1833. 
38LSJ s. v. EVTVYXclVC.U, 578. 
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immortality, she treats these matters as mere preface to the real truth 
about Eros. 
The ephemeral nature of the encounter with Absolute Beauty is 
illustrated by Socrates' behavior in the prologue. He stands in deep 
thought on the porch of Agathon's neighbor because he has gained a 
glimpse of Absolute Beauty. Although this glimpse interferes with his 
previous commitment to attend the banquet, Socrates cannot help 
pursuing this glimpse of Absolute Beauty for as long as it reveals itself 
to him. Aristodemus describes this process from an outsider's point of 
view: Socrates stands alone wherever he chances to stand (evioTE 
CxlTOOTCxS OlTOl av TVXlJ EOTT]KEV, 175b2) when he goes into deep 
thought. In reality, it is the sight of Absolute Beauty, not Socrates, 
which is erratic in appearing and disappearing at will; Socrates, as a 
pursuer of this Beauty, is no more erratic in standing alone in deep 
thought than Absolute Beauty is in revealing itself. 
If Absolute Beauty is all too often perceived for a brief moment, 
as chance dictates, lower forms of beauty are even more fleeting. 
Thus, Apollodorus describes his life before his conversion to 
philosophy as one of wandering aimlessly, wherever he chanced to 
go (nEptTpExc.uv oTilJ wxotµt, 173a1).39 He had no specific direction 
to life, since he had a poor understanding of the proper object of 
desire. When he met Socrates, however, he at least had the benefit 
39Cf. Pausanias' statement about Pandemic Eros in 181a7-b1: 
'O µev o\'iv TTJS Tiav8i)µov 'Acppo8iTT]S ws aA.news n6:v8nµ6s EOTl 
KOL E~Epyai;ETOl OTl av TVXlJ· 
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of direction in his search for beauty. He may not have apprehended 
Absolute Beauty, but at least he had begun to understand where it 
was to be found. 
Eros, then, does not always possess Beauty, but if it is 
fortunate, it may chance upon it. This truth is reinforced by two other 
incidents in the prologue where the terminology of "encounter'' refers 
to a lover's acquisition of beauty. Aristodemus meets (evTvxe'lv) 
Socrates washed up and wearing shoes (174a3). Aristodemus, the 
chief lover {epaaTTJs, 173b3) of Socrates, chances upon the object of 
his desire--one exhibiting a beauty he has rarely seen before. 
Phaedrus, too, encounters (eveTuxov, 177b5) the object of his desire, 
namely, a book of a wise man.40 Thus, in the prologue, too, the verbs 
-rvyxaveLv and evTVYXaveLv allude to the fulfillment of erotic desire.41 
xapi,ea8aL and its antonym BlacpevyeLv. The verb xapif;ea8aL 
can refer to the way in which Eros arrives at his goal: He receives 
some sort of gratification, where he receives the fulfillment of his 
desire. Xapif;ea8aL can refer to any kind of gratification, whether 
sexual, physical, emotional, or intellectual.42 Eryximachus uses the 
word always in a non-sexual sense (186b9, c3-4; 187d6; 188c4), 
40see pages 94-96. 
41The occurrences of eTvyxavov in 172a1, 175c6, 195a3, 
199b5, 206b3, 218d8, and 221a1 are outside our consideration, 
since they are used with supplementary participles in an idiomatic 
meaning. 
42LSJ s.v. xapif;w, 1978. 
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while Pausanias (e.g., 183d7; 184d3-4, e4; 185a1 -6; 185b5) and 
Alcibiades (217a4; 218c1 O, d4-5) always use the word to refer to 
sexual gratification only. 
In his speech, Pausanias distinguishes between a base Eros 
and a noble Eros (180c4-e1 ). It is shameful to gratify (xapisea6aL) 
the lover moved by the former, but not the lover moved by the latter 
(183e6-184a1). Therefore, the wise epwµevos will gratify the noble 
lover and flee from the base lover. To assist the epwµevos in 
discerning whom to gratify, Pausanias examines the laws of various 
states on gratification (182a7-184a2) and gives criteria to distinguish 
noble and base lovers.43 Socrates accepts and elaborates on 
Pausanias' distinction, without using the terminology of Pausanias 
(i.e., xapisea6aL and oLacpevyeLv). He enumerates several objects of 
desire, some nobler, some baser (208c1-209e4; 211 c1-d1 ). Though 
he grants that the lovers of beautiful bodies are true lovers (205d1-8), 
he urges the true lover to pursue the Beauty far above bodies, 
clothes, and other objects (211d3-e4). Thus, Socrates, without using 
the word "gratify," distinguishes between the objects of beauty to be 
indulged in and those to be avoided. 
The prologue underscores the true type of desire that is to be 
gratified. The verb gratify (xapiaaa6aL) occurs only once there, but in 
a significant place: Eryximachus states that he wants to gratify 
Phaedrus by having the guests offer encomia to Eros (177c6). The 
43To be specific, Pausanias uses xapisea6aL in 182a3, b3, d1; 
183d7, 184d3-4, e4; 185a 1-6, b5. 
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speeches of the dialogue are erotic gratification. Indeed, they are the 
only sort of gratification that Eryximachus finds acceptable; he has 
already dismissed the flute girl and put restrictions on the 
consumption of wine. Socrates, of course, consents to Eryximachus' 
suggestion and thereby suggests that gratification, contra 
Pausanias, need not be sexual. 
The opposite of xap(l;Ecr8aL in Pausanias' speech is oLacpEvyELv 
(184a2). Thus, when Socrates fled (ou~cpvyov, 17 4a7) the crowd at 
the victory party the day before, he was fleeing from the false desire 
that enthralled Agathon. Even as noble Eros or desire pursues 
beauty through encomia, so base desire pursues it through 
drunkenness and indulgence, as took place at Agathon's first party. 
And this, above all else, must be avoided by the true lover. 
Conclusion 
It should not be surprising that in a dialogue devoted to Beauty 
and its acquisition there will be words in its introduction that hint at the 
themes to follow. The presence of these words in the prologue 
affirms Socrates' thesis that Eros is a universal force. Even if we grant 
that each allusion to Eros in the prologue may be somewhat 
insignificant in itself, it gains in significance, when it is considered with 
other allusions to Eros. The whole of the vocabulary becomes greater 
than the sum of its parts. 
Each word with erotic overtones further supports the notion that 
the drama of the prologue is philosophical and erotic. The drama is 
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not meant merely as material to charm the non-philosophically 
minded reader into reading the dialogue. Instead, the prologue 
demonstrates that the discourse about Eros is not far removed from 
the affairs of ordinary life. Even as Socrates avers that Eros is to be 
found in different forms throughout human experience, the prologue 
demonstrates that Eros is a universal force. Eros' work is seen as the 
characters in the prologue talk about beauty and ugliness, about 
searching, inquiring, opining, gratifying, and a host of other activities. 
Although not everything called beautiful in the prologue is truly 
beautiful and not every activity associated with Eros is a fit pursuit of 
Absolute Beauty, the pervasive vocabulary of Eros in the prologue 
affirms that all men are lovers. Therefore, the dialogue is of interest to 
all readers; all can benefit from analyzing their definitions of erotic 
terms, as they compare their terminology of Eros with that of the 
characters of the dialogue. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
EROS AT THE SYMPOSIUM: 
THE PROLOGUE AND THE EPILOGUE 
In the previous three chapters we examined how certain 
elements of the prologue dramatize or hint at the influence of Eros: In 
the second chapter we saw that Apollodorus' narration of the dialogue 
is an Eros-driven activity, which despite all the weaknesses inherent 
in Eros leads the reader to Beauty; in the third chapter we saw that 
each of the characters in the prologue act erotically; in the fourth 
chapter we saw that the prologue is filled with words that resonate 
with the vocabulary of Eros. By now the reader of Plato's Symposium 
ought to have come to expect that even the most seemingly ordinary 
events and characters of the dialogue are influenced by Eros. 
We ought not to be surprised, therefore, to find that the 
symposium itself, that is, Agathon's banquet, is an exercise in erotics. 
Ancient symposia by their nature were erotic events, where flute-girls 
charmed the guests and homosexual love was rampant.1 Moreover, 
if we adopt the broader definitions of Eros employed by Socrates, 
1 Walter Burkert, "Oriental Symposia: Contrasts and Parallels," 
(hereafter Burkert, "Symposia") in Dining in a Classical Context, ed. 
William J. Slater (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991 ), 7, 
12-13. 
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even Agathon's symposium, where there is little indulgence in 
sensual pleasure, is erotic. 
Its eroticism is best seen by analyzing the prologue in light of the 
epilogue, since these two parts of the dialogue contain the most 
information about the setting of the symposium. The epilogue is the 
last portion of the dialogue, comprising 212c4-223d12. (The term 
epilogue, like prologue, is drawn from tragedy; it refers to the last 
portion of a work.) The prologue and epilogue are distinguished from 
the body of the dialogue in that they are not part of the series of 
speeches praising Eros, but descriptions of events preceding and 
following the encomia. Thus, the epilogue begins where Socrates' 
speech ends, even as the prologue ends where Phaedrus' speech 
begins. Although the epilogue does include a speech, namely, 
Alcibiades' encomium of Socrates, the subject matter is sufficiently 
different to distinguish it from the speeches that make up the body of 
the dialogue. Alcibiades' speech praises a man, not a god, and 
contains more drama than the speeches in the body of the dialogue.2 
Thus, it does not belong with the other six encomia, but marks the 
beginning of the epilogue. 
The epilogue consists of two parts: Alcibiades' encomium of 
Socrates (212c4-222b7) and the break-up of the symposium (222c1 ". 
223d12). It combines speech and drama. The speech, however, is 
not merely abstract talk. It is full of drama, while underscoring the 
2 Mitchell, 215-216, recognizing this, has characterized 
Alcibiades' speech as a "satyr-play." The encomium form is kept, but 
the object of the encomium has been changed. 
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philosophical significance of the dramatic action of the dialogue--
including the prologue. For although the speech ostensibly narrates 
the behavior of Socrates, it is also a drama of Eros at work in one 
individual. The qualities that Alcibiades describes as being present in 
Socrates are precisely those Socrates describes as being present in 
Eros.3 
Alcibiades' encomium of Socrates is without doubt one of the 
most dramatic of the speeches in the dialogue. No other speaker, 
with the possible exception of Socrates, discusses to such a degree 
the actions of the one lauded without lapsing into a list of his benefits 
to mankind. Unwittingly following the pattern laid down by Socrates in 
his encomium of Eros, Alcibiades is content to give a simple narration 
of some characteristic events in the life of Socrates. 4 Alcibiades does 
so without making overt philosophical statements about the gods, 
human nature, passion, sexuality, and the like, as Socrates does. 
Because of his intoxication, he is capable of little more than an 
"honest" narration of select facts {215a2-3, d6-e1; 217e1-6).5 
3Alcibiades is a self-professed expert on Eros; as Plutarch's Vit. 
Ale. 16.2 reveals, Alcibiades had an emblem of Eros with a 
thunderbolt on his shield. Cf. Bury, Iii, Ix. 
4Cf. Kenneth Darter, "The Significance of the Speeches in 
Plato's Symposium," Philosophy and Rhetoric 2 (1969): 232. 
5Alcibiades' speech also receives greater weight because his 
arrival is foretold in the prologue (172b1 ), but delayed until the 
epilogue. See Friedlander, 3:4; Warner, 162. 
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Alcibiades' speech, however, is as much a philosophical 
evaluation of Eros as the other encomia are.6 Like the encomiasts of 
Eros, Alcibiades cannot help drawing moral conclusions from the 
behavior of the man he praises. In fact, the deeds Alcibiades 
recounts have been selected to prove his thesis that Socrates is a 
hubristic lover and, thus, a person who cannot expound a cogent 
theory of love. As Nussbaum has noted, Alcibiades' speech is a 
refutation of Socrates' abstract Eros and a plea for love of individuals. 
Alcibiades refutes Socrates by being the one to appear suddenly 
(e~a(cpvns), whereas Socrates had stated in his speech that Absolute 
Beauty appears suddenly. 7 Alcibiades is no Absolute Beauty or even 
a lover of it. He loves particular instances of beauty, not the "universal 
Good." He is, in fact, the opposite of Socrates' Eros and Absolute 
Beauty. Thus, Alcibiades' speech necessarily enters the realm of 
philosophy; it does not merely recount the actions of a particular man, 
6ct. the weight his speech has received from scholars, as 
Krischer, 51-53, observes. Nussbaum, 186, calls Alcibiades' a 
defender of the traditional Greek education through poetry, with its 
emphasis on the particular, not the abstract; thus, Alcibiades 
conscientiously rejects philosophy and prefers to use images and 
metaphors in his speech, which are inferior forms of education 
according to Republic 7. Nussbaum is correct, provided that we 
understand that a deliberate rejection of philosophy is also a 
philosophical position. 
7 As Diodorus Siculus, 12.68.3-5, observes, every party of the 
Athenians saw in Alcibiades the characteristics they were looking for, 
so much that slaves and free alike vied to be in his presence. 
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but demands that Alcibiades' view of love be deemed the proper one 
and Socrates' philosophy of Eros rejected.a 
Alcibiades' speech reinforces the notion that philosophical 
discourse and dramatic action are not so far removed from one 
another as one might think. Because behavior reflects ethical, 
ontological, and sometimes epistemological presuppositions, 
dramatic action is necessarily philosophical. Since Socrates' behavior 
reflects his views of Eros, his actions as outlined by Alcibiades must 
have philosophical significance. Furthermore, Alcibiades' criticism of 
Socrates' behavior necessarily becomes a critique of Socrates' 
philosophy. Thus, even though Alcibiades' speech is not overtly 
philosophical, as those of other guests are, it nonetheless is an 
integral part of the philosophical discussion in the dialogue. To the 
degree that it evaluates Socrates' philosophy of Eros, it serves as 
commentary on the key philosophical exposition of the dialogue. 
BNussbaum, 184-185; Cf. Rosen, 279-280. Wolz, 349-351, 
argues that Alcibiades' speech serves the same function as the myth 
of Er. Both passages demonstrate that the philosophical system 
espoused in their dialogues is not without its problems. In the 
Republic, Er saw a man with the best possible education in virtue 
choosing his next life foolishly. In the Symposium, Alcibiades 
demonstrates that, to retain self-identity and the power to choose, a 
human being would have to resist the sight of Absolute Beauty. But 
this could only mean that a person would have to turn from good to 
evil. 
Wolz and Nussbaum have properly discerned the difference of 
views between Alcibiades and Socrates, even though Alcibiades 
largely confirms that Socrates is true to his beliefs about Eros. We will 
explore later (pages 198-206) how the position of Socrates is largely 
vindicated, but Wolz and Nussbaum rightly observe the seeds of 
doubt sown into Socrates' theory by Alcibiades. 
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Because of the philosophical import of the drama in Alcibiades' 
speech, we ought to expect that the drama of the conclusion of the 
party (222c1-223d12) will likewise imply a philosophy of Eros. This 
expectation is warranted, as we will see in the remainder of the 
chapter. Although a thorough explication of the epilogue would reveal 
its philosophy, such an effort would be beyond the scope of this 
present work, which focuses on the prologue. Instead, we will 
examine in this chapter the way in which the dramatic parallels 
between the epilogue and prologue reflect a similar philosophy of 
Eros. Specifically, we will examine how the prologue and epilogue 
demonstrate the limits of typical symposiastic behavior in pursuing 
Eros. Then we will examine how the uniqueness of Agathon's party 
and of its chief guest, Socrates, reflects the uniqueness of the 
Socratic theory of Eros. 
The Sway of Eros at Symposia 
As we noted in the first chapter, symposia in the ancient world 
were associated with drinking and sex. Naturally, therefore, one 
would expect that Eros would be a force at any symposium, including 
Agathon's. He is indeed present, even if in a slightly unconventional 
form: Instead of indulging their sexual longings (Eros), the men 
discuss them. Yet though Eros' presence in the Symposium is more 
cerebral, the reader's expectation--and Glaucon's (172b2)--that the 
symposium will be driven to a large degree by Eros is fulfilled. 
Moreover, to the degree that Eros is manifested differently at this 
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symposium than at a typical symposium, the limits of the latter in 
satisfying the longings of Eros are shown. 
The erotic nature of Agathon's party, as portrayed in the 
prologue and epilogue, is clearly seen when it is compared to 
Aphrodite's birthday party (as told by Diotima through Socrates), 
which serves as the archetype for all erotic symposia. It is at 
Aphrodite's party that Eros is first associated with symposia. Socrates 
narrates the events of her party to explain the role of Eros in general 
and his behavior at symposia in particular, where he leads men to 
discover beauty. Eros was conceived at Aphrodite's party; at 
Agathon's the guests and, above all, Socrates attempt to give birth to 
him again. At Aphrodite's party, Eros was born as a demi-god; at 
Agathon's party, he is born as a subject of philosophical inquiry. 
The parallels between Agathon's and Aphrodite's parties are 
not accidental. Plato has intentionally had Socrates craft his telling of 
Aphrodite's party to reflect the data of Agathon's party. Since 
Agathon's party is a fiction invented by Plato and Socrates' account of 
Aphrodite's party is a fiction within a fiction,9 it is not surprising that 
there will be parallels between the two parties. But the fictional nature 
of the parties does not undermine the argument that the parallels 
between them are significant. Indeed, their fictional nature confirms 
9Dover, Symposium, 141-142, finds no precedent in Greek 
literature or mythology for the story of Poros and Penia; he concludes 
that it is Plato's own invention created in the fashion of his day. There 
are antecedents for Poros in Aleman, but his cosmogony is different. 
Penia had been personified in 388 in Aristophanes' Plutus, written 
shortly before Plato's Symposium. 
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the importance of those parallels. Parallels between events in a 
historical work may be coincidental, but parallels between dramatic 
events in a work of fiction cannot entirely be due to chance. 
As we seek to discover the parallels between the two parties, we 
must ask which characters play similar roles at the two parties. Upon 
reflection, it becomes clear that Socrates behaves at Agathon's party 
as Penia does at Aphrodite's, Agathon behaves as Poros does, and 
Diotima functions much as Aphrodite does. 1 O Although elsewhere we 
have argued that Socrates manifests the qualities of Eros mentioned 
in 203c6-e5, it does not follow that Socrates cannot be most akin to 
Penia at Aphrodite's banquet in 203b1-c1. Eros seems to have 
inherited most of his traits from his mother, not his father. Even his 
resourcefulness and his search for beauty are traits that can be seen 
in Penia, who cleverly found a way to get pregnant by a god. Thus, 
the resemblance between Socrates and Penia actually emphasizes 
Socrates' Eros-like qualities. 
Both Penia and Socrates do not participate fully in their 
banquets. Penia comes after the banquet to receive the left-overs 
(203b3-4). Socrates enters while the banquet is half completed 
(175c4-6) and so cannot enjoy the meal fully. To underscore their 
1 O Since Diotima is not present in either the prologue or 
epilogue, her affinity to Aphrodite will not be treated here. 
Nonetheless, the parallels between the two are striking: Both are 
learned in the ways of love and impart that knowledge to males. Eros 
and Socrates are attendants of Aphrodite and Diotima, respectively. 
And it is through these two women that Eros and Socrates find the 
way to have their longings satisfied. 
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exclusion from full participation in the banquet, both stand outside. 
Penia stands at the door (203b5) and never enters Zeus' house. 
Later she espies Poros who has gone out into the garden; there she 
seduces him. Socrates, similarly, stands on the neighbor's porch 
(175a8). 
Why are Penia and Socrates excluded from their parties? Penia 
does not belong in the world of the gods, since she does not enjoy 
their bliss. Similarly, Socrates does not belong with the handsome 
aristocrats at Agathon's house. After all, he is poor--or at least acts as 
if he were, as his customary shoelessness suggests. Moreover, 
Socrates is usually ugly and disheveled and, thus, hardly the sort of 
man who deserves to be Agathon's guest of honor. Nonetheless, 
Socrates' exclusion from the banquet, unlike Penia's, is at his own 
instigation. Though he has received an invitation from Agathon 
(174a6-8), who eagerly desires to seat him next to himself (175c6-
d1 ), Socrates to some degree merits Alcibiades' barb: He does not 
deserve to be sitting next to handsome men such as Agathon and 
Alcibiades (213c3-5). 
Whether or not they are truly welcome, Socrates and Penia 
arrive at their banquets to encounter two men under the influence of 
alcohol: Socrates encounters Agathon; Penia, Poros. Technically 
speaking, Agathon is not drunk, but suffering from a hangover. A 
person with a hangover, however, is in the process of becoming 
sober but is still too weakened by the intake of alcohol and its 
aftermath to function altogether coherently. Both Socrates and Penia 
recognize the drunkenness of the men they meet to be an 
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opportunity. Penia, recognizing that she is unable to attract a mate 
because of her desperate circumstances, sees the drunken Poros as 
a potential father of her child. Similarly, Socrates recognizes that he is 
unable to produce any great wisdom on his own (175d8-e6). 
Therefore he uses the inebriated Agathon as a source to become 
"pregnant in his soul" (Kvovmv ... KaTa Ti]v '+'VXiJv; 206c1-3). 
Penia and Socrates can become pregnant only through 
seduction. They, however, cannot use physical beauty to seduce, 
since they possess none, but must employ other methods.11 Penia 
uses alcohol, while Socrates uses alcohol and rhetoric. Socrates can 
use alcohol because he himself is immune to the influence of alcohol 
(176c3-6; 214a4-5; 220a1-5), though the other guests are not. But 
his main instrument of seduction is his rhetoric. He makes young men 
like Apollodorus search out what he has said (172c5-6). Even those 
who are not his "pupils" are interested in his words, as Glaucon is 
(172a7-b3). As Alcibiades indicates, Socrates has "seduced" him and 
the other guests through his irresistible words (215e1-216a2; 218a2-
b4). 
Although Socrates has attempted to "seduce" many young men 
with his rhetoric (222a4-b4 ), he is preoccupied chiefly with Agathon in 
the symposium. It is next to Agathon that Socrates reclines (175c8), 
even as Penia lies down next to Poros (203b8-c1 ). It is the beauty of 
Agathon which has impelled Socrates to come in the first place. And it 
is Agathon with his "superior'' wisdom that can get Socrates pregnant 
11 Cf Bury, xii. 
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in his soul. For Socrates needs the ideas of other people in order to 
apprehend the truth, since his knowledge derives more from the 
rejection or modification of the ideas of other people than from ideas 
he originates.12 
Thus, the reader would expect that Agathon possesses a 
degree of bliss Socrates does not, even as the gods (including Poros) 
are happier than Penia. On further inspection, however, this does not 
appear to be the case--and not merely because Socrates' praise of 
Agathon is ironic. The respective behaviors of Agathon and Poros 
indicate that they are worse off than Socrates and Penia, for their 
drunkenness reveals a more profound poverty than that of Socrates 
and Penia. Though by every standard Agathon and Poros should be 
deemed fortunate, their behavior at their respective banquets argues 
the contrary.13 
In fact, the behavior of the four--Agathon and Socrates, Poros 
and Penia--at their banquets demonstrates their longings and their 
fulfillment, since oel'TTva in and of themselves are designed to satisfy a 
12Cf. Pl. Tht. 149a-151d; Symp. 175d2-e6. The latter is spoken 
with irony, to be sure, but it is the Socratic irony that characterizes him 
throughout the Platonic corpus. 
13Lowenstam, "Paradoxes," 98, equates both Alcibiades and 
Socrates with Penia and Poros: Alcibiades is handsome and wealthy, 
like Poros, but comes uninvited to the banquet like Penia. Socrates 
embodies virtue, as does Poros, but is ugly and poor like Penia. In 
this way, argues Lowenstam, Socrates and Alcibiades exchange 
roles, much as Socrates forces his beloveds to become his lovers. 
Lowenstam's interpretation, however, is skewed in that he does not 
discern the ironic poverty of Resourcefulness and the 
resourcefulness of Poverty. 
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longing, chiefly for food and drink, but sometimes for sex. Hence, it is 
not surprising that Eros was conceived at Aphrodite's party. But the 
way in which Socrates and Penia enjoy their banquets is different 
from the way in which Agathon and Poros do. Because Penia senses 
her cnrop[a, she is attracted to Aphrodite's party. She seeks not only 
alms but, when given the opportunity, she also seeks to get pregnant 
by a powerful deity. The oel'Tivov, thus, offers her the way to have her 
basic needs (food and drink) fulfilled while also giving her a chance to 
enjoy a beautiful god, Poros, and to achieve immortality through her 
offspring (cf 203b7-c1 ). In a similar way, Socrates and the other 
guests at the party desire to come into contact with Agathon because 
he has been successful recently in the theater. The guests hope not 
only to be well fed and entertained, but also to get a glimpse of the 
talent that astounded so many people a few days earlier (175e4-6; cf. 
194a8-b5). 
It is not only the guests, however, who desire to obtain a 
glimpse of Beauty and the Good. Agathon himself needs the acclaim 
and gratification that his banquet offers him. In this way, he is very 
much akin to Poros, who should be so blissful that he would not need 
to drink to surfeit. Nonetheless, Poros indulges in the pleasures at 
Aphrodite's party, gets drunk, and allows himself to be seduced by 
Penia. 
The drunkenness of Poros, therefore, illustrates the limits of the 
banquet in satisfying the desire for Beauty and the Good. In one 
sense, Poros is truly Resourcefulness himself, in that he is _filled to 
surfeit with the indulgence in sensual pleasures. He knows what 
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pleases him and sets about getting them. Yet if Poros is filled in the 
course of the banquet, he must have entered it unsatisfied. And, if 
Poros can be credited in knowing how to get his desires fulfilled, 
Penia, too, deserves recognition for seducing Poros. She, too, was 
able to discern how best to have her needs fulfilled. Thus, Poros 
ultimately is little better than Penia. In fact, Penia is the more 
resourceful of the two, for Poros allows himself to be overcome by 
wine and Penia, while Penia has enough presence of mind to see an 
opportunity for achieving what she longs for.14 
Drunkenness, then, reveals that Resourcefulness is not so 
resourceful after all, but lacks full satisfaction of its desires. 
Drunkenness also reveals thatPoverty is not so poor so as to have no 
chance of obtaining her desires, so long as she is not overwhelmed 
by drink. It is in this environment that Eros is conceived and operates. 
Eros takes advantage of beautiful hedonists and uses his poverty of 
beauty to acquire Beauty, just as his mother did. Therefore, the 
greatest sensualist cannot acquire Absolute Beauty, but Socrates--
the ugliest person and one most impervious to pleasure--can ascend 
to see that Beauty by taking advantage of the 8EtTivov. 
The 8EtTivov, then, gives birth to Eros, in that it awakens 
longings that cannot be satisfied by it. It reveals to guests that they 
have a lack, but it cannot fulfill the lack. Because the 8EtTivov is the 
14Mitchell, 128, is not far from this understanding when he 
writes that ''this woman Diotima must not be allowed to trick, us into 
forgetting that while an immortal slept, mortal Neediness seized upon 
the Way Over. The result is Eros." 
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initial experience of Eros, it is an appropriate beginning for Eros, but 
cannot be the goal, of the erotic experience. As Agathon tells 
Socrates, vuv oe Tipos To oe'LTivov TipWTa TPETiov. Dining--the 
indulging in sensual pleasures--is the beginning of the erotic 
experience, even as Aphrodite's birthday party was where Eros was 
conceived, but not where Eros found ultimate satisfaction. Without 
the banquet it is impossible to be aware of the erotic, but the banquet 
also manifests the lack of satisfaction that comes with indulging the 
senses. Only later, when the flute girl and wine are dismissed, can the 
banquet lead to the appreciation of higher forms of beauty.15 
Since those who let themselves be overcome by drinking 
(Agathon and Poros) are used by more sober individuals (Socrates 
and Penia) to awaken and satisfy erotic desires, Eros and Dionysus 
are akin, but are not, contra Anderson, one and the same.1 6 
15Although Anderson is not correct in identifying Eros and 
Dionysus (see fn. 16 below), the reader ought not to assume that 
Dionysus (excessive drunkenness) is inherently anti-erotic. 
16Anderson, 7-8, argues that, as Dionysus makes the actors in 
his plays wear masks, so he too puts on a mask in the Symposium, 
namely, the mask of Eros. To be sure, there are many qualities of 
Dionysus that Socrates uses to describe Eros: Eros dies and 
reappears, even as Dionysus undergoes a death and (ebirth each 
year; Eros, like Dionysus, is a daemon; Eros is a force that dwells in all 
mankind, even as Dionysus is said in the Orphic myth to be spread 
through all life. Moreover, Anderson argues each character in the 
dialogue wears a mask, in effect, and is part of a Dionysian-driven 
drama. But Plato does not explicitly identify Eros with Dionysus. 
Whatever qualities the two may share, in that they are both 
ephemeral demi-gods, they are not equated with one another in the 
dialogue. Furthermore, it is only when Dionysus is banished or 
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Dionysus and Eros are akin to the degree that they both strive after 
some pleasure: Dionysus seeks the pleasure of wine and the mantic, 
while Eros seeks the pleasure of beauty (including the beauty of 
truth). Moreover, their spheres of influence overlap, since Eros and 
Dionysus are credited with the mantic art.17 Yet, as we have seen in 
the previous chapter, those who are overwhelmed by the quest for 
Dionysian pleasure are those who cannot pursue erotic pleasures in a 
nobler way. Pausanias and Aristophanes are limited by their 
overindulgence in alcohol, so that they cannot see a greater or nobler 
manifestation of Eros than sex. 
Dionysian indulgence serves two functions: It manifests the 
erotic quest for fulfillment that drives all humans; it serves as an 
introduction to the love of beauty, but by itself cannot lead to Absolute 
Beauty. The 8el'TTvov, then, serves as a metaphor for Dionysian 
indulgence. Not only the heavy drinking associated with the 
symposium, but also the eating of much food demonstrate men's 
sense of lack. It shows that its participants recognize an absence of 
fulfillment. Therefore, they desire satisfaction in the 8eTTTvov. 
Thus, Socrates' behavior in the prologue and Diotima's myth of 
the origin of Eros reveal that wine is not a good instrument to awaken 
erotic pursuit of beauty. To be sure, it was because of wine that Poros 
restricted that full expression is given to Eros; that is to say, the 
encomia of Eros appear only after the consumption of wine is limited. 
17Eryximachus credits Eros for the power of prophecy; he uses 
Eros as a metaphor for the daemonic, the realm that reconciles man 
and god (188b6-d3). Socrates portrays Diotima as a prophetess from 
Mantinea, i.e., Prophet-land (201 d2-5). 
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begot Eros. But Peros had no control over the process; the sober 
Penia manipulated Peros to achieve the satisfaction of her own 
desires. In the same way, the ever sober Socrates manipulates the 
drunken crowd to satisfy his own quest for Absolute Beauty. To the 
degree that Socrates apprehends Beauty better than the other guests 
do, it is because he is a unique guest and has used the rather unique 
circumstances of the symposium to suit his purposes. For he has 
made Dionysian frivolity give way to truly Erotic philosophy. 
The Unigueness of Agathon's Symposium 
Agathon's symposium is rather unusual in that several elements 
normally associated with a symposium are removed in the prologue 
and reintroduced in the epilogue. Most notably, Eryximachus 
banishes the flute girl and heavy drinking, and Socrates attempts to 
avoid a large crowd. Ultimately, neither Eryximachus nor Socrates is 
able to have his wish. In the epilogue, Alcibiades brings in a flute girl 
with him (212d6) and drains a cooler of wine, while ordering the 
others to do the same (213d7-214a3). A small retinue of revelers 
enters with Alcibiades (212d7), but later a large crowd crashes the 
party, effectively putting an end to all discourse of Eros (223b2-6). 
Thus, wine, flute-girl, and crowd--banished in the prologue--are 
returned to the party in the epilogue. 
The most obvious effect of the banishment and reintroduction of 
these three elements is to make the epilogue complete the prologue, 
so that the dialogue takes a symmetrical form. The prologue begins 
with drunken men (or to be more accurate, men who are recovering 
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from drunkenness) who have just feasted; the body of the dialogue 
shows men recovering from this overindulgence (hence the 
hiccoughs of Aristophanes occur roughly in the middle of the 
encomia 18); the epilogue returns the dialogue to feasting and 
drinking. Moreover, the dialogue begins with allusions to the crowded 
party on the previous day (174a6-7; 176a6-b1); the body of the 
dialogue, in contrast, portrays an intimate group of men discussing 
Eros; the epilogue adds Alcibiades and his entourage to the party and 
then brings in a crowd of revelers so that the symposium ends in 
pandemonium. In effect, then, we have a Chinese-box effect, with the 
epilogue reintroducing items removed in the prologue.19 
181f we assume with von Blanckenhagen, 57, that there were 
two other guests between Pausanias and Phaedrus (the aAAovs 
Tt vex s of 180c2), then there would be a total of nine guests. 
Eryximachus' speech would then be the middle speech, being 
preceded by those of Phaedrus, the two unnamed guests and 
Pausanias, and followed by those of Aristophanes, Aristodemus, 
Agathon, and Socrates. Aristophanes hiccoughs, which occur during 
Eryximachus' speech, would then occupy the exact center of the 
encomia. 
Moreover, as Lowenstam, "Paradoxes," 89, observes, 
Aristophanes' hiccoughs are caused by his overindulgence (vno 
nAnaµovfls, 185c6) and must be "emptied" by sneezing. They 
physician who knows all about "emptiness and fullness (nAT)aµovf]v 
Kal Kevcuatv, 186c7)" then "fills in" for Aristophanes. Later, 
Eryximachus asks Aristophanes "to fill any gaps he has left 
(avanAT)pwaat, 188e3)." This emphasis on filling and emptying 
continues through Aristophanes' and Agathon's speeches. 
19Halperin, "Narrativity," 97, has rightly noted that the dialogue 
does not have a perfect chiastic structure in that the epilogue does 
not return the reader to the Apollodorian narrative. 
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The banishment and reintroduction of wine, flautist, and crowd, 
however, not only set up a general chiastic structure for the dialogue, 
but also highlight the unusual character of Agathon's symposium. 
Although it was not necessary that all three elements be present at a 
symposium, one would expect to find at least one of the three present. 
If a symposium had plenty of wine, the guests could make do without 
a flute-girl. Nor was it necessary to invite a large crowd to have a 
successful symposium. The archaeological evidence seems to 
indicate that a banquet room with couches for seven or nine people 
was typical.20 Thus, Agathon's intimate symposium is no more 
unusual than the large bash he threw the night before. 
What is highly unusual, however, is the absence or severe 
restriction of drinking.21 One would expect that a drinking party, 
avµTI6atov, would involve at least some drinking. The peculiarity of 
this party is underscored in both the prologue and the epilogue. In the 
prologue Eryximachus calls a banquet without heavy drinking a stroke 
of good luck (an Epµa'lov, 176c1-d4). In the epilogue Eryximachus 
reiterates the unusual terms of the banquet to Alcibiades (214b9-c5). 
Eryximachus is content to be part of the group, he says in the 
prologue, because there will be some relief from the typical drinking. 
20Banquet rooms had either seven or nine couches, which 
were usually occupied by one person only. Von Blanckenhagen, 57. 
21 This does not imply that ordinary drinking would be 
unrestrained; it was the duty of the symposiarch to regulate the 
drinking so that the guests would be jovial but not incoherent. See 
Ezio Pellizer, "Outlines of a Morphology of Sympotic Entertainment" in 
Sympotica, 178-179. 
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When the relief ends and the symposium turns into a real symposium, 
complete with drunken revelers, Eryximachus leaves.22 
In the prologue, Eryximachus becomes the magister bibendi 
because Pausanias and Agathon decline to take the job. Under 
Eryximachus' guidance, the symposium becomes an opportunity to 
imbibe words, not wine (177e4-10).23 After the guests have drunk 
fully from each other's speeches, a new guest arrives, Alcibiades, 
who steals Eryximachus' job from him. Alcibiades first challenges the 
performance of Eryximachus as magister bibendi by stating that the 
men are too sober for a drinking party (213e7-8). Then Alcibiades 
ignores the limits set by Eryximachus, as he drains a cooler of wine 
(213e10-214a 1 ). Although Eryximachus protests that encomia, not 
wine, are the refreshment for the evening, Eryximachus cannot keep 
him from drinking heavily. Nor can Eryximachus prevent other guests 
from crashing the party and bringing in their drunken revelry (223b2-
8). By default, Alcibiades becomes the new magister bibendi. 
22As Mitchell, 3, observes, the content of the dialogue fails to 
live up to its title. 
23Anderson, 17-18, suggests that Phaedrus is the 
symposiarch; for this reason, he is the first of the guests to speak, so 
that he can then attend his duties. Anderson cites as evidence the 
three occasions when Phaedrus seems to exercise authority over the 
group (194d; 195a; 199b). On those occasions, however, Phaedrus 
acts more as naTi]p A6yov than symposiarch. And in 195a, Socrates 
makes the appeal explicitly to Eryximachus, as moderator of the 
evening's discussion. Moreover, Phaedrus submits to the drinking 
instructions of Eryximachus (176d5-7), so that even if Phaedrus in 
some way controlled the drinking, he would be doing so at 
Eryximachus' bidding. 
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The prologue, then, contains the necessary ingredients for a 
symposium, but banishes them, while the epilogue reintroduces 
them. Why? These two parts of the dialogue mark the thresholds 
between the world of Eros and the world of talk about Eros. The body 
of the dialogue takes place in a world of almost surreal circumstances; 
the prologue removes the constraints of "symposiastic reality," while 
the epilogue reintroduces them. By removing these elements of the 
ordinary world, the symposium is marked as being a different sort of 
discussion. 
The crossing of a threshold is underscored by Socrates' bathing 
in both the prologue and the epilogue. As the prologue indicates 
{174a3-4), such behavior is rather unusual for Socrates. What makes 
it even more unusual is that Socrates repeats the bath less than 
twenty-four hours later (223d10-11 ). Certainly, hygiene alone is not 
his only consideration, since that matters little to him (172a3-4; cf. also 
219e7-220d5, where Alcibiades describes Socrates' indifference to 
social conventions). Instead, the bathing marks a transition. The first 
bath brings Socrates from the world of his natural ugliness and 
uncleanliness into the world of beauty. He has made himself beautiful 
so that he can enjoy the beauty of Agathon (174a8-9).24 The second 
bath, however, marks the transition back into his unkempt state. It 
purifies him from whatever sacrilege he may have encountered at the 
24oover, Symposium, 81, observes that the Greeks commonly 
bathed before a banquet. This explain in part Socrates' first bath, but 
not his second one. 
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banquet, as the guests praised Eros in false terms.25 As Brentlinger 
has observed, it is significant that Socrates bathes the second time in 
the grove at the Lyceum, adjacent to the Temple of Apollo. 
Brentlinger takes this to mean that Eros is marked not only by 
Dionysian youthfulness, but by a "striving for death," as embodied by 
Apollo. A better interpretation, however, is that the oblique reference 
to Apollo implies that Socrates is absolving himself of any Dionysian 
excess the previous day. 
The ancient Greeks would have been familiar with the concept 
of bath as ritual cleansing. At the Plynteria the Athenian women 
brought the image of Athena to the sea, purified it by washing it, and 
then brought it back to the city. Sometimes, as part of the ceremony, 
murderers and other criminals were allowed to rejoin the community 
after undergoing the same ritual purification as the statue of Athena. 
A ritual bath, moreover, was part of the initiation into the Eleusinian 
mysteries.26 Since the parody of the mysteries27 occurred shortly 
25John A. Brentlinger, "Introduction" to The Symposium of 
Plato, tr. Suzy Q. Groden (University of Massachusetts Press, 1970), 
2. 
26Walter Burkert, Greek Religion (hereafter Burkert, Greek 
Religion), tr. John Rattan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1985), 78-79; See also H. W. Parke, Festivals of the 
Athenians, Aspects of Greek and Roman Life, ed. H. H. Scullard 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1977), 152-153 for the 
Plynteria; 62-63 for the ritual washing in the Eleusinian Mysteries. 
Douglas Stewart, "Socrates' Last Bath," Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 1 O (1972) 253-259, argues that Socrates' bath in the 
Phaedo uses the language of the Orphic mysteries to demonstrate 
that Socrates was hoping to break free from the "Orphic wheel" of life, 
death, and reincarnation. Thus, a religious-philosophical 
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after the dramatic date of the symposium, it is fitting to see in the 
bathing Plato's own appropriation of the Eleusinian mysteries. 
Indeed, such an explanation accords well with Diotima's use of terms 
such as "initiate" and "highest form of the mysteries" (21 Oa1 ).28 
As happens frequently in his works, Plato uses religious 
terminology and actions to make a philosophical point.29 Plato sets 
up the Symposium as an initiation into the mysteries of a demigod. 
Thus, there is ritual purification (Socrates' washing) and abstention 
from sex and drink.30 Moreover, the masses--6 ox.Aos--are not 
understanding of the bath in the Symposium is not without precedent 
in the Platonic corpus. Although the Symposium (and indeed much of 
Plato's writings) are possibly tinged with Orphic language and ideas, 
Plato seems to have the Eleusinian mysteries in mind in this dialogue. 
271n 415 B.C., shortly before the expedition to Sicily left Athens, 
a number of the herms were mutilated. As this crime was 
investigated, it was discovered that in the year leading up to the 
expedition the Mysteries had been parodied--or at least performed 
for unauthorized people. See Thuc., 6.27-29; Andoc. 1. 
28Cf. also the allusion to initiation used by Alcibiades in 218b, as 
Anderson, 120, notes, and Socrates' rebuke to Alcibiades (ovK 
evq>nµfiaets, 214d5), as Mitchell, 181, notes. As a woman and mantic, 
Diotima is the appropriate person to initiate the guests at Agathon's 
party. See Dover, Symposium, 137. 
29Plato refers a number of times to the mysteries ( Cri. 54d, Grg. 
497c, Meno 76e, Phd. 69c, 81a, Phdr. 250b, Resp. 2.378a) and 
sacrifices (Resp. 1.327a, 328c). Yet as Phd. 69c-d indicates, the 
religious phenomena portray in crude fashion profound philosophical 
points. Thus, for example, when Socrates is about to die in the 
Phaedo (117a7-8), he asks that a cock be sacrificed to the god of 
healing, Asclepius; thereby, Plato uses a ritual to make the 
philosophical point that the soul is cured through the death of the 
body. 
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permitted to undergo the full initiation. Diotima initiates Socrates 
(209e5-21Oa1) and he shares his experience with only a handful of 
people. Yet all of this serves a philosophical point, namely, to enable 
the initiates to apprehend the force of Eros on mankind and to discern 
Absolute Beauty. Despite the religious language of the text, the 
encounter that Diotima outlines is not a mystical encounter, but rather 
a process that involves apprehension of sensual beauty and a 
thoughtful discussion of laws and ideas.31 
30Cf. the Antletriae, who had to abstain from sex during the 
Thesmophoria, and the practice of fasting associated with both the 
Eleusinian and Thesmophorian observances. See Parke, 69, 83, 86. 
Turner's anthropological explanation of abstention from sex in 
Ndembu installation rites can be applied to the situation of the 
symposium, since the ties formed by the epaaTns-epwµevos 
relationship resembled those of kinship in force: "[l]n preindustrial 
society, with its strong stress on kinship as the basis of many types of 
group affiliation, sexual continence has additional religious force. For 
kinship, or relations shaped by the kinship, is one of the main factors 
in structural differentiation. The undifferentiated character of 
liminality is reflected by the discontinuance of sexual relations and the 
absence of marked sexual polarity." Victor W. Turner, The Ritual 
Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Chicago: Aldine Publishing 
Company, 1969), 104. 
31 Burkert observes what many later Platonists ignore, namely, 
that Plato is using the metaphor of religion to express a philosophical 
truth. Plato is not necessarily establishing a new cosmology, nor is he 
necessarily advocating a retreat into mysticism. Rather, he uses the 
language of his contemporary Athenian religion to express his 
philosophical concepts. Burkert, Greek Religion, 322-324. In this 
respect, his use of religion parallels his use of "cobblers" and other 
aspects of the culture of his day. Cf. O' Brien, 203-205, for a similar 
analysis. O' Brien, 204, states the case well: "Lest we take the 
mystical form of Dionysus' speech more seriously than the 
philosophical context, we should note that it has its boozy counterpart 
in the speech of Alcibiades." Cf. Allen, 86. 
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The prologue, thus, describes the transition from the ordinary 
world into the mysteries of Eros, while the epilogue returns the reader 
to the ordinary world. But the abstention from wine, sex, and the 
crowd--along with Socrates' ritual bathing--serves a greater purpose 
than to set up the body of the dialogue as an initiation into the 
mysteries of Eros. It not only signals the commencement of a unique 
discussion of Eros, but also facilitates it. As we saw in the last chapter, 
indulgence in sensual beauty can sidetrack one from the pursuit of a 
nobler Beauty. Lower forms of beauty would charm all the guests 
except for the highly self-disciplined Socrates, so that none of them 
would be able to discern--much less discuss--nobler objects of desire. 
Therefore, all objects that would tempt the "inferior'' lovers must be 
removed. 
Alcohol, first of all, must be banished or severely restricted 
since, if the guests were permitted, all but Socrates would lose their 
reason in drink. Pausanias and Aristophanes, being addicted to drink, 
would become drunk once again; they are, after all, able to become 
drunk, even though they are oi 5vvaTc0TaTot Tiivetv (176c2-3). 
Eryximachus and Phaedrus, too, if compelled to drink, would likewise 
fall under the sway of alcohol, though more unwillingly. They cannot 
Anderson, 64, argues that Socrates uses the metaphor of the 
mysteries because he is fully aware that his metaphysical system 
cannot be proved by using his customary epistemological method, 
dialectic. Diotima's Ascent to Beauty reveals an ontological 
understanding of the world that is in a sense derived from the 
dialectical method, but cannot be proved with the certainty that the 
dialectical method demands. Thus, Anderson believes that Plato was 
as aware of the problems of participation of the Forms in the 
Symposium as in the Parmenides. 
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handle alcohol, as they Confess: i)µElS CxEl yap CxOVVOTOl (176C3). 
Only Socrates can drink and be unaffected (176c3-5). With the 
temptation of drunkenness gone, however, the guests can pursue a 
higher form of beauty. As sober men, they can reflect more critically 
on Eros and his place in society. 
Similarly, the removal of the flute-girl prevents the erotic 
attention of the men from focusing on one manifestation of sensual 
beauty. Consequently, the guests can see Eros as the universal force 
that he is. The dismissal of the flute girl, moreover, allows Socrates to 
become the real flautist of the dialogue. As Alcibiades notes, 
Socrates is a real Marsyas, who is able to charm all men by his 
playing (215b3-d1 ). In fact, Socrates is better than Marsyas, since he 
needs no instrument to charm men. His words have such a hypnotic 
effect that Alcibiades finds them irresistible.32 Moreover, Socrates in 
his encomium introduces a flute-girl, a woman who genuinely know all 
about erotic matters (201 d5; 207a5-6)--Diotima.33 Diotima becomes 
the dialogue's expert in love, much as a flute-girl at a symposium 
would have been the "expert" in the art of love. Like Socrates, she 
derives her seductive power from her ability to describe the workings 
32Cf. Mitchell, 188. Friedlander, 3:27, insightfully observes that 
Alcibiades in praising Socrates is at the same time praising Plato, the 
true Marsyas, who is able to have his protagonist (Socrates) say such 
persuasive words. 
33As we argued earlier, p. 48, fn. 5, Diotima is a fictional 
character. Nonetheless, the character Socrates has fashioned his 
fictional teacher to be a woman who knows the workings of Eros 
better than any flute-girl. 
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of Eros. Thus, Socrates--and Diotima speaking through Socrates--
are the real flautists of the dialogue. Hence their rival, the ordinary 
flute girl, must be removed from the symposium. 
As the removal of wine and the flute girl facilitates the discussion 
of Eros, so does the removal of the crowd. The crowd would not only 
have distracted the guests by its indulgence in alcohol and sex, it 
would also have prevented the discussion from being as frank as it is. 
Socrates' pursuit of Beauty appears strange even to a friend like 
Alcibiades (cf. 221c2-3); a crowd would not have given Socrates an 
opportunity to air his views.34 Since the crowd had acclaimed 
Agathon's poetic prowess two days earlier, it would most likely have 
been taken in by Agathon's arguments at the symposium and not 
given Socrates a chance to expound his views. Similarly, Pausanias 
receives a fairer hearing--and is, consequently, more frank about the 
laws of Athens--than he would have been had a crowd been present. 
Even Agathon is perhaps more irreverent to the gods than the 
presence of a crowd would have allowed.35 
The removal of the crowd serves another purpose. It shows 
that no act of hubris is committed until the crowd bursts in. The 
ancient reader would have expected the symposium at Agathon's 
house to have been a hubristic party for two reasons. First, 
Phaedrus, Eryximachus, and Alcibiades were present; these men 
34oover, Symposium, 4-5. 
35see Dorter, 218, who demonstrates that Pausanias' views 
are an attack on Athenian legal conventions of the day. 
196 
were all implicated in the mutilation of the herms the next year (415 
B.C.). Second, the symposium is set only one year before the 
mutilation of the herms; it was during this year that the Eleusinian 
mysteries were parodied in the course of a party.36 Thus, because of 
the guests and the setting of the symposium, the ancient reader 
would have expected that the symposium had either parodied the 
mysteries or performed some other hubristic action that would 
ultimately have led to the mutilation of the herms in the following year. 
Neither event occurs. 
To be sure, there are some allusions to these events of 416 and 
415 BC. Employing a term used to describe, among other things, the 
parodying of the mysteries (ecp' v[3pEl, Thucydides 6.28.2), Alcibiades 
and Agathon say that Socrates has been hubristic in his treatment of 
them (v[3ptOTfJS ET, 175e7; EllTOV a µE v[3ptOEV, 222a8). Socrates, 
moreover, employs the terminology of the mysteries in his speech: 
Socrates is an initiate but may not be able to understand the full 
import of the mystery rites (209e5-21 Oa3). The ascent to Beauty is 
described as culminating in the sight of Absolute Beauty, much as the 
highlight of the mysteries would be the observing of the ETIOTITtK6: 
(210a1 ). 
Nonetheless, employing vocabulary similar to that employed by 
the mysteries is not exactly the same as parodying them. Although 
361t may be more accurate to say that the Mysteries were 
parodied not so much by substituting mocking words for the rttuals of 
the mysteries as by performing the rituals in front of some uninitiated 
people. See Murray, 155-156. 
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Socrates does in a sense "initiate" the guests into his understanding 
of Eros, he does not use the rituals normally associated with the 
mysteries. Nor does Socrates have the guests act out the mysteries, 
as those who parodied them did. 37 The reference to the mysteries 
remains words and fairly generic words at that: Thus, although the 
words v'3ptcrTfis and v'3p(setv can be used to denote the parodying of 
mysteries, they can also denote any insolent behavior against man 
and god alike.38 Had Socrates used the words of the liturgy of the 
mysteries, substituting Eros for Demeter in the appropriate places, he 
would have been guilty of parodying the mysteries. But there is no 
indication that he did so, for then Plato's contemporaries would have 
charged him with parodying the mysteries in his Symposium.39 
37 Andoc. 1.11 : , AAKl'3lCx0f)V OE TOV OTPOTilYOV CXTTOOEl~C.U vµ'lv 
Ta µvcrTf)pta TTOtoOvTa ev oiK(~ µe8' ETEpc.uv. 
38LSJ, s.v. v'3p(sc.u and v'3ptcrTfis, 1841. Although we have few 
examples of a ypacpn v'3pec.us, it is a much discussed charge among 
the orators. An act of v'3pts was not necessarily an offense against 
the gods or religion, but "the core concept of hubris is to be found 
either in the psychology of the attacker, as one who misuses his 
strength, or else (perhaps better) in the sociology of his victim, such 
that hubris is an action which intentionally causes damage to the time 
(honour) of the person suffering it." See S.C. Todd, The Shape of 
Athenian Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 107, 270-271, 379~ 
380. 
39When Aeschylus accidentally used a number of the same 
words employed by the mysteries in one of his plays, he was taken to 
court. Though he was ultimately acquitted, the lawsuit demonstrates 
that an ancient Greek had to be careful in his choice of words. 
Certainly, Plato would have been brought to court, had his 
Symposium been thought to parody the mysteries outright. 
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Thus, although the guests at the symposium frequently employ the 
metaphor and terminology of the mysteries, there is no parody of 
them. 
Thus, there was neither sacrilege at Agathon's party nor a plot 
to undertake a hubristic action such as the mutilation of the herms. 
Although there is an anti-democratic and hubristic tone to the 
dialogue, its hubris is more subtle. Some of the notions espoused by 
the guests (particularly Pausanias) may offend the conventions of 
Athenian democracy, but the dialogue as a whole is not as blatantly 
hubristic as the parody of the mysteries and the mutilation of the 
herms were. 
In fact, the party does not become wild until after the crowd 
enters in the epilogue. The crowd distracts the guests from the 
pursuit from Absolute Beauty, for the crowd brings in the other 
elements (flute girl and wine) that had been excluded from the party in 
the prologue. Thus, Socrates' emphasis that the pursuit of Absolute 
Beauty is a solitary one receives confirmation. Though he can 
discuss Beauty and Eros with a small group of guests, he cannot 
describe to his host the vision of Absolute Beauty he saw on the way 
to the symposium (175d3-7). To pursue Beauty, Socrates must 
usually keep his distance from the crowd (174a7); he is unkempt and 
lacking social graces. When he does interact with the crowd, it is 
usually to reveal their ignorance by interrogating them.40 
40cf. Ap. 21 c-23b, as well as Socrates' behavior in questioning 
Euthrypho in Euthyphro. Although Euthyphro is the only individual 
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Thus, all of the guests are at their best during the body of the 
dialogue. Since, moreover, the prologue and epilogue allow elements 
forbidden through most of the dialogue, the guests appear at their 
worst in these portions of the dialogue. For example, in the prologue 
Pausanias and Aristophanes are recovering from their 
overindulgence in alcohol the night before. Consequently, in the 
prologue they discuss only their drunken condition (176a5-b4). But in 
the body of the dialogue they develop encomia that expound a logical 
argument with some flair and literary grace. In the epilogue, they get 
swept away by the party, which no longer permits orderly drinking 
(223b5-6). Presumably, Pausanias falls into a drunken sleep 
(223c3}, while Aristophanes stays up drinking with Socrates and 
Agathon (223c4-5). 
There is good reason, therefore, that the symposium banishes 
the crowd along with the flute-girl and wine for most of the dialogue. 
But why should these elements be reintroduced? If they were so 
counterproductive to the working of Eros--or at least the nobler 
working of Eros--why should these items be reintroduced once they 
have been banished? 
First, the reintroduction of the removed items calls attention to 
them. If by chance the reader missed seeing any significance to their 
banishment in the prologue, their reintroduction in the epilogue gives 
him another chance to consider why they have been absent for most 
with whom Socrates speaks, he exemplifies the sort of attitudes that 
lay behind Socrates' accusers in the Apology. 
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of the dialogue. In this way, the epilogue confirms the significance of 
the drama of the prologue. 
More importantly, the reintroduction of the banished elements 
returns the symposium to reality. After all, it is fine to theorize about 
the effects of Eros, but any theory about Eros must face up to the real 
world. Although the surreal environment of the symposium is an 
attractive and even necessary setting in which to consider Eros, it 
cannot be expected to continue indefinitely. Sooner or later, 
distracting elements from the real world will enter and the theories of 
Eros espoused by the guests will have to be tested by reality.41 
Not all of the guests can handle the real world, as the epilogue 
reveals. Phaedrus and Eryximachus leave shortly after the unruly 
crowd enters (223b6-8). Indeed, Eryximachus can scarcely bear 
Alcibiades' heavy drinking (215b9-c1 ). Given Eryximachus' 
opposition to indulgence in wine as stated in the prologue (175c5-d4), 
his reaction in the epilogue is not surprising.42 Meanwhile, 
Pausanias either leaves, being one of the unnamed others to depart 
41 As Turner, 129, has observed, a healthy society needs both 
the "immediacy of communitas" and the "mediacy of structure." 
Communitas emerges as people of disparate backgrounds undergo 
an initiation together and are forced to recognize their common 
humanity. 
42Anderson, 39, insightfully observes that Eryximachus can be 
influenced by alcohol as much as the other guests: "Although it is 
hard to see a self-centered pedant--especially a pompous one like 
Eryximakhos--out desecrating herms, it is not difficult to see Phaidros, 
drunk, persuaded by Alkibiades, and in turn persuading a drunken 
Eryximakhos that so long as they do not get caught there should be 
no problem." 
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(aAAovs Ttvas, 223b7), or remains silent at the party. His departure 
or silence is not surprising; despite his fondness for drink, his views on 
Eros are too unconventional to find much approval among the crowd. 
Aristodemus stays, but sleeps for most of the night (223b8-c1 ). Since 
he is one of the soberer individuals (176c2) yet cannot depart from his 
teacher Socrates, he finds his retreat from the symposium in sleep. 
None of these men can handle the erotic pursuit of Beauty amid the 
distractions of symposiastic elements. 43 
The only people to stay at the party and to stay alert are 
Socrates, Aristophanes, and Agathon. They are all drinking (223c4-
5), as may be expected from the descriptions of them in the prologue 
(176c2-5), but Socrates is the one in control of the situation. Although 
Agathon and Aristophanes are the two guests who should know the 
most about poetry, Socrates is teaching them about their craft, not 
they him (223c6-d6).44 
Thus, Socrates alone is able to face the real world and maintain 
his theory of Eros. He neither flees from symposiastic reality by 
leaving (as do Eryximachus and Phaedrus) nor flees from it in sleep 
(as does Aristodemus), nor indulges in it while losing control of his 
faculties (as do Aristophanes and Agathon). Why? To Socrates, 
even drink, beautiful flute-girls, and the hubbub of the crowd contain 
43Mitchell, 222, suggests--not unreasonably, though without 
conclusive proof--that Alcibiades leaves before the revellers come in. 
Indeed, the door left open by Alcibiades, Dionysus incarnate (cf. 
Anderson, 101 ), allows the drunken revelers to enter. 
44Cf. Anderson, 15. 
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the beginnings of the erotic process. They can lead to Beauty, even if 
they are not themselves the final goal of Eros. Though some people 
may despise these elements and others be seduced by them, 
Socrates uses them to accomplish his purpose. He prevents himself 
from being mastered by them and instead makes them lead him to 
Absolute Beauty. 
Thus, the reintroduction of the banished elements supports 
Eryximachus' claim that Socrates can indulge or refrain from 
indulging (176c3-5). In either case, Socrates uses the better 
elements in his environment to pursue Absolute Beauty while 
avoiding being seduced by the baser elements. Although the other 
guests must have these elements removed so that they can get a 
glimpse of Absolute Beauty through hearing Socrates' speech, he has 
no such need. For he is the unique guest at Agathon's symposium. 
Socrates. the Man Who Best Reflects 
the Unigueness of Agathon's Symposium 
So far, we have seen that Agathon's symposium is unique and 
that its uniqueness allows its participants to investigate Eros on a 
higher plane than would otherwise be possible. That uniqueness is 
best embodied in Socrates, whom we saw in the third chapter to be 
the best representation of Eros in the dialogue. Although we have 
already seen how the prologue portrays the erotic qualities of 
Socrates, it will be helpful to examine how the epilogue confirms this 
portrait. In this section, therefore, we will explore how Alcibiades' 
characterization of Socrates accords well with his behavior in the 
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prologue. For Alcibiades spends most of his speech describing the 
unusual behavior of Socrates, which reflects the latter's unusual 
views of Eros. And since the extraordinary circumstances of 
Agathon's symposium suit Socrates so well, Alcibiades' comments 
about Socrates highlight the unusual features of the symposium. 
Alcibiades' speech confirms the prologue's allusion to Socrates' 
cptAepaaTia. This is significant, for the dialogue as a whole evaluates 
Socrates' claim to erotic knowledge.45 In the prologue, Socrates 
claims that the only thing he knows is Ta Epc.uTtKa (177d7-8}. This is 
no idle boast, the epilogue reveals, for Alcibiades fears Socrates' 
<ptAepaaTia. Alcibiades claims that Socrates is so ruled by Eros (and 
thus knowledgeable in matters pertaining to him) that Socrates 
becomes intensely jealous and cannot keep his hands to himself, if 
one of his beloveds should praise anyone but himself (214d2-4}. 
Not surprisingly, then, Socrates ends up seated beside 
handsome men in both the prologue and the epilogue. In the 
prologue, Agathon invites him to sit next to him on his couch. 
Presumably, the only people to share a couch are Socrates and 
45Krischer, 53-55 argues that usually the last person to speak 
in a contest of speeches is the winner. If the Symposium is such a 
contest--and not everyone agrees that it is--then Alcibiades, not 
Socrates, would be the winner. Yet, as Krischer rightly argues, 
Alcibiades' speech confirms Socrates' victory--something that 
Socrates could not do without being rude. Thus, Socrates' speech is 
to be taken as the fullest explanation of Eros in the dialogue; 
Alcibiades' speech evaluates and confirms that claim. Nussbaum, 
166-167, has also argues that Alcibiades' speech causes the reader 
of the Symposium to re-evaluate the truth of Diotima's radical notions 
of Eros. Thus, for Nussbaum, Alcibiades refutes--not confirms--the 
arguments of Socrates. 
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Agathon (175c6-8), and Aristodemus and Eryximachus (175a4-5); 
Alcibiades' remark about a "third" person being present on Agathon's 
couch implies that the guests were generally each sitting one to a 
couch.46 Thus, Socrates is granted the privilege of sitting next to a 
handsome man, something none of the other guests is permitted. 
(Eryximachus is not so privileged by having Aristodemus seated next 
to him: Aristodemus is aµtKp6s and apes Socrates' anti-social 
behavior, including the custom of walking shoeless; while Socrates 
improved his appearance for the occasion, Aristodemus did not have 
the opportunity to do so.) In the epilogue, Socrates again sits next to 
a handsome man, Alcibiades. When Alcibiades has completed his 
speech, Agathon moves to the other side of Socrates, so that 
Socrates has Alcibiades on his left and Agathon on his right. Socrates 
ends up getting the seating arrangement he prefers, while Alcibiades 
cannot, his first choice being the current arrangement (Agathon-
Alcibiades-Socrates) and his second choice the arrangement with 
Agathon in the middle (Alcibiades-Agathon-Socrates).47 
Despite Socrates' fascination with beauty, however, he does not 
act as a typical lover. In fact, he makes the beloveds take the more 
46For a fuller discussion, see von Blanckenhagen, 55, who 
argues that only young men or a man and his young lover would sit at 
the same couch. 
4 71t is Socrates who determines the seating order at the end of 
the dialogue; in the prologue, however, it is determined by Agathon. 
Nonetheless, Alcibiades credits Socrates with the ability of always 
finagling a seat next to a handsome youth (213c2-5). To the degree 
that Socrates' stature as an intellectual has charmed Agathon, 
Socrates deserves credit for the seating arrangement in the prologue. 
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aggressive role, in effect making his beloveds lovers.48 Thus, in the 
prologue Aristodemus is called a lover (EpaaTi]s, 173b3) of Socrates, 
even though Aristodemus' youth ought to have made him an 
Epc.0µevos. Similarly, it is Agathon, not Socrates, who determines that 
the two will share a couch (175c6-8). Although Socrates is not 
displeased with the results, Agathon is the one who takes the 
initiative. 
In the epilogue, Alcibiades reiterates the point that Socrates 
forces his beloveds to invert the roles with him. Socrates refuses to 
capitalize on any opportunity that an aristocratic Athenian would have: 
He is unmoved by physical beauty, wealth, and reputation (216d7-
e2); he makes no amorous advances when alone with Alcibiades 
(217b3-7), nor does he make an improper move while wrestling with 
him (217b7-c4). Even when dining alone (217c7-d6) or sharing the 
same bed (219b4-d2), Socrates does not take advantage of the 
48Nussbaum, 165-199, and Vlastos, 30-34, have criticized 
Plato speaking in the voice of Diotima/Socrates for promoting a form 
of love that overlooks the individual to pursue an abstract beauty. For 
this reason, Nussbaum, views Alcibiades' speech as a commentary 
on the implausibility of such love. Nye defends Diotima by noting that 
a healthy relationship between lovers demands that they love not only 
each other's bodies, but also their lover's friends, family, and ideas. 
See Nye, "Diotima," 143-145. Donald Levy, "The Definition of Love in 
Plato's Symposium," Journal of the History of Ideas 40 (1979) 286-
287, defends Diotima's view of love by arguing that it may have more 
to do with love as it is rather than love as it ought to be. Moreover, if 
love inculcates virtue, there must be some concern for others. Levy 
has a point, but Alcibiades' speech does not bear him out, since 
Socrates is hardly successful at inculcating virtue in him. 
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situation. No matter how hard Alcibiades attempts to seduce 
Socrates, he cannot get him to yield. 
Alcibiades, moreover, as the epilogue reveals, is not the only 
lover to suffer such mistreatment from Socrates. Charmides, the son 
of Glaucon, Euthydemus, the son of Diocles, and countless others 
have experienced similar treatment by Socrates (222a8-b3). With 
some justification, Alcibiades avers that all the guests at the 
symposium have been bitten by affection for Socrates and, 
consequently, experienced Socrates' unique manner of 
demonstrating his love (218a7-b3). Thus, Alcibiades' speech in the 
epilogue demonstrates that Socrates' treatment of Agathon in the 
prologue is not unusuat.49 
Nonetheless, Socrates' epwµEvoL admire him and pursue him 
who does not pursue them in the ordinary way. This erotic effect of 
Socrates on his beloveds can only be termed madness. Thus, 
Alcbiades refers to "the madness and frenzy of his philosophy" 
(218b3-4).50 This madness is especially visible in Apollodorus, who 
asks his friends (173e1 -3), "Friend, am I clearly so disposed 
concerning myself and you that I am crazy and have lost my wits?"51 
49Belfiore, 148, notes the similarity between Alcibiades' 
situation and Agathon's. She sees Alcibiades' speech as a warning to 
Agathon. 
50-rfts cptAoa6cpov µovios TE KOL (3oKxEios. 
51.,.W cpiAToTE, KOL SfjA6v yE Sf) oTL ovTw OLovoovµEvos KOL 
'' - \ \C - I \ I TTEpL EµaVTOV KOL TTEpL vµwv µOLVOµOL KOL TTOpaTTOLVJ; 
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Though his friends avoid answering the question by calling his 
attention back to the task of narrating the dialogue, Apollodorus has 
guessed correctly: He is indeed mad and his madness comes from 
Socrates, the only man against whom he does not rail (173d4-10).52 
Because of their madness, Socrates' beloveds become volatile. 
Their attachment to philosophy becomes emotional, since erotic 
pursuits are not conducted entirely in a calm, rational manner. Thus, 
Apollodorus is overjoyed whenever he engages in philosophy, 
whether or not it benefits him in any way {173c2-5). And Alcibiades 
emphasizes primarily the seductive quality of Socrates' words rather 
than their content (215d3-216c3). Because of their emotional 
attachment to Socrates, his lovers imitate even the most minute of his 
quirks, such as his shoelessness (173b2). 
Yet their emotional volatility--a volatility difficult to avoid when in 
the presence of an Eros-like man so valiant in the pursuit of Beauty--is 
ultimately their undoing. By the time of the retelling of the dialogue (a 
dozen years after the symposium), Aristodemus is doubtlessly no 
longer a pupil of Socrates, even though he is still alive.53 Had he still 
52 De Vries, 68-69, has noted the connection between 
Alcibiades' and Apollodorus' praise of Socrates. Both direct irony 
against Plato the philosopher: Alcibiades, by consciously using irony 
to praise Socrates (and, thus, his pupil Plato); Apollodorus, by his 
fanaticism, demonstrates the same characteristics Alcibiades 
criticizes in Socrates. 
53Apparently, Aristodemus had told a few details about the 
story to Phoenix and one of Glaucon's friends had overheard the 
conversation. Then, the friend told Glaucon, giving him the 
impression that the symposium had happened recently, since he had 
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been interested in Socrates, he could have narrated the dialogue or 
Apollodorus could have referred Glaucon to him for an account of the 
symposium. But as Apollodorus describes him, Aristodemus was one 
of Socrates' lovers at the time of the symposium (Twv TOTE, 173b3-
4). Similarly, Socrates' influence on Alcibiades has also diminished by 
the time of the symposium. No longer is he in any sense a pupil of 
Socrates; though he is very much in love with Socrates (222c1-3), he 
cannot bring himself to follow him. 
The explanation for the volatility of Socrates' lovers lies chiefly in 
that, as much as they admire him, they cannot help feeling wronged 
by him. Agathon and Alcibiades have both been snubbed as Socrates 
pursues a more ethereal Beauty rather than concentrate only on 
them at their banquets (175a7-c6; 217c7-219b2). To both, Socrates 
has spoken elpc.vvtKws. Thus, both men threaten to bring charges 
against Socrates. They employ legal language to make their point: 
Agathon (175e6-9) says that he will go to court (otaotKaa6µe8a) 
concerning whose wisdom is greater; he will use Dionysus as his 
judge (otKaaTij).54 Alcibiades calls his audience jurors (avopes 
otKaaTa[, 219c5) because they are actually serving as judges of 
Socrates' arrogance (219c6-7). In effect, Alcibiades in the epilogue 
only heard Aristodemus and Phoenix talking about it recently. From 
this we can assume that Aristodemus was still alive when Apollodorus 
narrated the symposium to Glaucon. 
54A otaotKaa[a occurred when two parties made claim to the 
right to a certain property. Since neither of them was in possession of 
the property at the time, one of the disputants could not serve as a 
prosecutor and the other as a defendant. Instead, the dispute was 
seen as one between equals. See Todd, 119-120. 
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takes up where Agathon leaves off in the prologue. There Agathon 
states his desire to bring Socrates to trial, but his wish is carried out by 
Alcibiades. 55 
A paradox emerges: Socrates loves beautiful young men and 
they in turn are devoted to him, but Socrates' behavior ultimately 
turns them against him. Agathon and Alcibiades love Socrates, yet 
both profess a desire to take revenge on him for his hubristic 
treatment of them. No matter how jokingly or gently these criticisms 
are made, they are nonetheless reproaches leveled against Socrates 
and his concept of proper erotic behavior. 
Why, then, does Plato portray Socrates' lovers in this way? 
First, this portrayal defends Socrates against the charge of corrupting 
the youth. Alcibiades and Agathon have attempted to seduce him, not 
he them. If Alcibiades is to any degree culpable for the downfall of 
Athens, Socrates is in no way to blame. In fact, Socrates is portrayed 
as having a greater effect on restraining Alcibiades than Pericles and 
the other statesmen (215e4-216a2) Thus, the Symposium--and 
Plato's portrayal of Socrates' lovers in it--serves as an apology for the 
character of Socrates. 
More importantly, the behavior of Socrates' lovers highlights the 
contrast between their behavior and Socrates'. Alcibiades, for 
55oover, 166, insightfully notes that "the usual hybris of satyrs 
is sexual assault," but the hubris of the satyr Socrates lies in his 
refusal to gratify his sexual desires. But, as Allen, 104-108, observes, 
Alcibiades, not Socrates, is guilty of hubris. Alcibiades loves an 
eH5c.uAov, not Beauty itself. This leaves him as divided and torn 
asunder as the statues to which he alludes in his speech. 
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example, approaches love from a traditional understanding, namely, 
that a lover should pursue a beloved with a beautiful body and then 
seduce him. But Socrates rejects that type of love and refuses to 
pretend that a lover is giving a beloved "wisdom" or some other virtue, 
when in reality the lover is simply gratifying his sexual urges. To be 
sure, this view of Eros does not satisfy Alcibiades. Consequently, no 
matter how much he admires Socrates, he cannot bring himself to 
follow him. 
Thus, a distinction is made between those who have seen 
Absolute Beauty and those who admire or mimic the behavior of 
people who have. Both Alcibiades and Aristodemus have watched 
Socrates entranced as he ascends to Beauty. Alcibiades finds it 
partially an amusement (220c1-d5); Agathon, a distraction (175a10-
11 ); and Aristodemus, an oddity best ignored (175b1-3). But they 
remain observers from the outside and never experience Absolute 
Beauty themselves. As such, they cannot comprehend what Socrates 
has experienced.56 
This contrast between the behavior of Socrates' professed 
lovers and Socrates himself underscores Socrates' <pt:AEpaaT[a. 
56Warner, 161: Alcibiades "provides, as it were, an account of 
[Socrates' activity] from the perspective of the Cave-dwellers--which 
is, of course, that of the readers of the dialogues, ourselves." From a 
different perspective, Nussbaum, 198-199, argues that in the 
Symposium Plato offers two visions of love: the abstract (expounded 
by Socrates) and the particular (expounded by Alcibiades). One 
cannot mix the two, adding love of a particular beloved with Absolute 
Beauty, as Alcibiades wants. One must choose one vision of love or 
the other. Thus, the two kinds of lovers are ultimately unable to 
communicate his or her view of love to the other. 
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Socrates is unique among the guests at the symposium in his 
understanding of what Ta epwTtK6: is. Because this understanding is 
more cognizant of a greater Beauty, Socrates' uniqueness is to be 
praised. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen that the symposium in and of itself 
was an erotic event. Usually, the presence of Eros was seen in the 
indulgence in wine, women, and song that characterized a 
symposium. Agathon's symposium, however, takes on a different 
character. It is an improvement on the typical symposium, since the 
banishment of wine, the flute-girl, and a large crowd allows for the 
manifestation of Eros in a nobler manner. Nonetheless, the unusual 
character of the symposium cannot continue indefinitely. In the 
epilogue, the forbidden elements return and most of the guests are 
overcome by them. The vision of Eros espoused by Socrates recedes 
as the baser erotic forces of the symposium take over. Only Socrates, 
who has seen a glimpse of Absolute Beauty, remains unaffected. 
Since Socrates' <ptAepaaTia is unique, it is implicitly and 
explicitly analyzed and criticized in the prologue and the epilogue, 
especially by Agathon and Alcibiades. Although Socrates cannot lead 
Alcibiades, who equates the work of Eros with seduction, to 
understand where true Beauty lies, Socrates' perception of Eros is 
shown to be superior to that of Alcibiades. The prologue and epilogue 
reveal that, though everyone cannot understand the proper role and 
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object of Eros, the attentive reader can see a glimpse of Eros at work 
by looking at Socrates. 
These two parts of the dialogue, then, serve an important 
function, when considered together. They set up the body of the 
dialogue to reflect conditions that best suit Socrates, where he can 
get a fair hearing from the guests. At the same time, these portions of 
the dialogue evaluate Socrates' claims by demonstrating that 
Socrates alone is able to keep to the pursuit of Absolute Beauty, as he 
lives in the real world. 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
Why did Plato write a dramatic prologue for his Symposium? 
How is the prologue related to the rest of the dialogue, especially to 
the philosophical content of the dialogue? These are the questions 
that I set out to investigate in this dissertation. In the first chapter, I 
rejected an all too common approach to the dialogue, namely, to 
ignore the prologue and turn immediately to Phaedrus' speech. I 
argued that it would be a poor way to explicate the Symposium to 
ignore six Stephanus pages, or roughly a tenth of the total dialogue. 
Likewise, I refused merely to comment on the "dramatic charm" or 
"literary grace" of the prologue, while ignoring its philosophical import, 
as many scholars have done. If the prologue is at all relevant to the 
dialogue, it must be worthy of being treated in the same earnest as 
the body of the dialogue. 
In making this assumption, I have followed the premises of the 
dramatic approach to Plato This approach emphasizes that Plato did 
not write philosophical treatises, but dialogues that deal with 
philosophical issues. Although his dialogues contain philosophical 
propositions and arguments, the dialogues are not exclusively a 
collection of such elements, as one might expect to find in a treatise. 
Instead, they are real life conversations with intellectuals who have 
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not yet turned philosophy into an academic specialty. Since a major 
portion of the Greek intellectual life was found in poetry and the 
theater, an ancient Greek would not have separated drama from 
philosophy. Therefore, we did not come to the Symposium with the 
preconception that the "dramatic" elements could have no bearing on 
the "philosophical" or vice versa. Rather, we have assumed that the 
drama of the dialogue colored the philosophical discussion, as well as 
illustrated how a particular philosophical truth accorded with the 
observed phenomena of real life. 
Therefore, we set out to draw connections between the 
prologue and the body of the dialogue. We were not looking for the 
connections to demonstrate that Plato had the ability to craft a 
masterfully intricate dialogue--that point has been granted by nearly 
all scholars of Plato. Instead, we set out to investigate how the 
dramatic action in the prologue and the philosophical discussion in 
the body of the dialogue were designed to supplement each other. 
Some of the dramatic elements in the prologue are easily 
recognized as necessary for the development of the dialogue and its 
philosophy. Eryximachus' speech, which urges the assembled guests 
to discuss Eros (177a2-d5), sets the stage for the rest of the dialogue. 
It introduces the topic and prepares the reader to expect a series of 
speeches rather than the give-and-take of Socratic eAeyxos. By and 
large, these expectations are fulfilled in the body of the dialogue. Of 
course, Plato could have set up his work differently. He could have 
written a treatise on Eros, possibly alluding to a half dozen different 
views on the subject and then arguing for the view that he embraced. 
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This, however, was not the method he chose. He chose to put the 
expositions of different views of Eros into the mouths of certain 
characters. 
This method has a certain advantage: Rather than treat 
arguments in the abstract, Plato lets the characters of the dialogue 
argue as eloquently as possible for their view. This method means, 
however, that Plato not only had to introduce the topic of the dialogue, 
but the characters who would argue it. A well developed prologue 
became necessary in order to give the background information of the 
dialogue so that the arguments of the guests will not come from 
"straw men." As we saw in the third chapter, Plato introduces the 
reader to the characters in the prologue. Without doubt, Plato built on 
whatever impression of the characters his audience would have had. 
In the prologue, however, Socrates emphasizes those particular traits 
that would have some bearing on the dialogue. For example, 
Pausanias may have been better known to Plato's contemporaries 
than to us, but the only trait of Pausanias Plato reveals in the prologue 
is that Pausanias has drunk to excess on the previous night. For the 
purposes of the dialogue, this aspect of Pausanias' moral character is 
most important. To evaluate Pausanias' speech, one must know that 
it is spoken by a person who indulges in sensual pleasure. 
Behind every action of a character is an implicit theory of Eros 
and Beauty. The behavior of the characters in the prologue is 
predicated upon their particular understanding of what true Beauty is 
and how one ought to pursue it. Indeed, not only the actions and 
personality of the characters, but also the very words of the prologue 
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reflect particular views about Eros. As we discovered in the fourth 
chapter, the prologue is filled with words that have "erotic" overtones, 
which gain meaning as one progresses through the body of the 
dialogue. Ordinary words in the prologue are recalled in a new light, 
when those same words are used later in the dialogue to describe 
Eros, Beauty and other matters of philosophical import. Thus, even 
simple actions and words can reflect Eros' effect on an individual and 
that individual's perception of Eros and Beauty. 
Furthermore, as we discovered in the fifth chapter, the 
symposium itself manifests a peculiar understanding of Eros--one 
that accords best with Socrates' intentions for the symposium. 
Agathon's party is a symposium, but without the usual characteristics 
of a symposium. There is no indulgence in drink and flute-girls, but in 
encomia. Instead of pursuing objects of physical beauty, the crowd 
talks about Beauty and the desire for Beauty. Although no guest 
obtains lasting possession of Absolute Beauty, Socrates uses the 
symposium to encourage the other guests--and the reader--to see 
how to pursue Absolute Beauty in the best manner. For those who, 
like Socrates, have gotten a glimpse of Absolute Beauty are unable to 
be seduced by the elements reintroduced in the epilogue. 
The thesis of Socrates is two-fold: all men are lovers of Beauty, 
but not all men pursue Beauty in the proper way. Not only has this 
truth been demonstrated by the setting of the symposium and by the 
behavior and vocabulary of the guests, but it is also proved in the 
seemingly least germane part of the dialogue, the ApoUodoran 
prologue. As we saw in the second chapter, Glaucon and 
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Apollodorus' friends are interested in hearing the dialogue and 
Apollodorus is glad to tell it because they all desire a glimpse of 
Beauty. Although narration, especially of events not experienced 
first-hand, is open to distortion, it runs the same risk Eros does. Eros 
flourishes one minute and loses his life in the next one, then quickly 
comes back to life again. He is sometimes wealthy, sometimes poor. 
Thus, he is a perfect metaphor for the process of narration. 
Sometimes a narrative is able to relate the facts without 
embellishment or omission; other times narration fails to give an 
accurate summary of the dialogue. Thus, inasmuch as the 
Symposium is a narrated dialogue, it reminds the reader of the 
exhilaration and the pitfalls of the search for Beauty. 
As we have examined the connections between the prologue 
and the philosophy of Eros espoused in the dialogue, we have 
frequently observed that the phenomena of the prologue are best 
explained by Socrates' encomium of Eros. This is not to say that 
Socrates' views are entirely consistent or without their difficulties, 
when applied to real life. Nor is this to say that Socrates posits a 
positive doctrine, when he says he knows all about Eros. If any truth 
can be learned from his speech, it is this: Humans lack permanent 
possession of beauty, especially Absolute Beauty; the best that 
people can do is to understand their lack and to pursue Beauty in the 
most productive way. 
This view is the most comprehensive of all those espoused by 
the guests. While some of the guests equate Eros with sexual 
gratification or avoid the topic of sex, Socrates incorporates both a 
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sexual and an asexual understanding of Eros in his encomium. 
Although he will argue that the highest form of Eros is that of an 
intangible, invisible Absolute Beauty, he will not deny the value of 
pursuing other manifestations of beauty. Thus, his views of Eros are 
at the same time the most realistic of those proposed by the guests 
and the most idealizing. He does not etherialize Eros by denying the 
corporeal objects of Eros; he grants that those who love beautiful 
bodies are legitimately called lovers. Nonetheless, he establishes a 
hierarchy of values that encourages the reader to transcend physical 
beauty and pursue the beauty that does not fade as time passes. 
Plato, therefore, through Socrates encourages the reader to 
see Eros at work in the drama of the characters, but he also asks the 
reader to evaluate the drama through philosophy. Thus, we cannot 
separate the dramatic and the philosophical. The philosophy of the 
dialogue gives us insights into the drama of the prologue, while the 
drama of the prologue evaluates the merits of the dialogue's 
philosophy. There can be no better method to study the works of the 
man best known for advocating the "examined life." 
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